The variable influence of confession inconsistencies: How factual errors (but not contradictions) reduce belief in suspect guilt

Wrongful conviction statistics suggest that jurors pay little heed to the quality of confession evidence when making verdict decisions. However, recent research indicates that confession inconsistencies may sometimes reduce perception of suspect guilt. Drawing on theoretical frameworks of attribution theory, correspondence bias, and the story model of juror decision‐making, we investigated how judgments about likely guilt are affected by different types of inconsistencies: self‐contradictions (Experiment 1) and factual errors (Experiment 2). Crucially, judgments of likely guilt of the suspect were reduced by factual errors in confession evidence, but not by contradictions. Mediation analyses suggest that this effect of factual errors on judgments of guilt is underpinned by the extent to which mock‐jurors generated a plausible, alternative explanation for why the suspect confessed. These results indicate that not all confession inconsistencies are treated equally; factual errors might cause suspicion about the veracity of the confession, but contradictions do not.     

A Single Counterexample Leads to Moral Belief Revision

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision.     

The puzzle of Freud's puzzle analogy: Reviving a struggle with doubt and conviction in Freud's Moses and monotheism

In this paper the author points to a puzzle raised by Freud's contradictory use of an analogy of a jigsaw puzzle. She shows how, through the attempt to resolve this puzzle, meanings and implications of Freud's difficult struggle with his search for truth in Moses and monotheism come alive, both in Freud's writing and in the author herself. Central to this struggle is an encounter with the sources of doubt and conviction that ultimately allows one to embrace ideas experienced as true, although they are not demonstrable evidentially. The paper sheds light on the importance of Moses and monotheism as a theoretical text that reflects on developments in Freud's thinking on truth, and the possibility, dangers and inherent difficulties of grasping it.     

How Emotional Frames Moralize and Polarize Political Attitudes

Moralized issues, such as abortion and same‐sex marriage, are some of the most polarizing and divisive issues in politics. These topics motivate political engagement but present a barrier to democratic resolution. Yet we know little about how some issues become “moral issues” and others do not. In this article, I argue that exposure to persuasive frames, particularly those eliciting anger and disgust, serves to moralize and polarize public opinion. I test these hypotheses across three experiments on emerging debates over food politics. The results consistently show that persuasive frames increase issue moralization and, in turn, facilitate polarization. A panel analysis demonstrates that the effect of a single exposure lasts at least two weeks. Mediation analyses suggest that feelings of disgust and anger help explain how persuasive frames moralize political attitudes, while anger alone seems to explain the polarizing effects of framing. Overall, the findings provide new insight into framing, emotion, and the development of moral issues.     

Immediate and delayed effects of causal uncertainty inductions on uncertainty accessibility

Previous research has focused on enhanced processing as a response to causal uncertainty (CU), but relatively little empirical attention has been given to how CU is activated and the temporal unfolding of this activation. The current research investigates the counterintuitive idea that people inhibit causal uncertainty immediately after its activation. We find that this inhibition weakens over time. Study 1 demonstrates this inhibition effect with self-report uncertainty. Study 2 demonstrates this effect with an implicit accessibility measure. Temporary inhibition of uncertainty may be a general response when uncertainty is activated.     

THE TROUBLE WITH TERROR

Abstract: The argument proceeds from a sense of imminent danger; 9/11 and its sequel challenge our deepest pretensions regarding the universality and self‐evidence of moral/political conviction. The intransigence of such convictions is now an important source of international conflict and terror. It also signifies that the resolution of the disorder that now confronts the international community requires a transformation in our conception of morality itself. In this regard, philosophy has an important task to address. The discussion explores a radical change in our understanding of just war, the distinction between war and peace, the logic of conflict, and similar topics.     

The Motivating Role of Perceived Right Violation and Efficacy Beliefs in Identification with the Italian Water Movement

Because individuals' fundamental right to water is often taken for granted, little is known about why individuals participate in water activism. We examine how individuals identify with and intend to participate in the Italian Water Movement to defend the “public management” of water supply. Building on the collective‐action literature, we test an explanatory model in which the perceived violation of the right to water and group and participative‐efficacy beliefs increase movement identification, which predicts subsequent activism. Study 1 (N = 153 activists) largely confirmed our hypotheses: right violation and participative efficacy uniquely influenced movement identification, which in turn predicted activism. Study 2 corroborated these findings by employing a broader sample of 132 Italian citizens, with right violation, participative and group‐efficacy beliefs predicting movement identification, which in turn predicted activism. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

塑造公民诚信人格的具体目标

个体诚信修养是个体实现从诚信规范的他律向自律的转化,确立高尚的诚信人格的主体性活动。塑造公民的诚信人格具体而言就是做一个道德认识求真知、道德情感求真挚、道德信念求真诚、道德意志求真笃、道德行为求真切的诚信公民。     

Fired Up by Morality: The Unique Physiological Response Tied to Moral Conviction in Politics

Studies provide mounting evidence that morally convicted attitudes elicit passionate and unyielding political responses. Questions remain, however, whether these effects occur because moral conviction is another strong, versus a distinctly moral dimension of attitude strength. Building on work in moral psychology and neuroscience, I argue that moral conviction stems from a distinctive mode of mental processing that is tied to automatic affective reactions. Testing this idea using a lab experiment designed to capture self‐reported moral conviction and physiological arousal, I find that conviction about political objects positively predicts arousal evoked by the objects, while attitude extremity and importance do not. These findings suggest that moral conviction items do tap into moral processing, helping to validate the conviction measure. They also illustrate the value of using physiological indicators to study politics, help explain why morally convicted attitudes trigger such fervent responses, and raise normative questions about political conflict and compromise.     

Moral Conviction and Political Engagement

The 2004 presidential election led to considerable discussion about whether moral values motivated people to vote, and if so, whether it led to a conservative electoral advantage. The results of two studies—one conducted in the context of the 2000 presidential election, the other in the context of the 2004 presidential election—indicated that stronger moral convictions associated with candidates themselves and attitudes on issues of the day uniquely predicted self-reported voting behavior and intentions to vote even when controlling for a host of alternative explanations (e.g., attitude strength, strength of party identification). In addition, we found strong support for the hypothesis that moral convictions equally motivated political engagement for those on the political right and left and little support for the notion that a combination of morality and politics is something more characteristic of the political right than it is of the political left.