Assessing potential reinforcement-like effects of brief stimuli unrelated to food reinforcers

It is widely assumed that reinforcers are biologically relevant stimuli, or stimuli that have been associated with biologically relevant stimuli. However, brief, arbitrary stimuli have also been reported to have reinforcement-like effects, despite being unrelated to biologically relevant stimuli like food. The present study explored the potential reinforcement-like effects of brief stimuli across 5 experiments. In Experiments 1 through 4, pigeon subjects responded for food reinforcement and brief stimulus presentations in a 2-component multiple schedule. Neither baseline response rates nor resistance to change during disruption tests were systematically greater in a component with versus without brief stimulus presentations. Increasing the rate and duration of brief stimulus presentations in Experiment 4 did not reveal reinforcement-like effects when compared directly with food. In Experiment 5, pigeons chose between independent terminal links in a concurrent-chains procedure. Across conditions, varying the location, duration, and rate of brief stimulus presentations in the terminal links had no systematic effects on preference. In contrast, varying rates of food reinforcers resulted in large and reliable shifts in preference. Therefore, the present study found no systematic evidence that brief stimuli unrelated to food reliably increase response rates, resistance to change, or preference. These data demonstrate the value of systematic replication, and a behavioral momentum approach to assessing potential reinforcement-like effects.     

Pigeons can discriminate locations presented in pictures

The present experiments were designed to teach pigeons to discriminate two locations represented by color photographs. Two sets of photographs were taken at two distinctive locations on a university campus. These sets represented several standpoints at each location. For the true-discrimination group, pictures from the two locations were differentially associated with reward; for the pseudodiscrimination group, half of the views from each location were arbitrarily but consistently associated with reward. The former group acquired the discrimination much more rapidly. These birds also showed good transfer to new views from the standpoints used in training and to a new standpoint at each location not used in training. In a second experiment, another group of pigeons could terminate any training trial by pecking an “advance” key. Three of 4 subjects used this option to reduce the duration of trials in which pictures from the negative location were presented. These data suggest that pigeons can integrate views shown in pictures into a “concept” of a location. The method used here may be the experimental analogue of a common, natural process by which animals learn to identify locations.     

Theory change in immunology part II: The clonal selection theory

This two-part article examines the competition between the clonal selection theory and the instructive theory of the immune response from 1957–1967. In Part I the concept of a temporally extended theory is introduced, which requires attention to the hitherto largely ignored issue of theory individuation. Factors which influence the acceptability of such an extended theory at different temporal points are also embedded in a Bayesian framework, which is shown to provide a rational account of belief change in science. In Part II these factors, as elaborated in the Bayesian framework, are applied to the case of the success of the clonal selection theory and the failure of the instructive theory.     

On the limits of the matching concept in monkeys (Cebus apella).

Two cebus monkeys, with many years of experience matching a variety of static visual stimuli (forms and colors) within a standard matching-to-sample paradigm, were trained to press a left lever when a pair of displayed static stimuli were the same and to press a right lever when they were different. After learning the same/different task, the monkeys were tested for transfer to dynamic visual stimuli (flashing versus steady green disks), with which they had no previous experience. Both failed to transfer to the dynamic stimuli. A third monkey, also with massive past experience matching static visual stimuli, was tested for transfer to the dynamic stimuli within our standard matching paradigm, and it, too, failed. All 3 subjects were unable to reach a moderate acquisition criterion despite as many as 52 sessions of training with the dynamic stimuli. These results provide further evidence that, in monkeys, the matching (or identity) concept has a very limited reach; they consequently do not support the view held by some theorists that an abstract matching concept based on physical similarity is a general endowment of animals.     

Transfer of matching-to-figure samples in the pigeon

Three pigeons were trained on a modified six-key matching-to-sample procedure. The third peck on the figure-sample key (which presented a bird, hand, face, beetle, rabbit, fish, flower, or red hue, as the sample) lighted only one comparison key. Every three additional pecks on the sample lighted another comparison key, up to a maximum of five keys. Pecks on keys of matching figures produced grain. Pecks on nonmatching keys (mismatches) turned off all lights on the comparison keys and repeated the trial. Three figures were used during acquisition. The birds learned to peck each sample until the matching comparison stimulus appeared on one of three comparison stimulus keys, and then to peck that key. Later, five novel stimuli, employed as both sample and comparison stimuli, and two additional matching keys were added. Each bird showed matching transfer to the novel samples. The data suggest that the birds may have learned the concept of figure matching rather than a series of two-component chains or discrete five-key discriminations.     

Worldviews about change: Their structure and their implications for understanding responses to sustainability,technology, and political change

People hold different perspectives about how they think the world is changing or should change. We examined five of these “worldviews” about change: Progress, Golden Age, Endless Cycle, Maintenance, and Balance. In Studies 1–4 (total N = 2733) we established reliable measures of each change worldview, and showed how these help explain when people will support or oppose social change in contexts spanning sustainability, technological innovations, and political elections. In mapping out these relationships we identify how the importance of different change worldviews varies across contexts, with Balance most critical for understanding support for sustainability, Progress/Golden Age important for understanding responses to innovations, and Golden Age uniquely important for preferring Trump/Republicans in the 2016 US election. These relationships were independent of prominent individual differences (e.g., values, political orientation for elections) or context-specific factors (e.g., self-reported innovativeness for responses to innovations). Study 5 (N = 2140) examined generalizability in 10 countries/regions spanning five continents, establishing that these worldviews exhibited metric invariance, but with country/region differences in how change worldviews were related to support for sustainability. These findings show that change worldviews can act as a general “lens” people use to help determine whether to support or oppose social change.