A revision of the definition of lying as an untruth told with intent to deceive

The traditional and prevailing definition of lying is that lying is some variation or combination of: an untruth told with intent to deceive. I establish that this is the case, and that, as a result, contradictions and injustices arise. An alternative definition is proposed which is shown to avoid these difficulties. It is also shown that and how on the new definition the alleged Liar paradox is easily dissolved.     

A review of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy: Implications for models of social and cognitive knowing

The ability to distinguish people from things sheds light on an important theoretical question: how is the development of social cognition related to the development of physical cognition? According to Piaget (1954), cognition is unitary and the processes used in dealing with the physical world are the same as those employed in the social world. This statement should be questioned. Although people and objects share certain fundamental properties (size, shape, etc.), only people can communicate, act independently and have feelings and intentions. Thus, people seem much more complex to deal with than things. If all cognitive development derives from the growth of a unitary system, then knowledge about animate objects should lag behind that of inanimate objects. The present paper explores this idea by examining what infants know about the attributes that distinguish people from things. It is concluded that the onset of this distinction begins early in life. Even 2-month-old infants treat people and objects differently when confounding variables of the stimuli are controlled. Rather than lagging behind, the infants' understanding of people appears precocious. The infants' recognition of the crucial distinction between the two classes suggests that a conceptual system is beginning to be formed soon after birth. This conceptual system appears different for social and non-social objects and serves as a foundation from which infants might come to understand the distinctive properties of animate and inanimate objects.     

DISCIPLINING RELATIVISM AND TRUTH

Abstract. Imre Lakatos's philosophy of science can provide helpful leads for theological methodology, but only when mediated by the disciplines that lie between the natural sciences and theology. The questions of relativism and truth are used as indices for comparing disciplines, and Lakatos's theory of natural science is taken as the starting point. Major modifications of Lakatos's work are demanded as one moves from the natural sciences, through economics, the interpretive social sciences, literary theory, and into theology. Although theology may consist of Lakatosian research programs, it also includes programs of interpretation and programs for living. This conclusion must influence our definition of theological truth and our assessment of theological relativism.     

BELIEF VS. COMMITMENT, VALIDITY VS. VALUE: A RESPONSE TO WARD GOODENOUGH

Abstract. This paper is on Ward Goodenough's recent article (27: 3), suggesting that his points can be clarified by reiterating the distinction between the realms of meaning and relevance. Religion's "truth" is in the form of its ualue; the "proof" which it requires is uindication; and the resulting "faith" must be understood as commitment.     

Truth and democratic education

The connection of education to democracy is an issue of central importance to communities committed to liberty and justice. In her influential book Democratic Education Amy Gutmann addresses this connection. In doing so she takes up a position regarding democracies and the teaching of truth which is indefensible, and which removes any ban on manipulating citizens. Also indefensible is Gutmann's position concerning publicly-funded community colleges and universities. These she deems nonselective institutions; a mistake that obscures the unequal distribution of opportunities for democratically-required education. The outcome is to reveal Gutmann's analysis of democratic education and democratic participation to be, in important respects, inadequate.     

ON THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY AND RELIGION: A RESPONSE TO LEE CRONK

Abstract. Issue is taken with Dawkins and Krebs's (1978) conception of communication as being by nature manipulative and with Cronk's proposals concerning the evolution of morality, both of which are grounded in evolutionary biology. An alternative view, which recognizes that which humanity has in common with other species but which emphasizes humanity's distinctiveness, is offered to account for religion and morality.     

概念内隐记忆中的注意促进效应

Swallow和Jiang (2010)最早发现, 编码时的目标探测会促进同时呈现的背景信息在随后记忆测验中的表现, 并将这一现象称为注意促进效应(Attentional Boost Effect, ABE)。随后研究发现这一现象并不会出现在概念内隐测验中, 由此提出目标探测主要促进的是背景信息的知觉加工, 而非语义加工。本研究通过3个实验, 操纵了对背景信息的编码加工类型(知觉加工或概念加工)。结果发现, 当与目标探测同时进行的是对背景信息的概念加工任务, 则ABE会出现在随后的概念内隐测验中。反之, 当对背景信息进行的是知觉加工任务时, 则ABE会出现在随后的知觉内隐测验而不是概念内隐测验中。这些结果表明, 目标探测既可能促进背景信息的知觉加工, 也可能促进背景信息的语义加工, 但只有在目标探测下背景信息的编码加工与随后内隐测验中所依赖的提取加工具有一致性, 才会产生ABE。     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.