Assessing the relationship of Type A beliefs to cardiovascular disease risk and psychosocial distress

Investigators have begun to take a multimodal approach to the assessment and treatment of psychosocial risk factors for cardiovascular disease (CVD). For instance, cognitive responses have become the focus of contemporary research along with continued examination of overt Type A behaviors. Price (1982) has outlined a set of beliefs purportedly associated with Type A behavior and subsequent CVD risk. The current study examines the validity of this belief set as represented by a newly developed measure, the Type A Cognitive Questionnaire (TACQ). Subjects were 221 employed adults participating in a worksite CVD risk reduction program. They completed the TACQ as part of a pretreatment CVD risk screening protocol. As hypothesized, TACQ scores were significantly associated with Type A behavior, hostility, physiological mediators of CVD, and psychosocial distress. Discussion addresses continued refinement of the Type A belief construct.     

The Drinking Expectancy Questionnaire: A revised measure of alcohol-related beliefs

Alcohol-related expectancies have been recently proposed as potentially important determinants of drinking behavior. This study describes the development of a New Zealand measure of such beliefs, the Drinking Expectancy Questionnaire (DEQ). Items selected through interviews, literature review, and the modification of other relevant questionnaires were piloted on 333 drinkers in a community sample and 275 college students. Factor analyses of both samples revealed nine alcohol reinforcement domains relating to assertiveness, affective change, sexual enhancement, social enhancement, relaxation, cognitive impairment, dependence, carelessness, and aggression. The potential clinical and research possibilities using this revised expectancy measure are briefly discussed, along with the scale's strength and weaknesses.The financial assistance of the Alcoholic Liquor Advisory Council of New Zealand in conducting this study is gratefully acknowledged.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.     

Christ,Country, and Conspiracies? Christian Nationalism,Biblical Literalism,and Belief in Conspiracy Theories

When misinformation is rampant, “fake news” is rising, and conspiracy theories are widespread, social scientists have a vested interest in understanding who is most susceptible to these false narratives and why. Recent research suggests Christians are especially susceptible to belief in conspiracy theories in the United States, but scholars have yet to ascertain the role of religiopolitical identities and epistomological approaches, specifically Christian nationalism and biblical literalism, in generalized conspiracy thinking. Because Christian nationalists sense that the nation is under cultural threat and biblical literalism provides an alternative (often anti-elite) source of information, we predict that both will amplify conspiracy thinking. We find that Christian nationalism and biblical literalism independently predict conspiracy thinking, but that the effect of Christian nationalism increases with literalism. Our results point to the contingent effects of Christian nationalism and the need for the religious variables in understanding conspiracy thinking.     

Comparing Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians’ Religious and Political Beliefs Across Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa

This article compares the political correlates of Renewalist Christianity in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (N = 44,832). Renewalists include Pentecostals and Charismatic members of Mainline Protestant and Catholic churches. Though rarely studied comparatively, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa boast the largest Renewalist populations worldwide. Scholars have noted that the religious and political beliefs of Renewalists differ from other Christians, but existing studies either treat Renewalists as a single category or focus on Pentecostals while pooling Charismatic and non-Charismatic Catholics and Protestants as denominational blocks. Using multilevel mixed-effects models, this article first confirms that Renewalists’ religious and political beliefs differ from those of non-Renewalist Christians. Importantly, this cautions against the ubiquitous aggregation of Charismatic and non-Charismatic Catholics (and Protestants) in statistical analyses. Additionally, we theorize and evaluate differences between Renewalists and the role of regional context. Religious differences between Pentecostals and Charismatics, we show, are much larger in Latin America than in Sub-Saharan Africa.     

How do conspiratorial explanations differ from non-conspiratorial explanations? A content analysis of real-world online articles

The present research aims to identify unique characteristics of written conspiracy theories. In two pre-registered quantitative human-coded content analyses, we compared 36 pairs of conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial online articles about various events. As predicted, conspiratorial articles—compared to non-conspiratorial articles—contained less factual, more emotional and more threat-related information. Also, we predicted and found that conspiratorial articles presented more argumentation against the opposing standpoint and that they provided explanations that were more dispositional and less falsifiable. Contrary to our predictions, we did not consistently observe that conspiratorial articles presented less argumentation for their own standpoint. Also, we did not find consistent support that conspiratorial articles provided less information about the specific process or more information about the underlying goals of the respective events, or that conspiratorial explanations attributed the events to a lesser extent to situational factors. We discuss the relevance of our findings for the understanding of conspiracy theories.     

Inoculation against conspiracy theories: A consumer side approach to India's fake news problem

We attempt to replicate Roozenbeek and van der Linden's Western-based study in India by employing the Bad News Game, an online game, in which players take on the role of a misinformation tycoon. They are exposed to weakened doses of the strategies employed in conspiracy and fake news production with the aim to cognitively inoculate them against misinformation. The proliferation of inexpensive mobile connections coupled with a lack of digital literacy has resulted in a conspiratorial pandemic in developing countries like India. We test the game's impact on an Indian sample (n = 1002) using a within-subject design. We provide evidence of significant improvement in the ability of participants to identify the misinformation produced using Conspiracy, Impersonation, and to a lesser extent, the Discrediting technique, while observing greater truth discernment in correctly identifying true news. We also conduct sub-sample analyses. These findings have positive implications for methods that protect users from malignant online content.     

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.     

Ambiguity attitudes in qualitative contexts: The role of prior beliefs

Most studies of ambiguity aversion rely on experimental paradigms involving monetary bets. Thus, the extent to which ambiguity aversion occurs outside of such contexts is much less understood, particularly when the situation cannot easily be reduced to numerical terms. The present work seeks to understand whether people prefer to avoid ambiguous decisions in a variety of different qualitative domains (e.g., work, family, love, friendship, exercise, study, and health), and, if so, to determine the role played by prior beliefs in those domains. Across three studies, we presented participants with 24 vignettes and measured the degree to which they preferred risk to ambiguity in each. We also asked them for their prior probability estimates about the likely outcomes in the ambiguous events. Ambiguity aversion was observed in the vast majority of vignettes, but at different magnitudes. It was predicted by whether the vignette involved gain or loss as well as by people's prior beliefs; however, the heterogeneity between people meant that the role of prior beliefs was only evident in an individual-level analysis (i.e., not at the group level). Our results suggest that the desire to avoid ambiguity occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events.     

Do health beliefs about COVID-19 predict morbidity? A longitudinal study

In a highly powered (N ≈ 5000), six-months longitudinal study (December 2020-May 2021), we tested the assumption that beliefs concerning COVID-19 and the precautions against it predicted morbidity. Six months after having filled out a survey measuring beliefs about the disease and the precautions against it, participants reported if they were or had been ill with COVID-19. A lower likelihood of being or having been ill with COVID-19 was predicted by personal optimism concerning infection, perceived personal control over infection, perceived effectiveness of precautions, and self-reported personal or better-than-average adherence to the precautions. A higher likelihood of being or having been ill with COVID-19 was predicted by perceived personal control over a good outcome of an infection, egocentric impact perception concerning the impact of the disease, perceived difficulty of adherence to the precautions, and both personal and egocentric impact perception concerning the impact of the precautions. Comparative optimism did not predict morbidity, nor did personal optimism concerning severe disease or a good outcome, perceived personal control over severe disease, and moralization of the precautions. We discuss implications for public health communication.