The child verbal competence effect in court: a comparative study of field investigative interviews of children in child sexual abuse cases

The purpose of this study is to compare field investigative interviews of children (FIIC) with three different legal outcomes in child sexual abuse cases: (i) insufficient evidence to proceed (IEP); (ii) convictions; or (iii) acquittals by the court. One hundred FIIC were divided into one of the three outcome possibilities. Amongst the female interviewees older than 10 years, there were no cases of acquittals and the convicted cases were over-represented. The children's response to open questions was found to be the main difference between the three FIIC outcomes. The responses to these open questions were 1.9 and 2.3 times longer in the convicted cases compared to acquittals and IEP. Possible explanations for the result are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

Fallacies

Fallacies are things people commit, and when they commit them they do something wrong. What kind of activities are people engaged in when they commit fallacies, and in what way are they doing something wrong? Many different things are called fallacies. The diversity of the use of the concept of a fallacy suggests that we are dealing with a family of cases not related by a common essence. However, we suggest a simple account of the nature of fallacies which encompasses them all, viz., the term “fallacy” is our most general term for criticizing any general procedure used for the fixation of beliefs that has an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs, relative to that method of fixing beliefs. Very different sorts of things called fallacies are examined in the light of this account, e.g., denying the antecedent, circular arguments, so-called informal fallacies, and propositions said to be fallacies. We do not provide a theory of fallacies. Still, on our account pretty much all of those things that have been called fallacies are fallacies, and they have been called fallacies for pretty much the same reasons.     

Commentary on “Can a good philosophical contribution be made just by asking a question?”

This paper explains some of the reasoning behind “Can a Good Philosophical Contribution Be Made Just by Asking a Question?,” a paper which consists solely in its title and which is published in the same issue of the journal as the present paper. The method for explaining that reasoning consists in making available a lightly edited version of a letter the authors sent to the editors when submitting the title-only paper. The editors permitted publication of that paper on the condition that the authors also separately publish a version of that letter; the present paper aims to fulfil that condition.     

Circular definitions,circular explanations,and infinite regresses

This paper discusses some of the ways in which circular definitions and circular explanations entail or fail to entail infinite regresses. And since not all infinite regresses are vicious, a few criteria of viciousness are examined in order to determine when the entailment of a regress refutes a circular definition or a circular explanation.I would like to thank Professors Robert Tully, Howard Sobel, and Derek Allen for their constructive comments.     

Logical Pluralism from a Pragmatic Perspective

This paper presents a new view of logical pluralism. This pluralism takes into account how the logical connectives shift, depending on the context in which they occur. Using the Question-Under-Discussion Framework as formulated by Craige Roberts, I identify the contextual factor that is responsible for this shift. I then provide an account of the meanings of the logical connectives which can accommodate this factor. Finally, I suggest that this new pluralism has a certain Carnapian flavour. Questions about the meanings of the connectives or the best logic outside of a specified context are not legitimate questions.     

“Oh Events” for the Professor: Studies and Stories of Religious Studies Abroad

This response explains three ways in which the preceding essays are a significant contribution to the study of study abroad, explores three additional issues, and makes three suggestions for future work on religious studies and study abroad. This response is published alongside of six other essays, comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

A Test of Order-Constrained Hypotheses for Circular Data With Applications to Human Movement Science

Researchers studying the movements of the human body often encounter data measured in angles (e.g., angular displacements of joints). The evaluation of these circular data requires special statistical methods. The authors introduce a new test for the analysis of order-constrained hypotheses for circular data. Through this test, researchers can evaluate their expectations regarding the outcome of an experiment directly by representing their ideas in the form of a hypothesis containing inequality constraints. The resulting data analysis is generally more powerful than one using standard null hypothesis testing. Two examples of circular data from human movement science are presented to illustrate the use of the test. Results from a simulation study show that the test performs well.     

Psicologías para la evolución. Catálogo y crítica de los usos actuales de la Selección Orgánica

Resumen

Ofrecemos una clasificación y análisis crítico de los diversos enfoques que hoy reivindican y utilizan la teoría de la Selección Orgánica (o Efecto Baldwin). Desde una perspectiva constructivista denunciamos el uso generalizado de una interpretación reduccionista de la selección orgánica y de un completo olvido de la psicología ligada específicamente a ella, la psicología genética, destinada a explicar la construcción de innovaciones adaptativas. Esto nos permite un análisis de las limitaciones de las variadísimas interpretaciones que en la actualidad se hacen de la selección orgánica; por ejemplo, desde posiciones neodarwinistas—como la de Dennett—, biosemióticas—Deacon—, waddingtonianas—Matsuda—, de Sistemas Complejos—Depew y Weber—, o epigenéticas—Celia Moore—.