Réactions cognitives et émotionnelles à des discriminations raciales explicites vs ambiguës

In the continuity of the works on attributional ambiguity, this research focuses on the cognitive, emotional and behavioral effects produced by explicit or implicit employment discrimination. In accordance with our hypothesis, participants within an explicit discrimination perceive more injustice and discrimination compared to those with an ambiguous one. They also show more anger and demonstrate more adjustment strategies for finding a job within the explicit discrimination than the participants among the ambiguous one. These results are confronted with those of the literature and discussed in terms of their practical implications.     

Fragile promise: The role of justification in promise-breaking

People who consider themselves moral sometimes use self-serving justifications to rationalize their selfish behaviours. Previous studies have tested the role of ambiguity in justifying wrongdoings, but it remains unclear whether ambiguity also plays a role in justifying promise-breaking behaviour and whether heterogeneity exists. To investigate justification in promise-breaking, we introduced a new experimental paradigm called the card-guessing task and used hierarchical cluster analysis to classify participants based on their promise-breaking decisions in unambiguous and ambiguous conditions. Experiment 1 revealed three clusters of solutions: Cluster 1 always kept their promises (i.e., keepers); Cluster 2 only exploited the vague promises and broke their promises in the ambiguous condition (i.e., intermediates); Cluster 3 tended to take advantage of vague promises and broke their promises irrespective of ambiguity (i.e., breakers). Experiment 2 confirmed that participants in the three clusters differed in their norm-abiding preferences and social value orientations. Keepers were more altruistic and had a stronger sense of norm compliance than intermediates and breakers. In conclusion, our study demonstrates that self-serving justifications were more likely to be employed by people who are moderately sensitive to deviation from social norms, which has implications for strategic interventions and policy formulation concerning unethical behaviour.     

Ambiguity attitudes in qualitative contexts: The role of prior beliefs

Most studies of ambiguity aversion rely on experimental paradigms involving monetary bets. Thus, the extent to which ambiguity aversion occurs outside of such contexts is much less understood, particularly when the situation cannot easily be reduced to numerical terms. The present work seeks to understand whether people prefer to avoid ambiguous decisions in a variety of different qualitative domains (e.g., work, family, love, friendship, exercise, study, and health), and, if so, to determine the role played by prior beliefs in those domains. Across three studies, we presented participants with 24 vignettes and measured the degree to which they preferred risk to ambiguity in each. We also asked them for their prior probability estimates about the likely outcomes in the ambiguous events. Ambiguity aversion was observed in the vast majority of vignettes, but at different magnitudes. It was predicted by whether the vignette involved gain or loss as well as by people's prior beliefs; however, the heterogeneity between people meant that the role of prior beliefs was only evident in an individual-level analysis (i.e., not at the group level). Our results suggest that the desire to avoid ambiguity occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events.     

Awakening from Descartes' nightmare: On the love of ambiguity in phenomenological approaches to education

This paper is an exploration of the Cartesian paradigms of clarity and univocity and how these inform contemporary educational theory and practice. Phenomenology is discussed as a way of disrupting Descartes' visions of clarity and distinctness as paradigms of knowledge and as a return of inquiry to life as it is actually lived. Analogical discourse is examined as a way of giving a voice to this sort of inquiry. Heidegger's notions of inquiry as obedience and thanksgiving are discussed.     

Psychological determinants of decision attitude

Decision attitude — an analog of risk attitude — is the propensity to make (or avoid making) a decision: in decision aversion, a person finds it more desirable to receive through fiat the better of two options than to have a choice between them; in decision seeking, the choice is more desirable, even though it can lead to nothing better than the best option. Both decision aversion and decision seeking were found in hypothetical scenarios. Experimental manipulations and subjects' justifications point to anticipated regret, fear of blame for poor outcomes, and desire for equitable distributions as sources of decision aversion. One source of decision seeking (for self) and decision aversion (when deciding for others) appears to be the desire for the self-determination of the affected parties. We consider the implications of our results for personal choice and public policy decisions.     

Who is Afraid of Figure of Speech?

Aristotle's illustrations of the fallacy of Figure of Speech (or Form of Expression) are none too convincing. They are tied to Aristotle's theory of categories and to peculiarities of Greek grammar that fail to hold appeal for a contemporary readership. Yet, upon closer inspection, Figure of Speech shows many points of contact with views and problems that inhabit 20th-century analytical philosophy. In the paper, some Aristotelian examples will be analyzed to gain a better understanding of this fallacy. The case of the Third Man argument and some modern cases lend plausibility to the claim that Figure of Speech is of more interest as a type of fallacy than has generally been assumed. Finally, a case is made for the view that Figure of Speech, though listed among the fallacies dependent upon language, is not properly classified as a fallacy of ambiguity. More likely, it should be looked upon as a type of non sequitur. This has important consequences for the profile of dialogue associated with this fallacy.     

参照依赖和损失规避对个体收入分配公平判断的影响

收入分配公平判断是人们对自己收入所得公平与否的主观评价。通过对参照点和收入金额的控制,探讨参照依赖和损失规避对收入分配公平判断的共同影响。结果发现,(1)民众的收入公平判断受参照点的影响,在有参照点的情景下比无参照点情景下更感觉不公平;(2)不同工资水平下,民众的公平判断具有显著差异,而且民众对低于平均工资的“受损”比高于平均工资同等金额的“受益”赋予的公平感的权重更大,即存在得失感受的不对称;(3)不同的工资参照点、多得和少得的分配结果共同影响民众的公平判断,即损失规避在参照依赖对公平判断的影响中起调节作用。     

One Frog, Two Frog, Red Frog, Blue Frog: Factors Affecting Children's Syntactic Choices in Production and Comprehension

Two experiments are reported which examine children's ability to use referential context when making syntactic choices in language production and comprehension. In a recent on-line study of auditory comprehension, Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, and Logrip (1999) examined children's and adults' abilities to resolve temporary syntactic ambiguities involving prepositional phrases (e.g., “Put the frog on the napkin into ¨”). Although adults and older children used the referential context to guide their initial analysis (pursuing a destination interpretation in a one-frog context and a modifier interpretation in a two-frog context), 4 to 5-year olds' initial and ultimate analysis was one of destination, regardless of context. The present studies examined whether these differences were attributable to the comprehension process itself or to other sources, such as possible differences in how children perceive the scene and referential situation. In both experiments, children were given a language generation task designed to elicit and test children's ability to refer to a member of a set through restrictive modification. This task was immediately followed by the “put” comprehension task. The findings showed that, in response to a question about a member of a set (e.g., “Which frog went to Mrs. Squid's house?”), 4- to 5-year-olds frequently produced a definite NP with a restrictive prepositional modifier (e.g., “The one on the napkin”). These same children, however, continued to misanalyze put instructions, showing a strong avoidance of restrictive modification during comprehension. Experiment 2 showed that an increase in the salience of the platforms that distinguished the two referents increased overall performance, but still showed the strong asymmetry between production and comprehension. Eye movements were also recorded in Experiment 2, revealing on-line parsing patterns similar to Trueswell et al.: an initial preference for a destination analysis and a failure to revise early referential commitments. These experiments indicate that child–adult differences in parsing preferences arise, in part, from developmental changes in the comprehension process itself and not from a general insensitivity to referential properties of the scene. The findings are consistent with a probabilistic model for uncovering the structure of the input during comprehension, in which more reliable linguistic and discourse-related cues are learned first, followed by a gradually developing ability to take into account other more uncertain (or more difficult to learn) cues to structure.