Zhuangzi’s philosophy of thing

It is usually believed that the concept of ‘qiwu 齊物’ in the Zhuangzi means ‘equalizing things’. This reading of the Zhuangzi, however, presupposes that things are originally separated and exist independently. The equality of things is just a mental construct in a specific state of mind. In this paper, we will argue that this reading does not stand; what Zhuangzi does in the ‘Qiwulun 齊物論’is to examine how myriad things are created from the original oneness. According to Zhuangzi’s philosophy of thing, things are created by objectification through fact and value imposing. Oneness is therefore not a mere perspective but the condition for things being objectified. This understanding of the things’ being is comparable to Heidegger’s classification of thing and equipment, but it differs from Heidegger by its special implication on the Daoist liberation.     

The Enjoyment of the Sage and the Common People: A New Perspective on the Cosmology of the Laozi

The Laozi laughs at the joy of those who violate the Dao and praises the suffering of those who attain it,yet this does not mean that the political philosophy of the Laozi does not encompass a notion of happiness,a notion that is grounded in the "enjoyment of something together" (gong le共樂) by the sag and the common people.The philosophical foundation of the Laozi's view of happiness is its cosmology,of which there are two sequences:one is generation and the other is growth.With the influences of Wei/Jin-era metaphysics and Western philosophy,Chinese scholars used to overemphasize generation,tracing only the origin.But in the cosmology of the Laozi,both generation and growth are indispensable,and this is part of the reason why the Dao and the De are equally important in the Laozi.The happiness of the common people does not come from a psychological dependence on or attachment to certain form of domination,but from the full development of each individual's initiative and action affected by Mysterious De.     

To Die or Not to Die: Zhuangzi’s Three Immortalities

While it is known that the problem of death is a central topic animating the author/s of the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, leading Chinese and Western interpretations of this Chinese classic have usually focused much more on other themes and aspects. Even more problematic in the author’s view is the fact that the Zhuangzi has been closely associated with one death philosophy, the set of concepts, arguments and figures present in chapter 6. This study puts death back at the very center of the Zhuangzian philosophical project yet insisting at the same time on the difficulties of defending one philosophy of death since different passages introduce new concepts, imagery, nuances and perspectives. The Zhuangzi’s focus on death is being situated within a discussion of the “immortality” ideal––accepting a total death (“to die”) or find refuge in immortality ideals (“not to die”). Different passages from the Inner Chapters are being presented as proposing three distinct immortality projects or strategies––personal, social and cosmic––to address the problem of death. E. Becker’s reflections on the challenge of mortality and the psychological need of a “beyond” in order to cope with the consciousness of death provide the basic theoretical framework underlying the discussion of the Zhuangzi in this essay.     

Authenticity in the Zhuangzi ? Contemporary Misreadings of Zhen 真and an Alternative to Existentialism

This essay reviews the Zhuangzian notion of zhen 真, often through the text’s advancement of the zhenren 真人 (“genuine person,” “true person”) or zhenzhi 真知 (“genuine knowledge,” “true knowledge”). Contemporary scholarship, in both Chinese and English, often presents zhen as analogous to the existentialist theory of authenticity, which correspondingly reflects on interpretations of the “self,” and thereby the zhen person. Much of the Zhuangzi is a reaction to the Lunyu, including an ironic response to the Confucian cultivation project. If we establish our interpretation of the “self” against this background then we find that zhen in the Zhuangzi is actually used to argue against the Confucian identification of the person and self through social roles or conventions. However, advocating zhen does not suggest that there is some essential or core “self” to refer to; instead, it implies a natural state of responsiveness where the person acts efficaciously by being in line with what is obvious or affirmed in the situation. This essay thereby presents a reading of zhen that is historically and culturally consistent, and sets up the Zhuangzi as an alternative, and not an echo, to some of the major issues dealt with by the existentialist movement.     

论庄子“万物一齐”的生态审美观

当先秦诸子大都以人的理解为中心去看待人与自然万物的存在方式,认为万物只是相对于人来说才具有存在的价值和意义时,庄子站在古典存在论的立场上提出了含有生态审美智慧的“万物一齐”观,即“休乎天钧”的生态和谐理念、“为是不用而寓诸庸”的生态价值观念、“万物与我为一”的生态共生气象。其“万物一齐”的生态审美观所蕴涵的万物平等共生、放弃自我中心、无用之用等观念有助于当代的生态伦理和生态实践建设。     

Zhuangzi the Poet: Re-Reading the Peng Bird Image

The image of the Peng bird, which opens the Zhuangzi text, is not the product of metaphysical reasoning. An inspiring example of soaring up and going beyond, the image is used to broaden the outlook of the small mind; its function is thus more therapeutic than instructional. With its rich poetic and experiential content, the image of the Peng refuses to be reduced to an abstract concept, or a mere signifier of certain philosophical position. Misreading of the image results from any attempt to accurately “size up” its philosophical implication by measuring it quantitatively against a spectrum of positions and values. To see only the superficial “inconsistencies” in Zhuangzi’s argument and to read the wind under the Peng’s wings as a handicap that it needs to overcome in order to embark on its “free and easy wandering” is, in the name of logic and “consistency,” to ignore the big picture Zhuangzi presents.     

Sorrow and the Sage: Grief in the Zhuangzi

The Zhuangzi offers two apparently incompatible models of bereavement. Zhuangzi sometimes suggests that the sage will greet loss with unfractured equanimity and even aplomb. However, upon the death of his own wife, Zhuangzi evinces a sorrow that, albeit brief, fits ill with this suggestion. In this essay, I contend that the grief that Zhuangzi displays at his wife’s death better honors wider values averred elsewhere in the text and, more generally, that a sage who retains a capacity for sorrow will be better positioned for the robust joy so often identified as central to the Zhuangzi’s vision of flourishing. The sagely figures who entirely forego sorrow, I argue, achieve equanimity only through a sacrifice of the emotional range and responsiveness necessary not only for grief but also for the delight Zhuangzi recommends.     

ETHICS OF BEWILDERMENT

An ethics of bewilderment, which differs dramatically from the more familiar ethics of ease, is best understood through poetic presentations. Using examples drawn from Chinese and Western sources—notably Du Fu and Dante—this inquiry treats bewilderment as both an emotion and a virtue. Both these forms of bewilderment involve an acknowledgment of how minimal is the ethical confidence we have, given the feelings we have and the judgments we must make, but they also extend in productive ways the implications of that acknowledgment.     

庄子情欲本质及其调节的心理思想管窥

情欲是中国古代心理学思想研究的重要范畴,是关系密切但又各有所指的两个范畴。庄子指出情欲对人的身心健康具负面影响,提出许多关于情欲本质及其调节的心理思想。本文分析和总结了庄子的情欲本质观和调节观,这些思想对今天人们实施情欲心理调节仍有重要借鉴价值。