Defaults in update semantics

The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.     

Nudges and signposts: The effect of smart defaults and pictographic risk information on retirement saving investment choices

The authors tested two interventions to improve retirement savings investment decisions. In an incentive‐compatible experiment, 459 participants engaged in a task simulating their working life. Periodically during the simulation, participants chose between different investment options. The authors examined the effectiveness of a “nudge” by manipulating the default option and the effectiveness of a “signpost” by manipulating the display of a pictograph summarizing the expected return of each option. Participants often followed the default option, particularly when it was “smart” (i.e., became more conservative as retirement approached) and when presented together with dynamic pictographs (i.e., updated each year assuming the investment was held until retirement). Those most likely to make optimal choices (i.e., consistent with the life cycle model) were presented with a smart default or dynamic pictographs. These findings reveal how different choice architecture interventions can be used to positively influence behavior. Retirement funds and regulators can support retirement savings decisions by the provision of smart defaults and better risk information in the form of pictographs.     

Speaking Your Mind: Large Inarticulateness Constitutional and Circumstantial

When someone is asked to speak his mind, it is sometimes possible for him to furnish what his utterance appears to have omitted. In such cases we might say that he had a mind to speak. Sometimes, however, the opposite is true. Asked to speak his mind, our speaker finds that he has no mind to speak. When it is possible to speak one's mind and when not is largely determined by the kinds of beings we are and by the kinds of resources we are able to draw upon. In either case, not speaking one's mind is leaving something out whose articulation would or could matter for the purposes for which one was speaking in the first place. Inarticulation is no fleetingly contingent and peripheral phenomenon in human thinking and discourse. It is a substantial and dominant commonplace. In Part One I attempt to say something about what it is about the human agent that makes inarticulateness so rife. In Part Two, I consider various strategies for making the unarticulated explicit, and certain constraints on such processes. I shall suggest, among other things, that standard treatments of enthymematic reconstruction are fundamentally misconceived.