Effects of response requirement and alcohol on human aggressive responding.

Nine men participated in two experiments to determine the effects of increased response requirement and alcohol administration on free-operant aggressive responding. Two response buttons (A and B) were available. Pressing Button A was maintained by a fixed-ratio 100 schedule of point presentation. Subjects were instructed that completion of each fixed-ratio 10 on Button B resulted in the subtraction of a point from a fictitious second subject. Button B presses were defined as aggressive because they ostensibly resulted in the presentation of an aversive stimulus to another person. Aggressive responses were engendered by a random-time schedule of point loss and were maintained by initiation of intervals free of point loss. Instructions attributed these point losses to Button B presses of the fictitious other subject. In Experiment 1, increasing the ratio requirement on Button B decreased the number of ratios completed in 4 of 5 subjects. In Experiment 2, the effects of placebo and three alcohol doses (0.125, 0.25, and 0.375 g/kg) were determined when Button B presses were maintained at ratio values of 20, 40 and 80. Three subjects who reduced aggressive responding with increasing fixed-ratio values reduced aggressive responding further at higher alcohol doses. One subject who did not reduce aggressive responding with increasing fixed-ratio values increased aggressive responding at the highest alcohol dose. The results of this study support suggestions that alcohol alters aggressive behavior by reducing the control of competing contingencies.     

Self-control and impulsiveness in children and adults: Effects of food preferences

Experiment 1 used 6 preschool boys and Experiment 2 used 6 adult women to explore the effects of food preference on humans' choice in self-control paradigms. The boys showed a higher proportion of responses for more delayed, larger reinforcers (a measure of self-control) when those choices resulted in receipt of the most preferred food compared to when those choices resulted in the least preferred food. Further, the boys chose the less delayed, smaller reinforcers significantly more often when only those choices, as opposed to both choices, resulted in the most preferred food. Conversely, they chose the more delayed, larger reinforcers significantly more often when only those choices, as opposed to both choices, resulted in the most preferred food. Finally, the women demonstrated significantly less sensitivity to reinforcer amount relative to sensitivity to reinforcer delay (another measure of self-control) when they had a higher preference for the juice received as the less delayed, smaller reinforcer than for the juice received as the more delayed, larger reinforcer. Together, the results show that subjects' food preferences can influence self-control for food reinforcers.     

Exchange delays and impulsive choice in adult humans.

Choice responding by adult humans in a discrete-trial task was examined as a function of conditions that manipulated either the delay to point delivery or the delay between points and their exchange for money. In point-delay conditions, subjects chose between an "impulsive" alternative that provided a small amount of points immediately and a "self-control" alternative that provided a larger amount of points delayed by 15, 30, or 60 s. Points were exchanged for money immediately following the session. Subjects preferred the self-control alternative. In exchange-delay conditions, subjects chose between a small amount of points exchangeable for money immediately following the session and a larger amount of points exchangeable for money after 1 day, 3 weeks, or 6 weeks. A self-control preference observed for all subjects in the 1-day exchange-delay condition reversed to exclusive impulsive preference for 4 of the 6 subjects when choice conditions involved exchange delays of 3 or 6 weeks. These results show that human choice is sensitive to the manipulation of exchange delays and that impulsive preference can be obtained with exchange delays on the order of weeks.     

Context dependent changes in the reinforcing strength of schedule-induced drinking.

Previous experiments show that the opportunity to engage in schedule-induced responding is reinforcing. In this experiment, the reinforcing strength of schedule-induced drinking was measured. Four rats were trained on a concurrent-chain schedule. The two terminal links provided food pellets on identical fixed-time schedules. In addition, one terminal link also provided the opportunity to press a button that operated a water dipper. In this link, the rats showed polydipsic drinking. Button-pressing rate for polydipsic drinking was a bitonic function of pellet rate, and it was possible to describe the relationship with a slightly modified version of the matching equation for primary reinforcement. This equation also closely fit the data from other studies. Initial-link response rates, however, did not appear to be influenced by the availability of water in the terminal links. Control conditions suggested that the reinforcing strength of polydipsia was strongly bound to the context provided by periodic food reinforcement.     

The effects of modifying consummatory behavior on the topography of the autoshaped pecking response in pigeons

The autoshaped responses of two debeaked pigeons that had developed modified eating behavior were compared to the autoshaped responses of three control subjects that ate grain normally. The control subjects exhibited keylight responding that was judged normal by two independent raters. The debeaked subjects pecked the key and ate grain with both normal and modified responses. The results of this study demostrate that an autoshaping procedure using grain as an appetitive stimulus may be used to establish a response that is not biologically preorganized.     

Performance of humans in concurrent avoidance/positive-reinforcement schedules

Performance maintained under concurrent schedules consisting of a variable-interval avoidance component and a variable-interval positive-reinforcement component was studied in three human subjects using points exchangeable for money as the reinforcer. The rate of responding in the avoidance component increased, and the rate of responding in the positive-reinforcement component declined, as a function of the frequency of point-losses avoided in the avoidance component. The performance of all three subjects conformed to equations proposed by Herrnstein to describe behavior in concurrent schedules. The logarithms of the ratios of the response rates in the two components, and the logarithms of the ratios of the times spent in the two components, were linearly related to the logarithms of the ratios of the frequency of loss avoidance in the avoidance component to the frequency of reinforcement in the positive-reinforcement component. When a changeover delay of 5.0 sec was imposed, the slopes of the linear functions were close to 1.0 in the case of two subjects, whereas the third subject exhibited significant undermatching. For two subjects the changeover delay was then reduced to 2.0 sec; in both cases the slopes of the linear functions were lower than under the 5.0-sec condition. One subject participated in a third phase, in which no changeover delay was imposed; there was a further reduction in the slopes of the linear functions.     

How Do I Treat My Hungry Lion: A Model for Violence Management in Prison

This theoretical model for the management of violence relies on the notion that there are fundamentally only two kinds of prison violence—provoked and unprovoked—and that all violence is caused by the influence of some fear-causing agent which triggers the autonomic nervous system's Fight or Flight Response (FFR) which in turn causes the release of FFR chemicals to create and enable an action potential for violence in the actor. Provoked violence is an act of violence which occurs in response to an FFR instigated by some external, independent contemporaneous, real or imagined fear causing agent. Treating provoked violence must include suppressing the production of an excess of FFR stimulant chemicals, which at the same time employing psychodynamic therapy to modify the negative behavior learned from a lifetime of excessive responses to FFR chemical releases. Unprovoked violence is the result of an actor's addiction to FFR chemicals. This addiction leads the actor to experience an apperceptive compulsion to engage in thrill seeking as a method of exposing himself to fear causing agents that are calculated to cause the release of FFR chemicals. In order to treat unprovoked violence you must treat both the chemical addiction and the negative pattern of behavior which was learned to support the habit of self-triggering an FFR. Thus any successful treatment of violence must employ both energetic and psychodynamic models for development of fear management strategies.     

Le juge,le médecin et le détenu. Regard critique sur la suspension de peine pour raison médicale

The purpose of the article is to give a critical view of the “suspension médicale” (a kind of compassionate release), which is often considered as a “humanist” law. Based on a research conducted on the experience of prisoners at the end of their lives, it appeared that many more or less objective criteria are involved in the decision-making process. In this context, physicians and magistrates try to articulate their actions according to expertise. The decision of granting or refusal also depends on the perception of the prisoner's personality. The application of the law thus reflects the tensions and alliances between medicine and justice in the treatment of a deviant and vulnerable population.     

How to Release Oneself from an Obligation: Good News for Duties to Oneself

In some cases, you may release someone from some obligation they have to you. For instance, you may release them from a promise they made to you, or an obligation to repay money they have borrowed from you. But most take it as clear that, if you have an obligation to someone else, you cannot in any way release yourself from that obligation. I shall argue the contrary. The issue is important because one standard problem for the idea of having duties to oneself relies on the impossibility of self-release. The argument (the ‘Release Argument’) is that a duty to oneself would be a duty from which one could release oneself, but that this is an absurdity, and so there can be no duties to oneself. This argument is to be rejected because a duty from which one can release oneself is perfectly possible, and such release occurs quite properly from time to time.