Postmodernism: What One Needs to Know

This essay is an introduction to postmodernism and deconstruction as they relate to the special challenges of scholarship and teaching in the science and religion multidiscipline.     

The place of human values in the language of science: Kuhn,Saussure, and structuralism

The current paradigm in medicine generally distinguishes between genetic and environmental causes of disease. Although the word paradigm has become a commonplace, the theories of Thomas Kuhn have not received much attention in the journals of medicine. Kuhn's structuralist method differs radically from the daily activities of the scientific method itself. Using linguistic theory, this essay offers a structuralist reading of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Our purpose is to highlight the similarities between these structuralist models of science and language. In part, we focus on the logic that enables Kuhn to assert the priority of perception over interpretation in the history of science. To illustrate some of these issues, we refer to the distinction between environmental and genetic causes of disease. While the activity of scientific research results in the revision of concepts in science, the production of significant differences that shape our knowledge is in part a social and linguistic process.     

语言转向和西方心理学理论和研究的深入发展

语言转向是西方哲学自我批判的产物,对西方心理学摆脱“康德式难题”具有重要意义。该文以西方哲学语言转向的内在逻辑为理论背景,分析了由此引发的西方心理学研究主题、线索和路径变迁。分析哲学、解释学和结构主义是语言转向的三种方式,共同实现了20世纪的语言转向,影响心理学理论和研究的变迁,推动心理学关注语言建构和文本陈述,激发新的心理学理论和研究。     

The "Natural" and the "Formal"

The paper presents an argument against a metaphysical conception of logic according to which logic spells out a specific kind of mathematical structure that is somehow inherently related to our factual reasoning. In contrast, it is argued that it is always an empirical question as to whether a given mathematical structure really does captures a principle of reasoning. (More generally, it is argued that it is not meaningful to replace an empirical investigation of a thing by an investigation of its a priori analyzable structure without paying due attention to the question of whether it really is the structure of the thing in question.) It is proposed to elucidate the situation by distinguishing two essentially different realms with which our reason must deal: the realm of the natural, constituted by the things of our empirical world, and the realm of the formal, constituted by the structures that we use as prisms to view, to make sense of, and to reconstruct the world. It is suggested that this vantage point may throw light on many foundational problems of logic.     

The ontology of words: a structural approach

Words form a fundamental basis for our understanding of linguistic practice. However, the precise ontology of words has eluded many philosophers and linguists. A persistent difficulty for most accounts of words is the type-token distinction [Bromberger, S. 1989. “Types and Tokens in Linguistics.” In Reflections on Chomsky, edited by A. George, 58–90. Basil Blackwell; Kaplan, D. 1990. “Words.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume LXIV: 93–119]. In this paper, I present a novel account of words which differs from the atomistic and platonistic conceptions of previous accounts which I argue fall prey to this problem. Specifically, I proffer a structuralist account of linguistic items, along the lines of structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics [Shapiro, S. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. Oxford University Press], in which words are defined in part as positions in larger linguistic structures. I then follow Szabò [1999. “Expressions and Their Representations.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195): 145–163] and Parsons [1990. “The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects.” Synthese 84: 303–346] in further defining words as quasi-concrete objects according to a representation relation. This view aims for general correspondence with contemporary generative linguistic approaches to the study of language.     

Do Ante Rem Mathematical Structures Instantiate Themselves?

Ante rem structuralists claim that mathematical objects are places in ante rem structural universals. They also hold that the places in these structural universals instantiate themselves. This paper is an investigation of this self-instantiation thesis. I begin by pointing out that this thesis is of central importance: unless the places of a mathematical structure, such as the places of the natural number structure, themselves instantiate the structure, they cannot have any arithmetical properties. But if places do not have arithmetical properties, then they cannot be the natural numbers. The self-instantiation thesis turns out to be crucial for the identification of mathematical objects with places in structures. Unfortunately, we have no reason to believe that the self-instantiation thesis is true.     

Social psychology and social networks: Individuals and social systems

Social psychology and social network research are both centrally concerned with human sociality. Despite some historically significant interactions between the two, these areas of investigation have not been usefully deployed together in recent research endeavours. The present paper attempts to bring out some points of both theoretical and methodological contentions, to characterize the gap between them, to traverse briefly the trajectories of their historical development, and to provide some concrete instances of these differences. Intellectual resources available to Asian social psychology are reviewed, which may help bridge the gap between the two areas of research. We conclude by calling for a greater integration of social psychology and social network perspectives in future research.     

On three arguments against categorical structuralism

Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory.     

Pragmatic post‐structuralism (I): participant observation and discourse in evaluating violence intervention

This paper discusses the process and merits of a post‐structuralist approach to participant observation and describes the use of this research strategy in evaluating a community based ‘stopping violence’ programme. While the participant observation research strategy is commonly employed as a ‘process evaluation’ method (Rossi and Freeman, 1993 ) it's role within a distinctly post‐structuralist programme is a novel application of a well‐established research strategy. This has significant implications for how social scientists may approach both participant observation and evaluation in the future. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Marx,Hegel, and Critical Theory in Postwar Germany: A Conversation with Iring Fetscher

This paper consists of an introduction to the life and work of Iring Fetscher by the interviewer, followed by a conversation with Fetscher, and notes. In the interview, Fetscher discusses his relationship to Marxism, Hegelianism, Lukács, and the Frankfurt School, as well as his critique of Althusser. The contribution of Fetscher, an extremely well-known German specialist on Soviet and Marxist thought, is here discussed in greater detail than anywhere else to date in the English-language scholarly literature.