A preliminary sketch of a Jungian socioanalysis – an emerging theory combining analytical psychology,complexity theories,sociological theories,socio- and psycho-analysis,group analysis and affect theories1

This paper presents a preliminary sketch of what we have termed a Jungian socioanalysis – an emerging theory combining analytical psychology, complexity theories, sociological theories, socio- and psycho-analysis, group analysis and affect theories. Our assumption is that Jungian theory and practice need to attend to and focus more on social contexts, sociality and the influence of societal developments. But also, on the other hand, that analytical psychology, primarily Jung’s theory of individuation and the transcendent function as well as the broad complexity perspective of his theory of psyche, can be extended to a ‘socio’ and not just a ‘psycho’ perspective. The paper presents five foundational assumptions for a Jungian socioanalysis, with the following headings: 1) A Jungian socioanalysis calls for a complex psychology; 2) (Un)consciousness is social and sociality has a dimension of (un)consciousness; 3) A Jungian socioanalysis explores social fields ‘from within’ by smaller groups; 4) A Jungian socioanalysis enables and is enabled by emerging metaphors and affect-imagery; 5) Socio-cultural fields have an impulse toward individuation. This is the first of two papers in the present edition of the journal – the second paper gives socio-clinical illustrations of our thesis in this paper.     

On matters of mind and body: regarding Descartes

In this paper the author considers Descartes’ place in current thinking about the mind‐body dilemma. The premise here is that in the history of ideas, the questions posed can be as significant as the answers acquired. Descartes’ paramount question was ‘How do we determine certainty?’ and his pursuit of an answer led to cogito ergo sum. His discovery simultaneously raised the question whether mind is separate from or unified with the body. Some who currently hold that brain and subjectivity are unified contend that the philosopher ‘split’ mind from body and refer to ‘Descartes’ error’. This paper puts forward that Descartes’ detractors fail to recognise Descartes’ contribution to Western thought, which was to introduce the Enlightenment and to give a place to human subjectivity. Added to this, evidence from Descartes’ correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia supports the conclusion that Descartes did in fact believe in the unity of mind and body although he could not reconcile this rationally with the certainty from personal experience that they were separate substances. In this Descartes was engaged in just the same dilemma as that of current thinkers and researchers, a conflict which still is yet to be resolved.     

'Nueva carne' y psicología: el ejemplo cinematográfico de Cronenberg

Resumen

El objetivo de este artículo ha sido realizar un análisis psicológico del cine de David Cronenberg, siguiendo dos puntos de vista diferentes: uno conceptual, según el cual defendemos que la psicología puede definirse dentro de un sistema específico de categorías y puede beber de los análisis de distintos tipos de fenómenos artísticos o culturales; y otro temático, según el cual la “nueva carne” (una expresión estética basada en la transformación del cuerpo humano que ocurre normalmente por la fusión entre el organismo y la materia—la mayoría de las veces, tecnológica—) es el eje sobre el que giran las películas del autor canadiense. Específicamente, lo que nos ha interesado estudiar ha sido la teoría del sujeto cronenbergiana, atendiendo a su concepto de “cuerpo” y, como acabamos de apuntar, a la “nueva carne” como superación psico-fisiológica de la idea de subjetividad clásica, la estructura dualista que distingue entre mente y cuerpo.     

El problema mente-cuerpo. Un ensayo de antropología wittgensteiniana

Resumen

Este artículo representa un intento por resolver el problema antropológico clásico, especialmente planteado por Descartes, de la relación mente-cuerpo, que tantos problemas ha causado en psicología. Para ello nos inspiramos en la crítica de las entidades internas que realiza el segundo Wittgenstein mediante su Argumento del Lenguaje Privado. Después aplicamos dicha crítica a los reduccionismos verificacionistas en psicología, conductismo y fisiologismo, así como a la teoría de James-Lange sobre las emociones. El error de estas posturas consiste en partir del dualismo cartesiano y de su perspectiva egocéntrica como supuesto implícito.     

Mind,brain and body. Healing trauma: the way forward

The paper explores an interdisciplinary whole person approach to healing from trauma that conserves our rich inheritance from Jung but also takes on board insights from research in the areas of attachment, trauma and the neurobiology of emotion. It is now over 20 years since insights from neurobiology began to be used to inform clinical practice. The paper reviews key insights which have emerged, along with the ways they enable therapists to help mind, brain and body to heal and the ways in which they clarify why, in clinical practice, we do what we do. Traditionally the emphasis has been on words, interpretations, and meaning‐making. Currently there is greater appreciation of the affective, relational, embodied aspects of therapeutic work and the way in which these relate to traumatic early interactive experience that is held outside of human awareness. The ways in which knowledge of particular systems of connectivity inform understanding of the whole mind‐brain‐body relationship are examined. The way forward for clinical practice to become more focused in order to help clients to heal in mind and body is reviewed.     

The seventh penis: towards effective psychoanalytic work with pre‐surgical transsexuals

The author reflects on his contrasting analytic work with two transsexual patients. He uses three previous psychoanalytic studies (Stoller, Morel and Lemma) to explore whether effective analytic work with the issues driving a person's determined wish for sex reassignment surgery (SRS) is possible. Particular consideration is given to how such work might navigate a path between traumatizing and pathologizing the patient on the one hand and avoiding important analytic material out of fear of so doing on the other. The author proceeds to ask whether it is possible to tell in advance, with any degree of reliability, who is and who is not likely to benefit from surgery. He considers certain diagnostic issues in relation to these questions. Illustrations are given of how, in practice, countertransference anxieties about psychopathologizing transsexual patients can contribute to significant difficulties in working clinically with them. It is argued that the understanding and containment of such anxieties could eventually lead to more effective analytic work, and that such work might be further facilitated by considering the contribution of mind‐body dissociation to transsexualism.     

The technologically-mediated self: reflections on the container and field of telecommunications

This paper contains reflections on the use of the imagination in technologically-mediated therapy and analysis. As part of the individuation process the psyche is seen as needing to adapt to new technological ways of communicating. The notion of a technologically-mediated self is posited describing a self which can only be apprehended through, and by, the use of telecommunications. This self is seen as identical to the in-person self, a subset, or superset of it. There is a revisioning of our notions of the container and the field in this work performed through technological-mediation. The need to engage the imagination in approaching this kind of work is emphasized in order to create an imaginal play-space in which the body will be deeply affected. Some thoughts on how the process of individuation might look through such analytic work is presented.     

Early trauma and affect: the importance of the body for the development of the capacity to symbolize

In this paper I aim to outline the importance of working clinically with affect when treating severely traumatized patients who have a limited capacity to symbolize. These patients, who suffer the loss of maternal care early in life, require the analyst to be closely attuned to the patient's distress through use of the countertransference and with significantly less attention paid to the transference. It is questionable whether we can speak of transference when there is limited capacity to form internal representations. The analyst's relationship with the patient is not necessarily used to make interpretations but, instead, the analyst's reverie functions therapeutically to develop awareness and containment of affect, first in the analyst's mind and, later, in the patient's, so that, in time, a relationship between the patient's mind and the body, as the first object, is made. In contrast to general object‐relations theories, in which the first object is considered to be the breast or the mother, Ferrari (2004) proposes that the body is the first object in the emerging mind. Once a relationship between mind and body is established, symbolization becomes possible following the formation of internal representations of affective states in the mind, where previously there were few. Using Ferrari's body‐mind model, two clinical case vignettes underline the need to use the countertransference with patients who suffered chronic developmental trauma in early childhood.     

Noah’s Ark: technical and theoretical implications concerning the use of metaphor in the treatment of trauma1

In this paper, using my clinical work with a 3-year-old boy who lost his hearing when he was between 9 and 12 months old, and whose disability was only discovered when he was 22 months old, I will explore two issues of paramount technical importance when working with trauma. Firstly, it is crucial to create a boundary around the traumatic event, so that life before, during and after the trauma can be circumscribed and the traumatic event explored and hopefully understood and integrated. Secondly, it is of paramount importance to establish the level of developmental organization at the time of the trauma, especially in relation to the capacity to integrate bodily affects into mind. I will show how trauma and its vicissitudes are directly dependent on the person’s capacity to resolve the splitting that trauma creates in the mind, and also the key role played by the use of metaphors in the process whereby trauma becomes thinkable and can therefore be integrated into the self.