Category discrimination by pigeons using five polymorphous features

Eight pigeons were trained to discriminate between sets of color photographs of natural scenes. The scenes differed along five two-valued dimensions (site, weather, camera distance, camera orientation, and camera height), and all combinations of the feature values were used. One value of each dimension was designated as positive, and slides containing three or more positive feature values were members of the positive stimulus set. Thus, each feature had an equal, low, correlation with reinforcement, and all features had zero correlations with each other. Seven of the 8 pigeons learned this discrimination, and their responding came under the control of all five features. Within the positive and negative stimulus sets, response rates were higher to stimuli that contained more positive feature values. Once discrimination had been achieved, reversal training was given using a subset of the slides. In this subset, only a single feature was correlated with reinforcement. All pigeons learned this reversal successfully and generalized it to additional photographs with the same feature content. After reversal, the original reinforcement contingencies were reinstated, and training was continued using all the slides except those that had been used in reversal. Reversal generalized to these slides to some extent. Analysis of the response rates to individual slides showed that, compared with prereversal training, only the feature that had been subjected to reversal contingencies showed a reversed correlation with response rate. The remaining features showed the same correlation with response rate as they had before reversal training. Thus, reversal on some members of a category following category discrimination training led to generalization to stimuli within the category that were not involved in the reversal, but not to features that were not reversed. It is therefore inappropriate to refer to the pigeons as learning a concept.     

From demonstration to theory in embodied language comprehension: A review

Recent findings in psychology, psycholinguistics, and neuroscience present a challenge to current amodal theories by suggesting that cognitive states are not disembodied in language comprehension. Accumulating behavioral evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on processing of language describing concrete and abstract concepts. The extant embodied theories that support either a strong or a moderate embodied view are then presented, as are the perspectives that define how the researchers discuss the role of sensory-motor grounding in language processing. The article concludes by discussing several lines of research that might help distinguish between various theoretical approaches and resolve some of the fundamental issues that fuel much of the debate in the field.     

Language Processing Differences Between Blind and Sighted Individuals and the Abstract Versus Concrete Concept Difference

In the property listing task (PLT), participants are asked to list properties for a concept (e.g., for the concept dog, “barks,” and “is a pet” may be produced). In conceptual property norming (CPNs) studies, participants are asked to list properties for large sets of concepts. Here, we use a mathematical model of the property listing process to explore two longstanding issues: characterizing the difference between concrete and abstract concepts, and characterizing semantic knowledge in the blind versus sighted population. When we apply our mathematical model to a large CPN reporting properties listed by sighted and blind participants, the model uncovers significant differences between concrete and abstract concepts. Though we also find that blind individuals show many of the same processing differences between abstract and concrete concepts found in sighted individuals, our model shows that those differences are noticeably less pronounced than in sighted individuals. We discuss our results vis-a-vis theories attempting to characterize abstract concepts.     

Active or Inert? An Experimental Comparison of Creative Ideation across Incubation Periods

The primary objective of this study was to contribute to the growing research discipline investigating the effects of physical exercise on divergent thinking creativity performance. Thirty‐two students participated in this two‐visit, within‐subject intervention. Individuals consented to participate in two randomized, and counterbalanced, experimental conditions, consisting of 15 min of active treadmill walking and an inert, seated control incubation period. Creativity was assessed at baseline and post‐exercise (and control) via the Instances Creativity Task (ICT). Creativity scores for changes in fluency (F(1, 31) = 2.90, p = .10) were not statistically significant across the experimental conditions. Originality scores were higher at baseline and follow‐up when compared to the exercise condition (F(1, 31) = 6.82, p = .01). However, there was no statistically significant condition × time interaction effect (F(1, 31) = 1.78, p = .19). Further analyses demonstrated that there was no statistically significant difference between the experimental conditions on recall score (F(1, 31) = 1.04, p = .32). All models indicated statistically significant main effects for time: fluency (F(1, 31) = 131.17, p < .001); originality (F(1, 31) = 36.54, p < .001); and recall (F(1, 31) = 51.75, p < .001). These findings suggest that both active and inert creative incubation periods may similarly enhance subsequent divergent thinking performance.     

Prototypes of the “natural” concepts discovery

In works of Eleanor Rosch “natural” concepts was introduced that reflect a high correlated structure of features of objects of the external world. Prototypes of the “natural” concepts are clearest cases of objects that reflect this highly correlated structure. The same high correlated structure manifested in the “natural” phenotypical classification. To formalize this highly correlated structure, we define a special type of probabilistic causal relations and then probabilistic formal concepts as a cyclically connected probabilistic causal relations. Based on these definitions, we developed a method of prototypes discovery and illustrate it on the example of digits’ prototypes discovery.     

Toward the bigger picture: Concrete and abstract thinking about a transgression,and the role of time in interpersonal forgiveness

Rumination is commonly considered detrimental to forgiveness. In contrast, we propose that different forms of post-transgression thinking are differentially effective for forgiveness, depending on their timing. Concrete thinking focuses on event details, whereas abstract thinking abstracts from details and views the event in a broader context. Following construal level theory, we propose that concrete thinking is increasingly ill-matched, and abstract thinking better matched, to the construal abilities and motivation afforded by psychological distance. Hence, over time, concrete thinking would be negatively, and abstract thinking positively, associated with forgiveness. Two correlational recall studies, with time since transgression measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2), demonstrated that with greater temporal distance concrete thinking was more negatively, and abstract thinking more positively, related to forgiveness. Study 3 employed a prospective-longitudinal methodology over five time-points; intra-individual decrease in concrete thinking and increase in abstract thinking over time were related to higher levels of forgiveness.     

Consciousness as a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality

The work demonstrates that brain might reflect the external world causal relationships in the form of a logically consistent and prognostic model of reality, which shows up as consciousness. The paper analyses and solves the problem of statistical ambiguity and provides a formal model of causal relationships as probabilistic maximally specific rules. We suppose that brain makes all possible inferences from causal relationships. We prove that the suggested formal model has a property of an unambiguous inference: from consistent premises we infer a consistent conclusion. It enables a set of all inferences to form a consistent model of the perceived world. Causal relationships may create fixed points of cyclic inter-predictable properties. We consider the “natural” classification introduced by John St. Mill and demonstrate that a variety of fixed points of the objects’ attributes forms a “natural” classification of the external world. Then we consider notions of “natural” categories and causal models of categories, introduced by Eleanor Rosch and Bob Rehder and demonstrate that fixed points of causal relationships between objects attributes, which we perceive, formalize these notions. If the “natural” classification describes the objects of the external world, and “natural” concepts the perception of these objects, then the theory of integrated information, introduced by G. Tononi, describes the information processes of the brain for “natural” concepts formation that reflects the “natural” classification. We argue that integrated information provides high accuracy of the objects identification. A computer-based experiment is provided that illustrates fixed points formation for coded digits.     

具身视角下道德概念净脏隐喻的特征、影响因素与未来展望

摘 要 基于概念隐喻理论与具身认知理论,身体净脏与道德概念存在隐喻联结;道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,并对道德判断产生一致性和补偿性效应;道德概念净脏隐喻的中介因素有厌恶情绪和道德自我意象,调节因素有身体敏感性和道德敏感性;未来研究应在道德概念净脏隐喻的神经机制、情境性、指向性、干预机制、文化差异等方面进行丰富和完善。     

共享概念的性质对拥有关系句子情景模型建立的影响

应用扇效应技术探讨共享概念的性质对建构拥有关系情境模型的影响。共包括2个实验,探讨在将“多人买1物”句式中的所购“物品”改变为隐含共同地点信息的“物品”条件下,被试对“多人买1物”拥有行为句式的学习是否表现出扇效应。结果表明,当所购物品隐含的相同地点信息的情况下,“多人买1物”的拥有行为句式无论是否具有明确的地点状语,都如同“1人买多物”的句式一样,没有表现出扇效应,与Radvanskv的研究结果不同。据此认为,只有在共享概念是属于情景模型建构的维度信息的情况下,有共享概念的信息才能整合为同一个情景模型。     

Learning about life and death in early childhood

have argued that young children initially understand biological phenomena in terms of vitalism, a mode of construal in which "life" or "life-force" is the central causal-explanatory concept. This study investigated the development of vitalistic reasoning in young children's concepts of life, the human body and death. Sixty preschool children between the ages of 3 years, 7 months and 5 years, 11 months participated. All children were initially given structured interviews to assess their knowledge of (1) human body function and (2) death. From this sample 40 children in the Training group were taught about the human body and how it functions to maintain life. The Control group (n=20) received no training. All 60 children were subsequently reassessed on their knowledge of human body function and death. Results from the initial interviews indicated that young children who spontaneously appealed to vitalistic concepts in reasoning about human body functioning were also more sophisticated in their understanding of death. Results from the posttraining interviews showed that children readily learned to adopt a vitalistic approach to human body functioning, and that this learning coincided with significant development in their understanding of human body function, and of death. The overall pattern of results supports the claim that the acquisition of a vitalistic causal-explanatory framework serves to structure children's concepts and facilitates learning in the domain of biology.