The transfer of respondent eliciting and extinction functions through stimulus equivalence classes

Two studies investigated the transfer of respondent elicitation through equivalence classes. In Experiment 1, match-to-sample procedures were used to teach 8 subjects two four-member equivalence classes. One member of one class was then paired with electric shock, and one member of the other class was presented without shock. All remaining stimuli were then presented. Using skin conductance as the measure of conditioning, transfer of conditioning was demonstrated in 6 of the 8 subjects. In Experiment 2, similar procedures were used to replicate the results of Experiment 1 and investigate the transfer of extinction. Following equivalence training and conditioning to all members of one class, one member was then presented in extinction. When the remaining stimuli from this class were then presented, they failed to elicit skin conductance. In the final phase of the experiment, the stimulus that was previously presented in extinction was reconditioned. Test trials with other members of the class revealed that they regained elicitation function. These results demonstrate that both respondent elicitation and extinction can transfer through stimulus classes. The clinical and applied significance of the results is discussed.     

"结构":解读古典经济学哲学构架的逻辑中轴--瓦尔特·本雅明:作品、生活、时代和历史的交叠

马克思的"古典经济学"概念具有明确内涵、外延并与一定的"知识型"相关,这与西方学者在一般的、含糊的意义使用这个概念具有根本的异质性.它界划了一种分析的范式,说明了马克思与资产阶级经济学之间存在着"知识型"的断裂,这种分析范式就是从配第和布阿吉尔贝尔开始的探讨社会结构及由这种结构所决定的运动规律,这是"古典经济学"概念之独特内涵所在.福柯等人忽视了古典经济学的"结构"视角而从"劳动"范畴出发,认为马克思对李嘉图的修正在西方知识的最深层中并未产生真正的间断性,这是没有读懂马克思"古典政治经济学"的真正内涵.     

Differential mastication kinematics of the rabbit in response to food and water: Implications for conditioned movement

Analysis of naturalistic chewing patterns may provide insight into mapping the neural substrates of jaw movement control systems, including their adaptive modification during the classically conditioned jaw movement (CJM) paradigm. Here, New Zealand White rabbits were administered food and water stimuli orally to evaluate the influence of stimulus consistency on masticatory pattern. Chewing patterns were recorded via video camera and movements were analyzed by computerized image analysis. The mandibular kinematics, specifically the extent of dorsal/ventral, medial/lateral, and rostral/caudal movement, were significantly larger in food-evoked than water-evoked chewing. Water-evoked chewing frequency, however, was significantly higher than that of food-evoked movements. In light of known cortical mastication modulatory centers, our findings implicate different neural substrates for the responses to food and water stimuli in the rabbit. A detailed delineation of jaw movement patterns and circuitry is essential to characterize the neural substrates of CJM.     

Reasons and practical possibility

According to a common thesis about normative reasons for action, you have a reason to perform a given action only if you can act for that reason. This thesis has long had broad appeal and is intended to capture the practical character of practical reasons. I’ll call it the ‘Practicality Thesis’. Recently, however, various writers have developed subtly different objections to it, each designed to show that there can be actions you have a reason to perform even though you could not act for that reason – because, were you aware of the reason-giving facts in the ways needed to act for the reason, it would no longer be a reason for you to so act. This article defends the Practicality Thesis against such objections. It considers some extant defences but shows that these are inadequate. It then advances an alternative approach intended to counter any structurally similar objection.     

In defense of a regulated market economy

The dominant understanding of political corporate social responsibility (CSR) suggests new, broader political roles for businesses in the globalized economy, challenging the classical liberal social order (where business firms’ task is to focus on economic issues and the government's role is to take care of political responsibilities). In this paper, we show how the major framing of the political CSR discussion not only challenges the classical liberal social order but also goes against the more general political economic perspective of the regulated market economy (where strict and [in most cases] strong boundaries exist between business and politics). We argue that this latter tendency of the political CSR discussion is its main weakness. We introduce a Rawlsian reframing of political CSR that is in line with the idea of a global-regulated market economy and compatible with some of the basic global ethical aims of the political CSR movement.