孟子的心理学思想研究

该文较系统地论述了孟子的普通心理思想。主要问题是:心理学思想的基本观点,知虑心理思想,情欲心理思想,志意心理思想,智能心理思想,性习心理思想。     

Exploring the set-theoretical structure of objects by additive trees

Arrangements of feature sets that have been proposed to represent qualitative and quantitative variation among objects are shown to generate identical sets of set-symmetric distances. The set-symmetric distances for these feature arrangements can be represented by path lengths in an additive linear tree. Imperfect versions of these feature arrangements are proposed, which also are indistinguishable by the set-symmetric distance model. The distances for the imperfect versions can be represented by path lengths in an additive imperfectly linear tree. When dissimilarities are defined by the more general contrast model and a constant may be added to proximity data, then for both the perfect and imperfect arrangements an additive tree analysis obtains a perfect fit with an imperfectly linear tree. However, in the case of the contrast model also the distinction between the perfect and imperfect arrangements disappears in that also for the perfect arrangements the resulting tree need no longer be linear.The author is grateful to Mathieu Koppen for detailed comments on an earlier version of this article.     

Points of View

An adequate evaluation of argumentation requires identification of the object to which the argumentation pertains: the point of view. What are the distinguishing features of this object? In the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, the object of argumentation is referred to by means of the notion ‘standpoint’. In other theories concerned with argumentation, reasoning, convincing or persuading, notions are used such as ‘thesis’, ‘conclusion’, ‘opinion’ and ‘attitude’. This paper is a survey of the characterisations of the object of argumentation given in the various theories. It discusses the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, socio-psychological research on persuasion, cognitive research on reasoning, argumentative discourse analysis, two variants of informal logic, advocacy and debate, and the theory of communicative action. Next, it explores some relations between the notions used in these theories. Finally, it outlines some starting points for further research into the problems of identification.     

Indclus: An individual differences generalization of the adclus model and the mapclus algorithm

We present a new model and associated algorithm, INDCLUS, that generalizes the Shepard-Arabie ADCLUS (ADditive CLUStering) model and the MAPCLUS algorithm, so as to represent in a clustering solution individual differences among subjects or other sources of data. Like MAPCLUS, the INDCLUS generalization utilizes an alternating least squares method combined with a mathematical programming optimization procedure based on a penalty function approach to impose discrete (0,1) constraints on parameters defining cluster membership. All subjects in an INDCLUS analysis are assumed to have a common set of clusters, which are differentially weighted by subjects in order to portray individual differences. As such, INDCLUS provides a (discrete) clustering counterpart to the Carroll-Chang INDSCAL model for (continuous) spatial representations. Finally, we consider possible generalizations of the INDCLUS model and algorithm.We are indebted to Seymour Rosenberg for making available the data from Rosenberg and Kim [1975]. Also, this work has benefited from the observations of S. A. Boorman, W. S. DeSarbo, G. Furnas, P. E. Green, L. J. Hubert, L. E. Jones, J. B. Kruskal, S. Pruzansky, D. Schmittlein, E. J. Shoben, S. D. Soli, and anonymous referees.This research was supported in part by NSF Grant SES82 00441, LEAA Grant 78-NI-AX-0142, and NSF Grant SES80 04815.     

Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?

Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes.     

Pessimism

The problem of pessimism is the secular analogue to the evidential problem of evil facing traditional theism. The traditional theist must argue two things: that the evidence shows that this is on balance a good world and that it is the best possible world. Though the secular optimist who advocates any form of secular moral theory need not argue that the current and future world will likely be the best possible world, she nonetheless must argue that were there a clean solution to the problem of current and future suffering in which all sentient life could be instantly and painlessly eliminated, we would have reasons not to employ the clean solution because the future promises to bring on balance a good world in which the evil of human and animal suffering is outweighed by whatever is good in the world. Pessimism is the view that the evidence argues against secular optimism. It is argued here that it is anything but clear that secular optimism is warranted when viewed from an impersonal point of view. The problem is then evaluated from the personal point of view in which a form of personal optimism is defended even in the face of impersonal pessimism.     

Professional Autonomy and the Normative Structure of Medical Practice

Professional autonomy is often described as a claim of professionalsthat has to serve primarily their own interests. However, it can also beseen as an element of a professional ideal that can function as astandard for professional, i.e. medical practice. This normativeunderstanding of the medical profession and professional autonomy facesthree threats today. 1) Internal erosion of professional autonomy due toa lack of internal quality control by the medical profession; 2)the increasing upward pressure on health care expenses that calls for ahealth care policy that could imply limitations for the professionalautonomy of physicians; 3) a distorted understanding of theprofession as being based on a formal type of knowledge and relatedtechnology, in which other normative dimensions of medical practice areneglected and which frustrates meaningful communication betweenphysicians and patients. To answer these threats a normative structureanalysis of medical practice is presented, that indicates whichprinciples and norms are constitutive for medical practice. It isconcluded that professional autonomy, normatively understood, should bemaintained to avoid the lure of the technological imperative and toprotect patients against third parties' pressure to undertreatment.However, this professional autonomy can only be maintained if members ofthe profession subject their activities and decisions to a criticalevaluation by other members of the profession and by patients and ifthey continue to critically reflect on the values that regulate today'smedicine.     

Global Progress I: Empirical Evidence for ongoing Increase in Quality-of-life

This paper argues that both the relativist and the pessimist critiques of the idea of progress are inadequate. Progress is defined as increase in global quality of life (QOL). Such QOL is intrinsically subjective, but not relative. It can be reliably measured through life satisfaction-type questions. The World Database of Happiness provides extensive data on social, economic and psychological factors that correlate with overall QOL. They include wealth, health, security, knowledge, freedom and equality. Various statistical data suggest that all these QOL indicators have undergone significant improvements during the last half century, in most of the world. This gives strong support to the thesis that progress objectively occurs.     

Representation of subjective preferences under ambiguity

The objective of this paper is to show how potentially incomplete preferences of a decision maker (DM) on acts can be modelled formally in a subjective ambiguity perspective. We identify acts as functions from a state space Ω to bounded support (finitely additive) probabilities over a set X of prizes. Then, we characterize preferences over equibounded acts a which have a numerical representation by the family of functionals , where u is a cardinal utility on X (representing the risk attitude of the DM) and Π is a unique pointwise closed convex set of probabilities on all events in Ω (representing the ambiguity perceived by the DM). To this end, in addition to the usual independence and continuity assumptions, we add completeness and dominance for preferences restricted to constant acts; moreover, we consider two other properties (subjective monotonicity and coherence) related with the preferences of a DM who is not able, owing to his partial knowledge, to evaluate any event in Ω.     

Peter Singer’S Argument for Utilitarianism

The paper begins by situating Singer within the British meta-ethical tradition. It sets out the main steps in his argument for utilitarianism as the ‘default setting’ of ethical thought. It argues that Singer’s argument depends on a hierarchy of reasons, such that the ethical viewpoint is understood to be an adaptation – an extension – of a fundamental self-interest. It concludes that the argument fails because it is impossible to get from this starting-point in self-interest to his conception of the ethical point of view. The fundamental problem is its mixing the immiscible: the Humean subordination of reason to interest with the Kantian conception of reason as universal and authoritative.