Does the philosophy of medicine exist?

There has been a great deal of discussion, in this journal and others, about obstacles hindering the evolution of the philosophy of medicine. Such discussions presuppose that there is widespread agreement about what it is that constitutes the philosophy of medicine.Despite the fact that there is, and has been for decades, a great deal of literature, teaching and professional activity carried out explicitly in the name of the philosophy of medicine, this is not enough to establish that consensus exists as to the definition of the field. And even if consensus can be obtained as to what constitutes the philosophy of medicine, this does not mean that it exists as a field.     

Commentary on “Can a good philosophical contribution be made just by asking a question?”

This paper explains some of the reasoning behind “Can a Good Philosophical Contribution Be Made Just by Asking a Question?,” a paper which consists solely in its title and which is published in the same issue of the journal as the present paper. The method for explaining that reasoning consists in making available a lightly edited version of a letter the authors sent to the editors when submitting the title-only paper. The editors permitted publication of that paper on the condition that the authors also separately publish a version of that letter; the present paper aims to fulfil that condition.     

Awakening from Descartes' nightmare: On the love of ambiguity in phenomenological approaches to education

This paper is an exploration of the Cartesian paradigms of clarity and univocity and how these inform contemporary educational theory and practice. Phenomenology is discussed as a way of disrupting Descartes' visions of clarity and distinctness as paradigms of knowledge and as a return of inquiry to life as it is actually lived. Analogical discourse is examined as a way of giving a voice to this sort of inquiry. Heidegger's notions of inquiry as obedience and thanksgiving are discussed.     

Towards reflexive practice: Engaging participants as co-researchers or co-analysts in psychological inquiry

This paper considers some of the implications of reflexivity for the practice of psychological research. After a brief consideration of the theoretical background to a concern with reflexivity, the paper goes on to examine how various researchers have attempted to incorporate components of reflexivity in their research practice. While a group of sociologists of science have operationalized reflexivity by self-conscious concern for their own role in the construction of social—scientific knowledge, new paradigm co-operative inquirers interpret a need for reflexivity by including their participants as fully self-reflexive co-researchers. Mulkay's suggestion for a dialogic analytical exchange with one's participants is also considered. The second half of the paper illustrates an attempt at reflexive practice in the authors' own research. This was a project concerned with identity change during the transition to motherhood, and aimed to allow the women a strong hand in helping to shape the project's direction. Preliminary analysis of a woman's data was taken back to her for her comments, and her reflections on the data were incorporated in the final case study. A detailed example of the investigator and participant's discussion of a piece of data is provided.     

The explicit and implicit dance in psychoanalytic change

How the implicit/non-declarative and explicit/declarative cognitive domains interact is centrally important in the consideration of effecting change within the psychoanalytic arena. Stern et al. (1998) declare that long-lasting change occurs in the domain of implicit relational knowledge. In the view of this author, the implicit and explicit domains are intricately intertwined in an interactive dance within a psychoanalytic process. The author views that a spirit of inquiry (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage 2002) serves as the foundation of the psychoanalytic process. Analyst and patient strive to explore, understand and communicate and, thereby, create a 'spirit' of interaction that contributes, through gradual incremental learning, to new implicit relational knowledge. This spirit, as part of the implicit relational interaction, is a cornerstone of the analytic relationship. The 'inquiry' more directly brings explicit/declarative processing to the foreground in the joint attempt to explore and understand. The spirit of inquiry in the psychoanalytic arena highlights both the autobiographical scenarios of the explicit memory system and the mental models of the implicit memory system as each contributes to a sense of self, other, and self with other. This process facilitates the extrication and suspension of the old models, so that new models based on current relational experience can be gradually integrated into both memory systems for lasting change.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed: Joshua I. Miller, Democratic Temperament: The Legacy of William James Ellen Kappy Suckiel, Heaven's Champion: William James's Philosophy of Religion Ruth Anna Putnam (ed), The Cambridge Companion to William James David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucious, and the Hope for Democracy in China Dale Jacquette, Wittgenstein's Thought in Transition Michael T. Chiselin, Metaphysics and the Origin of Species Richard Swinburne, Is There a God? Evert van der Zweerde, Soviet Historiography of Philosophy Rem B. Edwards (ed), Ethics of Psychiatry: Insanity, Rational Autonomy, and Mental Health Care Jennifer Radden, Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality     

Why global justice matters

Why does global justice as a philosophical inquiry matter? We know that the world is plainly unjust in many ways and we know that something ought to be done about this without, it seems, the need of a theory of global justice. Accordingly, philosophical inquiry into global justice comes across to some as an intellectual luxury that seems disconnected from the real world. I want to suggest, however, that philosophical inquiry into global justice is necessary if we want to address the problems of humanity. First, in some cases, a theory of global justice is needed for identifying what counts as legitimate problems of justice. Second, even in obvious cases of injustices, such as the fact of preventable extreme poverty to which we know we have an obligation to respond, we cannot know the content and the limits of these obligations and who the primary bearers of these obligations are without some theoretical guidance. However, I acknowledge that philosophical inquiry on global justice risks becoming a philosophical parlor game if it loses sight of the real-world problems that motivate the inquiry in the first place. If global justice is to provide the tools for addressing the problems of humanity, it must remain a problems-driven enterprise.     

Word use of outpatients with a personality disorder and concurrent or previous major depressive disorder

In a recent study, Rude, Gortner, and Pennebaker (2004) found word use to be related to depression and vulnerability to depression in the essays of college students. We sought to replicate and extend these findings in a clinical sample. Written essays of 304 psychiatric outpatients with a personality disorder and a mixed psychiatric profile on DSM-IV axis-I and 108 healthy controls were examined with word count software. Data on the tendency to be discrepant about the current self compared to a more ideal self were also gathered. We found that psychiatric outpatients in general used more words referring to the self and negative emotion words and fewer positive emotion words, compared to healthy controls. However, word-use proved unrelated to depression specifically. Actual-ideal self discrepancies were related to patient status and to current depression. Contrary to our hypothesis, these discrepancies did not correlate with the use of words referring to the self. We conclude that the negative content and self-focus of written essays and high levels of discrepancy reflect a negative thinking style that is common to a range of psychiatric disorders rather than being specific to depression.