Growing Up Can Be Painful: A Case Report of the Bat Mitzvah and Chronic Pain

Among a subgroup of adolescents with chronic pain syndromes, anxiety about “growing up” appears common and may be exacerbated by developmental transitions. Using the bat mitzvah ceremony as one example of a developmental rite of passage, we present two cases in which adolescent girls facing this transition developed new chronic musculoskeletal pain syndromes or experienced recurrences of pain symptoms. In both cases, the transition to adulthood, symbolized by the bat mitzvah, was associated with anxiety in adolescents who were unusually focused on the negative aspects of becoming independent adults. The aims of this case report are (1) to highlight the role of developmental transitions as a possible factor in the biopsychosocial model of pediatric pain; (2) to illustrate how to address emotional and cognitive responses to these transitions in the context of cognitive-behavioral treatment for pain; and (3) to suggest systematic approaches to investigating this clinically-observed phenomenon in future research.     

A developmental study of the bat/ball problem of CRT: How to override the bias and its relation to executive functioning

In two experiments, we explored the nature of the bias observed in the bat/ball problem of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick, 2005, J. Econ. Perspect., 19, 25), how to override it, and its relation to executive functioning. Based on the original bat/ball problem, we designed two additional isomorphic items. In Experiment 1, for four age groups, including 7-, 11-, and 15-year-olds and adults, we determined that the bias is related to the System 1 intervention; the performance in this item was not a matter of mathematical ability and it could be facilitated by changing the order in which the problems were presented. In Experiment 2, we determined that for 15-year-olds, good and bad performances in the item were related to executive functioning, particularly response-distractor inhibition, updating information in working memory, and the regulation of attention; however, subtle differences were identified when the problem was performed in a facilitative context compared with a non-facilitative context. The results indicated that cognitive abilities are a necessary but non-sufficient condition to resolve the problem.     

KINDS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT IT IS LIKE TO BE SOMETHING?

Abstract: In this article I distinguish the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature from that of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Work on consciousness has typically dealt with the latter while employing the language of the former. I propose several ways of analyzing what it is like to be a certain kind of creature and find problems with them all. The upshot is that even if there is something it is like to have certain kinds of experience, it does not follow that there is anything it is like to be a certain kind of creature. Skepticism about the existence of something that it is like to be an F is recommended.