Stylistic appearances and linguistic diversity

Philosophy is beginning to pay problems of linguistic justice the attention they deserve in today's heavily interconnected and migrant world. Contemporary philosophy itself, however, has a particular problem of linguistic justice that deserves metaphilosophical attention. At least in the philosophical tradition that is mainstream in much of the world today, viz., analytic philosophy, methodological and sociological mechanisms make it the case that the voices of non-(native) Anglophone philosophers are substantially less heard. Among the mechanisms responsible for this situation, argues this paper, is the emphasis given by influential philosophical institutions to linguistic style and appearances as signs of clarity, precision, and rigour in the treatment of philosophical problems. Such an emphasis is not justifiable, in part because it deprives philosophy of a wider variety of perspectives. The paper concludes by presenting and motivating a recent initiative that aims to foster greater linguistic and cultural diversity within the profession.     

Detection of words versus good old counting: A note on Mizrahi and Dickinson, “The analytic-continental divide in philosophical practice”

In a recent Metaphilosophy article, Moti Mizrahi and Michael Dickinson argue against characterizing the divide between analytical and continental philosophy as a divide in the use of arguments. This hypothesis is rejected on the basis of a text-mining approach. The present paper argues that the results they extracted do not answer the questions they set out to answer as well as would have been possible. This is due to Mizrahi and Dickinson's choice to disregard duplicate occurrences of argument word pairs, their main indicator for the occurrence of arguments in articles. This paper reconstructs their method by now also counting duplicates. A small corpus (n = 436) of recent (2015–2021) analytical and continental articles is used to rerun the experiment; the results oppose Mizrahi and Dickinson's and suggest that arguments (as operationalized by Mizrahi and Dickinson) occur more in analytical articles. The paper argues that part of the discrepancy derives from the specific methodological choices they made.     

What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.     

Does Analytic Thinking Insulate Against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation? Evidence From Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have long targeted Ukraine. We investigate susceptibility to this pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective. Is greater analytic thinking associated with less belief in disinformation, as per classical theories of reasoning? Or does analytic thinking amplify motivated system 2 reasoning (or “cultural cognition”), such that analytic thinking is associated with more polarized beliefs (and thus more belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation among pro-Russia Ukrainians)? In online (N = 1,974) and face-to-face representative (N = 9,474) samples of Ukrainians, we find support for the classical reasoning account. Analytic thinking, as measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test, was associated with greater ability to discern truth from disinformation—even for Ukrainians who are strongly oriented towards Russia. We find similar, albeit weaker, results when operationalizing analytic thinking using the self-report Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale. These results demonstrate a similar pattern to prior work using American participants. Thus, the positive association between analytic thinking and the ability to discern truth versus falsehood generalizes to the qualitatively different information environment of postcommunist Ukraine. Despite low trust in government and media, weak journalistic standards, and years of exposure to Russian disinformation, Ukrainians who engage in more analytic thinking are better able to tell truth from falsehood.     

Thinking disposition,thinking style,and susceptibility to causal illusion predict fake news discriminability

Acceptance of fake news is probably modulated by an intricate interplay of social, cultural, and political factors. In this study, we investigated whether individual-level cognitive factors related to thinking and decision making could influence the tendency to accept fake news. A group of volunteers responded to a COVID19-related fake news discrimination scale as well as to questionnaires assessing their thinking style (reflective vs. intuitive) and thinking disposition (actively open-mindedness). Furthermore, they completed a computerized contingency learning task aimed at measuring their tendency to develop a causal illusion, a cognitive bias leading to perceive causal connections between non-contingent events. More actively open-minded and more reflective individuals presented higher fake news discrimination scores. In addition, those who developed weaker causal illusions in the contingency learning task were also more accurate at differentiating between fake and legitimate news. Actively open-minded thinking was the main contributor in a regression model predicting fake news discrimination.     

Developing the matrix representation grid (MRG): A method for observing group processes. Findings from time-limited group psychotherapy for alcohol-dependent patients

The MRG was published 1988 in order to support developments in group psychotherapy methods as one of the all too few process observation research methods for studying group-as-a-whole. After 9 years of what pilot studies have labeled successful clinical trials, this study aims at validating the MRG against the established SAVI: Structural Analysis of Verbal Interaction (Agazarian & Simon 1989). Videotaped group sessions from short-term groups for alcohol dependent patients conducted along two therapy methods, one behaviorally oriented and the other group analytic, are used as material. The MRG is validated in the study, confirmed to be clinically valuable, and some interesting comparisons between the two treatment modalities are also made.     

Interpersonal conflict in group therapy: An object relations perspective

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how object relations theory can be used to understand and regulate interpersonal conflict in group psychotherapy. Such concepts as projective identification, intersubjectivity and the analytic third are used to describe how conflict emerges in group psychotherapy and how it can be worked through. Case material is also provided to illustrate concepts and techniques in promoting a group's transition from a paranoid/schizoid to a depressive position. Positive aspects of the concept of projective identification are discussed including its use as a form of communication, a method of reducing anxiety and reintegrating previously dangerous and threatening aspects of the self.The paper was funded by Evan F. Lilly Memorial Trust Grant PV 13,067.     

Validity and temporal stability of the chimeric face technique for studying hemispheric processing asymmetries: Data from 6-through 14-year-old children

The validity and temporal stability of the chimeric face technique as a measure of cerebral hemispheric functioning in children were investigated. The method is based upon the observation that when a subject encounters a representation of the human face, the left side (from the observer's point of view) of the face dominates his or her perception of it. This bias was shown to be present in a majority of children ranging from 6 through 14 years old, and it was stronger for right-handers than for left-handers. The 1-month temporal stability of the bias was 67%, which is comparable to that of other surface methods. As in other split-message techniques, the typical left visual field bias was more reliable than the unusual right visual field bias. The implications of these data are discussed.