Heidegger's Early Critique of Husserl

This paper examines Heidegger's critique of Husserl in its earliest extant formulation, viz. the lecture courses Ontologie from 1923 and Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung from 1923/4. Commentators frequently ignore these lectures, but I try to show that a study of them can reveal both the extent to which Heidegger remains committed to phenomenological research in something like its Husserlian form, and when and why Heidegger must part with Husserl. More specifically, I claim that Heidegger rightly criticizes Husserl's account of 'equipmental objects', and that he is especially unsatisfied with the terminology in which Husserl presents his phenomenological analyses, not only of 'equipment', but of other types of entities as well. However, it will also emerge that Heidegger's own phenomenological work presupposes the performance of what Husserl calls the 'epoch 7 ', the method of 'bracketing' natural knowledge. In this way, Heidegger's sometimes very severe critique must be understood as an internal critique.     

What is Postnormal When There is no Normal? A Postdichotomous View of the Histories of the Past,Present, and Future

In this paper, I discuss the concept of ‘postnormal times’ and argue that the term postnormal is misrepresentative where applied to describe a state beyond so-called ‘normal’ times. Such normality is characterized by, i) progress towards social, economic and political equilibrium, and ii) future betterment for all. I posit that these conditions represent, at best, misplaced optimism and, at worst, a deliberate veil of untruths. I also argue that the foundation of thinking on normalcy, based on the classical free market economics of Adam Smith, was flawed from the outset. I propose that what are termed postnormal times actually represent an extreme set of long-term ‘normal times’. Importantly, I propose that human responses to a situation of extreme normalcy will be different from responses to the novel and truly postnormal. Action, or lack thereof, to address extreme normalcy requires a different mindset and starting point to that for addressing a new or post-normalcy. As such, I call for fundamental change to economic and political priorities and for a focus on social needs and values in the very near future. Finally, I posit that, whether we live in postnormal, ‘hyper-normal’, abnormal or ‘new normal’ times, we must accept that, for most of humanity and for the planet on which we live, these are not good times, and we must strive to bring about urgent and radical change.     

Beyond Existence and Non-Existence

Abstract

When Husserl speaks of the so-called ‘transcendental reduction’ or ‘phenomenological epochē’ many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ‘accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing’ (Id I §30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ‘the positing of its actual being’ (Id I §88, p. 182). Second, Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an ‘object’ of thought even when we refer to non-existent, hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects. This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding ‘ordinary’ object. The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground.     

论保密义务与诚信原则

尊重患者隐私,保守执业秘密,是医师的道德义务,也是法律义务,保密义务的理论基础在于诚实信用原则.为此,医疗活动中应引入体现伦理道德要求的诚信理念,从道德和法律两方面规范医师的行为,并且建立以法律规范为主的规制模式.     

Impure temporalities in the history of political philosophy: the historiography of dēmokratia in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain

ABSTRACT

Building on Bernard Williams’ thesis about the intertwining of history and political philosophy, the essay explores how the problem of the history of dēmokratia after the late-eighteenth and over the nineteenth-century in Britain constituted a primary and critical field in which the philosophical meaning of democracy was debated. Configuring a new temporal perspective grounded in the relationship between ancient and modern democracy, historiographical works by John Gillies, William Mitford, and George Grote put forth an understanding of the concept as a battlefield, involving several conflicting meanings, narratives and historical forces. This historiographical tradition highlighted the tensions underpinning the definition of democracy in the long-term temporal frame linking antiquity and modernity. So even more than contemporary philosophical and political writings, historical understanding constituted a unique concept of democracy that both concentrated and dispersed meaning; it was not just one vision of democracy, among others, but one that acquired the paradoxical power to forge some semantic stability and coherence over time, and to accentuate the threat of the concept’s break up into distinct political premises and historical moments that constituted it.