The ironic impact of intergroup apologies on intergroup attitudes: Understanding the role of perceived power for post‐apology outgroup attitudes

The present research investigates how intergroup apologies, defined as apologies between two groups, affect perceived remorse and outgroup attitudes (e.g., explicit and implicit), in the context of power asymmetries. We recruited participants from two countries that differ in perceived power: South Korea and the United States. Participants read a vignette describing a violent act committed by an outgroup member (Korean or American), with or without an intergroup apology. Participants answered questions assessing perceived remorse and explicit attitudes toward the outgroup, followed by the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Results revealed that Koreans perceived less remorse following an intergroup apology from the United States, compared to when they did not read an intergroup apology. Further, a mediated moderation analysis indicated that perceived remorse mediated the relationship between apology and explicit attitudes towards the United States. However, an analogous effect for implicit attitudes was only marginally significant. In contrast, among American participants, no effect of the apology on perceived remorse, explicit attitudes, or implicit attitudes and no evidence for a mediation was found. We discuss the implications of these effects on understanding the effectiveness of intergroup apologies between countries that differ in perceived power.     

Semantic and Moral Luck

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either.     

‘I’ll Make It Up to You:’ Examining the effect of apologies on forgiveness

Receiving an apology is a key component to the management of conflict and the likelihood that forgiveness will occur. However, not all apologies are effective at alleviating interpersonal conflict. The current research focused on the content of an apology (e.g. ‘I’ll make it up to you; I was wrong; I feel bad that I did this …’) and the differential impact this content may have on self-reported and behavioral forgiveness among young adults. Seven different apologies were designed and tested for effectiveness within an experimentally created transgression. Undergraduate students (N = 199) completed a distribution of resources task in which the researchers simulated a transgression experience without the students’ knowledge. Following the transgression, students received one of the seven apologies. Results indicate that receiving an apology that expressed a desire to compensate for wrongdoing appeared to be the most effective apology in terms of promoting both self-reported and behavioral forgiveness.     

Trust maintenance as a function of construal level and attributions: The case of apologies

When do recipients of an apology (“trustors”) base their decision to trust a perpetrator (a “trustee”) on the attributional information embedded in an apology? Attributions provide a detailed account of the trustee's causal involvement in committing a transgression. We therefore argue that trustors in a low construal level mindset use this information in their trusting decision. However, trustors in a high construal level mindset likely consider all apologies as simple statements of regret, regardless of the attributional information they contain. We find support for this argument in four laboratory experiments. This research nuances the idea that to restore trust by means of an apology, the trustee must only use an effective attribution for a negative outcome. We also present a more realistic understanding of the process leading from apologies to trust than has been offered in previous work by simultaneously considering the role of the trustor and that of the trustee in the trust restoration process.     

Asymmetries between victims' and transgressors' perspectives following interpersonal transgressions

When interpersonal transgressions occur, the involved parties try to understand what occurred and how justice should be restored. However, research has documented that victims and transgressors often diverge in their accounts of what transpired. In this paper, I review and summarize empirical research on victims' and transgressors' asymmetric perceptions of interpersonal transgressions and the different justice‐restoring responses each party subsequently desires. By conceptualizing transgressions in terms of the social roles of victim and transgressor, I contend that justice responses can be thought of as attempts to correct inequitable distributions of material and symbolic resources. This social exchange perspective enables us to understand each party's motives and how various justice responses might satisfy them. I argue that because of these asymmetric perspectives, reconciliation is difficult, and conflict is liable to be perpetuated rather than resolved.     

A Long Time Coming: Delays in Collective Apologies and Their Effects on Sincerity and Forgiveness

Political apologies by one group to another often occur a significant period of time after the original transgression. What effect does such a delay have on perceptions of sincerity and forgiveness? A delayed apology could reflect the offender group's reluctance to apologize, or, alternatively, it could represent time and consideration spent on developing an appropriate response. In the latter case, the delayed apology would represent a sincere acknowledgment of the harm done, whereas in the former case it would not. In two studies, we found that a verbal collective apology, when delayed, was perceived to be less sincere than when offered more immediately following a transgression, and this translated to less forgiveness. However, in Study 2, the negative effects of time delay on sincerity and forgiveness were mitigated or reversed when the apology was in the form of commemoration. The commemorative apology, in particular when delayed, gave rise to favorable attributions (including representativeness of apologizing group, commitment to remember, and giving voice to victims), which mediated the effects on sincerity. The results suggest that collective apologies that are offered with considerable delay appear less meaningful and less deserving of a forgiving response, unless the apologizing group is able to express consideration and thoughtfulness through the apology process.     

Expectations Among Aboriginal Peoples in Canada Regarding the Potential Impacts of a Government Apology

After continued pressure, the Canadian government offered an apology to Aboriginal peoples for its role in the Indian Residential School (IRS) system, where children were removed from their families in an effort to assimilate the Aboriginal population. Although the apology was sought after, it was unclear what Aboriginal peoples expected it to accomplish in relation to their treatment and quality of life within Canada. Quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed that, although Aboriginal adults (N = 164) felt the apology could potentially be a first step towards improved relations with the government and non‐Aboriginal Canadians, expectations that such changes would actually come to fruition were generally pessimistic. In exploring predictors of such expectations, path analysis indicated that those who had been intimately impacted by IRSs reported greater perceived discrimination that, in turn, was associated with lowered intergroup trust and forgiveness. Those who perceived high levels of discrimination were less likely to expect changes following the apology, which was mediated by the low levels of intergroup trust and forgiveness towards the government, but not towards non‐Aboriginal Canadians. Essentially, an apology was not enough to elicit hope for improved intergroup relations, especially when perceptions of continued discrimination impeded the restoration of intergroup trust and forgiveness.     

Collective Apologies and Their Effects on Forgiveness: Pessimistic Evidence but Constructive Implications

In the last three decades, there has been an explosion in the frequency with which leaders of groups have issued official apologies for collective transgressions. These apologies are commonly assumed to lay a pathway to forgiveness and reconciliation, but empirical examination of the downstream consequences of collective apologies is still in its infancy. In this article, we review a series of studies—including interview studies, survey studies, and experiments—that question the assumed wisdom that collective apologies lead to intergroup forgiveness. Reasons for the muted evidence of an apology–forgiveness link at the intergroup level are elaborated, and implications for how best to issue gestures of reconciliation and remorse are discussed.