Lenin,Hegel and Western Marxism: From the 1920s to 1953

I would like to thank the following people for helpful comments and criticisms: Janet Afary, Paul Buhle, Bud Burkhard, Olga Domanski, Nigel Gibson, Peter Hudis, Martin Jay, Douglas Kellner, Andrew Kliman, Pierre Lantz, Heinz Osterle, Jim Thomas, Lou Turner, and Alan Wald.     

Merleau-Ponty,Marx, and Marxism: The problem of history

At the present time, Europe, particularly eastern Europe, is still immersed in a major political transformation, the most significant such change since the Second World War, arising out of the rejection of official Marxism. This unforeseen rejection requires meditation by all those concerned with the relation of philosophy to the historical context. Marxism, that follows Marx’s insistence on the link between a theory and the context in which it arises, cannot be indifferent to the rejection of Marxist theory in practice. In respect to the usual tendency to pass rapidly over practice for a theoretical analysis of social theory, Merleau-Ponty stands out for his concern to evaluate the theoretical claims of Marx and Marxism against practice.     

‘Why not Lukács?’ or: on Non-Bourgeois Bourgeois Being

The Lukács Circle in Szeged, a spontaneous, unofficial organization of young Hungarian scholars and philosophy teachers, characteristically represented Georg Lukács' influence on young Hungarian intelligentsia in the period of late socialism. In this paper, the author recalls and critically analyses the intellectual milieu and motives that led a considerable part of young Hungarian intelligentsia of that time to make a cult of Lukács' philosophy. The key to the analysis is the ambiguous character of the political feelings and philosophical orientation of many young people in the period of late socialism and the paradoxical non-bourgeois bourgeois character of Lukács' philosophy. Lukács' young followers were dissatisfied with the political conditions of real socialism and with official Marxism. However, they considered themselves Marxists and were convinced by the anti-capitalist, romantic idea of democratic socialism. In the eyes of his young followers, Lukács was a genuine philosopher whose teaching was interwoven by his wide-ranging bourgeois middle-class education, promising both a real philosophical alternative to official Marxism and a high-level philosophical foundation for a non-capitalist but democratic future human history. The author argues that Lukács' philosophy did not satisfy these expectations. In his political philosophy, the philosopher could not move away from the mythological idea concerning the leading role of the communist party and therefore could not elaborate a genuine philosophical foundation for the idea of democratic socialism. Despite the superiority of his philosophy, his methodology and approach to the history of philosophy failed to provide a real philosophical alternative to the Bolshevik tradition of Marxism.     

The Colonization Thesis: Habermas on Reification

Abstract

According to Habermas’ colonization thesis, reification is a social pathology that arises when the communicative infrastructure of the lifeworld is ‘colonized’ by money and power. In this paper I argue that, thirty years after the publication of the Theory of Communicative Action, this thesis remains compelling. However, while Habermas offers a functionalist explanation of reification, his normative criticism of it remains largely implicit: he never explains what is wrong with reification from the perspective of the people whose social relations are reified. As a result, Habermas cannot explain why only some forms of colonization lead to reification effects. In particular, he suggests that reification effects result from the juridification of communicatively structured domains of action but not from the commodification of labour power. I criticize this argument and suggest that if the normative dimension of the colonization thesis is made explicit, a more nuanced explanation of reification becomes possible.     

Lay counselors: Thoughts on the crossing of ecological frameworks and the use of lay counselors in the scale up of early infant mental health interventions

The recent call for the scale-up of evidence-based early childhood development interventions, in lower and middle-income countries and for minority groups in high-income countries, has seen numerous suggestions to train greater numbers of lay mental health workers to fulfill these functions. While studies have found that concepts from developed country settings, such as attachment, parental sensitivity, and containment, find purchase and relevance within developing settings, the management of contextual and cultural factors and the tensions of cultural interfacing in the rollout of these programs in developing country settings require consideration. Drawing on the experiences of two successful South African mother–infant home-visiting programs as examples, this article discusses some of the challenges in provision of attachment-based infant mental health programs and highlights the need for careful consideration of a number of factors pertaining to the recruitment, supervision, and management of lay mental health workers before large-scale rollout is conducted.