Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.     

TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE: ON DREAMING THE IMPOSSIBLE

Abstract. My comment on Ethics in an Age of Technology, volume 2 of Ian G. Barbour's Gifford Lectures, acknowledges the excellence of Barbour's depictions of the social-cum-technological problems facing humanity in the coming millennium. Barbour's proposed solutions, too, are reasonable—but usually presuppose fundamental reforms in social values, especially within the powerful industrialized societies. Without further analysis of technology and values, this seems to make such solutions “impossible dreams.” My thesis is that clear analysis of the ideal aspects of technology (as itself the embodiment of knowledge and values), plus clues from Alfred North Whitehead on the dynamics of social change, can reinforce hope even in “impossible” dreams. First, technology, though embodied in solid material machinery and powerful social institutions, is no more “solid” than constant reaffirmation of the values behind it (as was the case with the Berlin Wall). Second, great ideals, over time, have the power to help create the conditions of their own possibility. Social change is both “pushed” by coercive forces (e.g., climate changes) and “pulled” by great values (e.g., human dignity). Therefore there are practical benefits to be gained from attending to, and celebrating, even currently “impossible” dreams as they work to make themselves possible.     

The history of Russian psychoanalysis and the problem of its periodisation

The formation and spread of the psychoanalytic teaching of Sigmund Freud and his followers is one of the most significant events in the life of the spirit in the twentieth century. The recognition of this as an historical fact--irrespective of its relation to Freud and his ideas--assumes of course and need to gain a proper understanding and appropriate interpretation of psychoanalysis in all its dimensions. Generally speaking, the history of psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic movement has been researched quite fully, although for a variety of reasons and circumstances there are a number of gaps in it. Perhaps the most important of these is the history of Russian psychoanalysis, which has developed within a country where, at the beginning of the century, Freud's works were translated and published in a most effective and representative way, and where psychoanalytic ideas drew a response both from specialists and among the public at large, although in content and inclination the Russian mentality did not at heart suit a psychoanalytical treatment of man and his culture.     

Experimentally enhancing self-compassion: Moderating effects of trait care-seeking and perceived stress

Social mentality theory suggests that the ability to be reassuring and compassionate to oneself relies on the activation of care-seeking and caregiving mentalities. In this experimental study, college students were randomly assigned to recall memories of care-seeking, caregiving, a combination of care-seeking and caregiving, having fun (active control group), or a no-treatment control group. Participants completed the memory recall task twice per day for four days and were assessed on pre- and post-test levels of self-reassurance. Findings showed a moderating effect of individual differences in trait care-seeking and perceived stress. In response to the caregiving interventions, high care-seekers exhibited increased self-reassurance whereas low care-seekers exhibited decreased self-reassurance. In response to the care-seeking interventions, highly stressed individuals showed increased self-reassurance. Findings suggest that fostering self-compassion/reassurance can be achieved for certain individuals by activating the interpersonal processes involved in care-seeking and caregiving with others.     

On Post‐apocalyptic and Doomsday Prepping Beliefs: A New Measure,its Correlates,and the Motivation to Prep

Post‐apocalyptic scenarios provide the basis for popular television shows, video games, and books. These scenarios may be popular because people have their own beliefs and visions about the apocalypse and the need to prepare. The prevalence of such beliefs might also hold societal relevance and serve as a type of projective test of personality. However, there are no quantitative accounts of post‐apocalyptic or prepping beliefs. As such, we conducted seven studies (N_total = 1034) to do so. In Studies 1 and 2, we developed a post‐apocalyptic and prepping beliefs scale, explored its correlates, and confirmed its structure and psychometric properties. In Study 3, we attempted to activate a ‘prepper’ mindset and further explore the correlates of the new scale. In Studies 4 and 5, we investigated covariations in daily feelings, thoughts, and events, and prepping beliefs. In Studies 6a and 6b, we compared scores from ‘real’ preppers and to a non‐prepping group. Overall, we found that post‐apocalyptic concerns and prepping beliefs are predictive of low agreeableness and humility, paranoia, cynicism, conspiracy mentality, conservatism, and social dominance orientation. We also found that increased belief in the need to prep is associated with God‐belief, negative daily experiences, and global political events. © 2019 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Unfounded beliefs among teachers: The interactive role of rationality priming and cognitive ability

Previous research suggests that unfounded beliefs (UB)—such as conspiracist beliefs and beliefs in the supernatural—stem from similar cognitive and motivational mechanisms. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that cognitive ability is negatively associated with UB but only among individuals who value epistemic rationality. The present study goes beyond previous correlational studies by examining whether the negative association between cognitive ability and UB can be strengthened through a subtle rationality prime. In a large scale online experiment (N = 762 French teachers), we demonstrate that priming rationality (vs. control) does enhance the negative relationship between cognitive ability and adherence to supernatural beliefs, as well as conspiracy mentality (d = 0.2). This effect was not obtained for illusory pattern perception. This study's usefulness as a “proof of concept” for future interventions aimed at reducing UB prevalence among the general public is discussed.     

When criticism is ineffective: The case of historical trauma and unsupportive allies

Three studies examined the effect of historical trauma reminders and criticism from international allies on attitudes toward current conflicts. In Study 1, Israeli participants (N = 116) were primed with the Holocaust, and read either that the U.S. President Obama supports Israel's right to defend itself and attack Iran, or that he opposes such action. Then, support for preemptive violence was assessed. Study 2 (N = 133) replicated this design, comparing inclusive and exclusive framings of the Holocaust. Study 3 (N = 478), examined the effect of Holocaust reminders and criticism from the European Union on attitudes toward militant policies against Palestinians. All three studies found that Holocaust primes juxtaposed with international criticism increased support for aggression, especially under exclusive framings of the Holocaust. Study 3, however, found this effect only among left‐wing participants. These findings indicate that when historical trauma is salient, international criticism may be ineffective and may even backfire.     

文化心理学的双重内涵

文化心理学具有双重内涵。一种内涵可以表达为“文化心理”学,关注研究对象的文化特征,以“文化心理”为主要研究内容;另一种内涵可以表达为文化“心理学”,强调研究者的文化负载,以“心理文化”为主要研究内容。当前文化心理学的研究未能有效整合“文化心理”与“心理文化”,这妨碍了对文化心理学的整体理解     

学习的倦怠之原因与对策研究

学习的倦怠是一种消极的萎靡不振的身心状态,是乏力、焦虑、厌倦、冷漠、消沉、郁闷、悲观等的综合反映。学习过分紧张,破坏生命节律,学习和升学上的压力过大,学习上的挫折与归因不当,缺乏自信心等都是学习倦怠的根源。恢复体力和脑力,科学安排学习生活;舒缓压力,放飞心灵;改进学习,创造成功体验;积极评价,找回自信等都是解决倦怠的有效措施。     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.