BEWILDERMENT AND THEREAFTER: Some Reflections in Response to Lee Yearley

The following reflections were originally an oral response to issues raised in Lee Yearley's presentation in May 2009 at Harvard Divinity School. As written here, they follow upon his oral and now written comments, highlighting key issues and points for development, drawing on this respondent's expertise in comparative and Hindu studies.     

Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

Rationality ideals and mentality

Mackenzie, this journal, this issue, convincingly shows that in certain dialogue games (commitment games) there are procedural restrictions similar to those that I impose on rationality idealizations. But, whereas my rationality analysis is set in the context of belief games, commitment games do not postulate beliefs. Is this significant? I suggest that mackenzie thinks that it is. There follow discussions of Psychologism and Behaviourism.     

Burden of proof

This paper presents an analysis of the concept of burden of proof in argument. Relationship of burden of proof to three traditional informal fallacies is considered: (i) argumentum ad hominem, (ii) petitio principii, and (iii) argumentum ad ignorantiam. Other topics discussed include persuasive dialoque, pragmatic reasoning, legal burden of proof, plausible reasoning in regulated disputes, rules of dialogue, and the value of reasoned dialogue.     

Do health beliefs about COVID-19 predict morbidity? A longitudinal study

In a highly powered (N ≈ 5000), six-months longitudinal study (December 2020-May 2021), we tested the assumption that beliefs concerning COVID-19 and the precautions against it predicted morbidity. Six months after having filled out a survey measuring beliefs about the disease and the precautions against it, participants reported if they were or had been ill with COVID-19. A lower likelihood of being or having been ill with COVID-19 was predicted by personal optimism concerning infection, perceived personal control over infection, perceived effectiveness of precautions, and self-reported personal or better-than-average adherence to the precautions. A higher likelihood of being or having been ill with COVID-19 was predicted by perceived personal control over a good outcome of an infection, egocentric impact perception concerning the impact of the disease, perceived difficulty of adherence to the precautions, and both personal and egocentric impact perception concerning the impact of the precautions. Comparative optimism did not predict morbidity, nor did personal optimism concerning severe disease or a good outcome, perceived personal control over severe disease, and moralization of the precautions. We discuss implications for public health communication.