Does the philosophy of medicine exist?

There has been a great deal of discussion, in this journal and others, about obstacles hindering the evolution of the philosophy of medicine. Such discussions presuppose that there is widespread agreement about what it is that constitutes the philosophy of medicine.Despite the fact that there is, and has been for decades, a great deal of literature, teaching and professional activity carried out explicitly in the name of the philosophy of medicine, this is not enough to establish that consensus exists as to the definition of the field. And even if consensus can be obtained as to what constitutes the philosophy of medicine, this does not mean that it exists as a field.     

Stylistic appearances and linguistic diversity

Philosophy is beginning to pay problems of linguistic justice the attention they deserve in today's heavily interconnected and migrant world. Contemporary philosophy itself, however, has a particular problem of linguistic justice that deserves metaphilosophical attention. At least in the philosophical tradition that is mainstream in much of the world today, viz., analytic philosophy, methodological and sociological mechanisms make it the case that the voices of non-(native) Anglophone philosophers are substantially less heard. Among the mechanisms responsible for this situation, argues this paper, is the emphasis given by influential philosophical institutions to linguistic style and appearances as signs of clarity, precision, and rigour in the treatment of philosophical problems. Such an emphasis is not justifiable, in part because it deprives philosophy of a wider variety of perspectives. The paper concludes by presenting and motivating a recent initiative that aims to foster greater linguistic and cultural diversity within the profession.     

Detection of words versus good old counting: A note on Mizrahi and Dickinson, “The analytic-continental divide in philosophical practice”

In a recent Metaphilosophy article, Moti Mizrahi and Michael Dickinson argue against characterizing the divide between analytical and continental philosophy as a divide in the use of arguments. This hypothesis is rejected on the basis of a text-mining approach. The present paper argues that the results they extracted do not answer the questions they set out to answer as well as would have been possible. This is due to Mizrahi and Dickinson's choice to disregard duplicate occurrences of argument word pairs, their main indicator for the occurrence of arguments in articles. This paper reconstructs their method by now also counting duplicates. A small corpus (n = 436) of recent (2015–2021) analytical and continental articles is used to rerun the experiment; the results oppose Mizrahi and Dickinson's and suggest that arguments (as operationalized by Mizrahi and Dickinson) occur more in analytical articles. The paper argues that part of the discrepancy derives from the specific methodological choices they made.     

What analytic metaphysics can do for scientific metaphysics

The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful.     

Does Analytic Thinking Insulate Against Pro-Kremlin Disinformation? Evidence From Ukraine

Pro-Kremlin disinformation campaigns have long targeted Ukraine. We investigate susceptibility to this pro-Kremlin disinformation from a cognitive-science perspective. Is greater analytic thinking associated with less belief in disinformation, as per classical theories of reasoning? Or does analytic thinking amplify motivated system 2 reasoning (or “cultural cognition”), such that analytic thinking is associated with more polarized beliefs (and thus more belief in pro-Kremlin disinformation among pro-Russia Ukrainians)? In online (N = 1,974) and face-to-face representative (N = 9,474) samples of Ukrainians, we find support for the classical reasoning account. Analytic thinking, as measured using the Cognitive Reflection Test, was associated with greater ability to discern truth from disinformation—even for Ukrainians who are strongly oriented towards Russia. We find similar, albeit weaker, results when operationalizing analytic thinking using the self-report Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale. These results demonstrate a similar pattern to prior work using American participants. Thus, the positive association between analytic thinking and the ability to discern truth versus falsehood generalizes to the qualitatively different information environment of postcommunist Ukraine. Despite low trust in government and media, weak journalistic standards, and years of exposure to Russian disinformation, Ukrainians who engage in more analytic thinking are better able to tell truth from falsehood.     

Thinking disposition,thinking style,and susceptibility to causal illusion predict fake news discriminability

Acceptance of fake news is probably modulated by an intricate interplay of social, cultural, and political factors. In this study, we investigated whether individual-level cognitive factors related to thinking and decision making could influence the tendency to accept fake news. A group of volunteers responded to a COVID19-related fake news discrimination scale as well as to questionnaires assessing their thinking style (reflective vs. intuitive) and thinking disposition (actively open-mindedness). Furthermore, they completed a computerized contingency learning task aimed at measuring their tendency to develop a causal illusion, a cognitive bias leading to perceive causal connections between non-contingent events. More actively open-minded and more reflective individuals presented higher fake news discrimination scores. In addition, those who developed weaker causal illusions in the contingency learning task were also more accurate at differentiating between fake and legitimate news. Actively open-minded thinking was the main contributor in a regression model predicting fake news discrimination.     

场依存性与独立性认知方式对视动错觉的影响

为探讨认知方式对视动性错觉的影响,对100名男性军校学员进行了棒框测验,15名高分者和15名低分者分别作为场依存组和场独立组。每名被试随机给予一系列视动阶跃刺激(5,10,15,20,30,40,60,80,100,120度/秒),每个刺激持续20秒。记录被试视动错觉出现的潜伏期和错觉模糊量。研究结果表明:1.场依存组被试的错觉潜伏期短于场独立组,它与刺激速度呈幂函数关系,而场独立组潜伏期随刺激速度的增加呈直线下降;2.在5—120度/秒的范围内,两组被试错觉量回归成两条直线,两直线回归系数无显著性差异,而截距差别十分显著。因此,场依存性/独立性认知方式是视动错觉个体差异性的一种重要影响因素,它对军事飞行员的心理学选拔和训练有着重要的意义。     

Polanyi's Finalism

Although Michael Polanyi's model of science and his construal of the nature of the real are usually thought to be congenial to religion and although Polanyi himself says that "the stage on which we thus resume our full intellectual powers is borrowed from the Christian scheme of Fall and Redemption" (Polanyi 1958, 324), theologians have given little attention to the model of God he presents. The metaphysical and theological vision unfolded in part 4 of Personal Knowledge is a thoughtful alternative to materialist versions of neo-Darwinism and provides a platform for revisiting four long-standing controversies at the interface of science and religion: whether life and mind can be completely specified in terms of physical analysis, whether nature can be adequately understood without appeal to final causes, whether natural selection adequately explains life's diverse forms, and whether knowledge can be fully objectified. Through an exploration of Polanyi's contribution to these discussions, we undertake to show not only that his treatment of God as a cosmic field is strikingly original but also that in reinstating activity as a metaphysical category, he reconstructs our understanding of our creaturely hope and calling.     

大学生场依存性─－独立性认知方式分析

对二十一个学科专业１５２６名大学生的场依存性─－独立性认知方式进行调查所获得的新近常模资料表明：大学生场依存性─－独立性个体差异的群体分布是正态性的,其总体平均水平以《认知方式图形测验》成绩作指标为１３．７（ｓ为４．６）。在此基础上,对文献所报道的影响场依存性─－独立性发展水平的两个因素作了进一步的研究分析,发现,大学生场依存性─－独立性的性别差异非常接近显著水平;专业分化是不依赖于性别因素而导致大学生场依存性─－独立性水平显著不同的主要因素．