惠能心理化功思想的心理结构与成分分析

惠能的思想中蕴含丰富的心理化功思想,其心理化功思想以心为核心,强调心在化消极为积极中的本体性或核心作用。这种转化作用主要表现在化烦恼为菩提、化恶为善、化邪为正几个方面,其心理机制包括认知转化、心态转化、信念转化、归因和诠释转化等。这一化功思想对当今人们化解心理困扰,提升心境界,激发心理潜能,满足对美好生活向往的需要,具有十分重要的现实价值。     

Spiritual Development in the Fourth Quarter of Life

SUMMARY

Spirit, the activating or essential principle influencing a person, and body interpenetrate each other but do not dominate each other in predictable ways. Normal aging is neither a failure of the human spirit nor a failure in the body's Biology. The spirit becomes more apparent as a result of spiritual development.

The fourth quarter of life covers age 75 to 100 years. Prior to age 75, the human spirit undergoes significant developmental events: a crisis of meaning which may result in conversion or more commonly stripping or shedding; transitions, including loss of clearly defined roles and loss of the sense that the individual's life makes a difference.

One motif applied by our culture to old age is the “iconic illusion”; however, it is evident that in some respects this motif has limited application to the fourth quarter of life. “Meaning making” is, in fact, enhanced in the fourth quarter of life, given reasonable levels of cognitive health. The desire and ability to make sense out of existence, to draw together an understanding of a meaningful life trajectory, is best done in the fourth quarter of life. The dominant sense of time in the fourth quarter of life particularly facilitates spiritual development.     

Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention

ABSTRACT

For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention.