Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Christ,Country, and Conspiracies? Christian Nationalism,Biblical Literalism,and Belief in Conspiracy Theories

When misinformation is rampant, “fake news” is rising, and conspiracy theories are widespread, social scientists have a vested interest in understanding who is most susceptible to these false narratives and why. Recent research suggests Christians are especially susceptible to belief in conspiracy theories in the United States, but scholars have yet to ascertain the role of religiopolitical identities and epistomological approaches, specifically Christian nationalism and biblical literalism, in generalized conspiracy thinking. Because Christian nationalists sense that the nation is under cultural threat and biblical literalism provides an alternative (often anti-elite) source of information, we predict that both will amplify conspiracy thinking. We find that Christian nationalism and biblical literalism independently predict conspiracy thinking, but that the effect of Christian nationalism increases with literalism. Our results point to the contingent effects of Christian nationalism and the need for the religious variables in understanding conspiracy thinking.     

How do conspiratorial explanations differ from non-conspiratorial explanations? A content analysis of real-world online articles

The present research aims to identify unique characteristics of written conspiracy theories. In two pre-registered quantitative human-coded content analyses, we compared 36 pairs of conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial online articles about various events. As predicted, conspiratorial articles—compared to non-conspiratorial articles—contained less factual, more emotional and more threat-related information. Also, we predicted and found that conspiratorial articles presented more argumentation against the opposing standpoint and that they provided explanations that were more dispositional and less falsifiable. Contrary to our predictions, we did not consistently observe that conspiratorial articles presented less argumentation for their own standpoint. Also, we did not find consistent support that conspiratorial articles provided less information about the specific process or more information about the underlying goals of the respective events, or that conspiratorial explanations attributed the events to a lesser extent to situational factors. We discuss the relevance of our findings for the understanding of conspiracy theories.     

祖辈协同教养与幼儿错误信念理解能力的关系:亲子依恋与祖辈同住的作用

为考察祖辈协同教养与幼儿错误信念理解之间的关系以及幼儿亲子依恋的中介作用,采用方便抽样的方法,调查了某城市三所幼儿园345名小班至大班的祖辈协同教养幼儿及其家庭教养人。对幼儿使用操作任务考察错误信念理解能力,对其家庭教养人利用自陈式问卷收集家庭教养方式和亲子依恋等数据。结果显示：(1)祖辈协同教养类型显著影响幼儿的错误信念理解水平和亲子依恋,“有祖辈同住”协同教养幼儿的错误信念理解水平以及依恋的安全性均显著低于“无祖辈同住”协同教养幼儿;(2)亲子依恋在祖辈协同教养的民主信任和教养冲突两个维度与幼儿错误信念理解能力之间分别存在显著的中介作用;(3)祖辈协同教养类型在教养冲突、亲子依恋、错误信念理解能力的中介模型中起调节作用,在“有祖辈同住”条件下,协同教养冲突显著负向预测幼儿的亲子依恋安全感。     

Inoculation against conspiracy theories: A consumer side approach to India's fake news problem

We attempt to replicate Roozenbeek and van der Linden's Western-based study in India by employing the Bad News Game, an online game, in which players take on the role of a misinformation tycoon. They are exposed to weakened doses of the strategies employed in conspiracy and fake news production with the aim to cognitively inoculate them against misinformation. The proliferation of inexpensive mobile connections coupled with a lack of digital literacy has resulted in a conspiratorial pandemic in developing countries like India. We test the game's impact on an Indian sample (n = 1002) using a within-subject design. We provide evidence of significant improvement in the ability of participants to identify the misinformation produced using Conspiracy, Impersonation, and to a lesser extent, the Discrediting technique, while observing greater truth discernment in correctly identifying true news. We also conduct sub-sample analyses. These findings have positive implications for methods that protect users from malignant online content.     

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.     

BELIEF VS. COMMITMENT, VALIDITY VS. VALUE: A RESPONSE TO WARD GOODENOUGH

Abstract. This paper is on Ward Goodenough's recent article (27: 3), suggesting that his points can be clarified by reiterating the distinction between the realms of meaning and relevance. Religion's "truth" is in the form of its ualue; the "proof" which it requires is uindication; and the resulting "faith" must be understood as commitment.     

Jung in the academy: devotions and resistances

Jung's position in the contemporary mainstream English-speaking university is problematical indeed. For various historical and ideological reasons, Jung is generally not included in the courses in academic psychology, and in the humanities and social sciences his reception is lukewarm to say the least. He has only a marginal place in religious studies. This notorious academic resistance to Jung is compensated, some would say overcompensated, by student interest and enthusiasm, which sometimes seeks to make a religious dogma out of Jung's psychology. In a sense, cynical resistance to Jung and fanatical devotion to Jung can be seen to generate each other in a sort of binary opposition. This situation is unfortunate because neither extreme presents a fair or balanced view of Jung's thought or of his contribution to intellectual history. These and other problems associated with the teaching of Jung in a university setting are briefly outlined in this paper.     

Points of View

An adequate evaluation of argumentation requires identification of the object to which the argumentation pertains: the point of view. What are the distinguishing features of this object? In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the object of argumentation is referred to by means of the notion ‘standpoint’. In other theories concerned with argumentation, reasoning, convincing or persuading, notions are used such as ‘thesis’, ‘conclusion’, ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’. This paper is a survey of the characterisations of the object of argumentation given in the various theories. It discusses the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, socio-psychological research on persuasion, cognitive research on reasoning, argumentative discourse analysis, two variants of informal logic, advocacy and debate, and the theory of communicative action. Next, it explores some relations between the notions used in these theories. Finally, it outlines some starting points for further research into the problems of identification.     

Intersections of personal vs. collective trauma during the COVID-19 pandemic: the hijacking of the human imagination

This paper explores how the deadly shadow of COVID-19 passing over the Earth constitutes a collective trauma that frequently opens up or ‘triggers’ un-remembered personal trauma, and it provides clinical examples of these intersections. The paper further explores how the human imagination, which we normally utilize to make meaning out of traumatic experience, can be hijacked by fear – leading to avoidance of suffering and to illusory formulations and alternative realities such as conspiracy theories. Alternatively, the imagination can be employed in more realistic and creative ways – leading through conscious suffering to healing and wholeness. Which path the imagination takes is shown to depend on the capacity of individuals to feel the full reality of the human condition in general and the exquisite vulnerability of our existence as fragile human beings at this moment in history. Ernest Becker’s analysis of our ‘denial of death’ and his urgency to embrace our common human vulnerability is explored in relation to Jung’s early tendency to deny the body. The author proposes that the more creative uses of the imagination, connected to a more humble and realistic apprehension of our common destiny, may be seen in the ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement that swept the world in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak.