荀子社会分层的政治伦理思想及其现代价值

基于天人关系,荀子从人的自然本性和社会性出发,对其社会分层的政治伦理思想作了哲学论证。以“礼”为核心和标准,荀子把社会分层划分为社会等级分层与社会职业分层两个层面。荀子把“礼”的功能———“群”与“分”,特别是等级差别之“分”作为社会分层的手段,以最终实现社会和谐有序的政治理想。这对于我们今天构建社会主义和谐社会仍具有一定的现实意义。     

Self and Community in the Xunzi

This paper investigates Xunzi’s ideas on self and community. According to Xunzi, the origin of Confucian rituals lies in the need to nourish human desires. However, this nourishment is more than the simple satisfaction of desire. Rather, in the development of rituals, desires are evaluated and directed according to the overall good of a person in order that the person can actively pursue fulfilment and self-realization. If human beings are controlled by momentary desires, they live like beasts and cannot act as autonomous agents. Confucian rituals constitute a normative framework for human life and desires. Following Xunzi, this normative framework is based on a cultural and collective interpretation of our own nature. Through Confucian rituals a person can not only satisfy desires properly, but can also enjoy human relationships within the community. Most importantly, it is through these Confucian rituals that a person realizes himself as an agent who can control and direct his own life.     

"儒"的自我理解——荀子说儒的意义

No matter what the original meaning of “Ru” was, looking at it from the perspective of the history of philosophy, the image of “Ru” as portrayed by other schools in the Warring States period was infused with the characteristics of Confucianism of that time. The self-understanding of Warring States Confucians expressed by their employment of the character “Ru” clearly displayed Ru’s character as well as the main points of the Ru school, namely Confucianism. In particular, the words and thoughts of Xunzi, the great Confucian master, on “Ru”, epitomize Pre-Qin Confucian’s understanding and expectations of themselves, and also reflect the Confucian new pursuit in facing the age of the unification of Qin. Translated by Yan Xin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (5): 19–26     

教化:荀子伦理思想的本旨

Xunzi carried on the noble ambitions of “Zhou Kong Jiaohua 周孔教化” and systematically demonstrated the necessity of cultivation and how to realize it. Starting from the belief that human nature is evil, he argues that cultivation was necessary and its teachings must penetrate the mind. The key of cultivation is to cultivate man’s feelings, encourage man to behave properly, and attempt to mold his nature through Ritual cultivation, Musical cultivation, and the Five Classics. The main point of Xunzi’s ethical thought is cultivation. As far as cultivation theory is concerned, Xunzi’s is the most logical and systematic of the famous Pre-Qin thinkers. Translated by Peng Chuanhua from Nanchang Daxue Xuebao 南昌大学学报 (Journal of Nanchang University), 2005, (2): 1–8     

"仁"与"未仁"的两难选择--孔、孟、荀评管仲解读

自孔子称管仲“如其仁”,之后的孟、荀却给出了不同的评价,后代儒者就面临诠释管仲之仁与未仁的两难选择。本文即联系诠释中所显现的问题,考察孔、孟、荀何以会给出各自不同的评价,试图还原先秦儒家面对现实管仲时所体现出的评价原则,梳理孔、孟、荀由此而展开的思维理路,并为理解先秦儒家的核心理念及运用原则提供补益。     

FRAMES OF COMPARISON Anthropology and Inheriting Traditional Practices

This essay seeks to develop and illustrate an approach to comparison based on ad hoc frames. A frame is defined by a question, to which different thinkers can be seen as offering complementary and/or competing responses. Pursuing a middle ground between universalist conceptions of comparison and particularist rejections of comparison, this approach brings various positions into dialogue in a manner that is not inherently totalizing. The article draws extensively on Hegel's philosophy of religion to articulate this approach to comparison and its presuppositions. The second section of the essay seeks to illustrate the value of this approach by using the question of how traditional practices are inherited to frame a comparison of Hegel on habit and the Confucian thinker Xunzi on ritual. This comparison functions principally to indicate the process of comparison and suggest the value of pursuing this comparison in greater depth.     

Zhi and Neng belong to mind: a study of the capacity to be good in the mind of Xunzi

ABSTRACT

The mainstream of academia thinks that Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which claims that human nature is bad, is in contrast with those of Confucius and Mencius and is unable to provide a foundation for human moral subjectivity. However, there are more and more scholars bringing up different ideas, such as Lu Debin and Fung Yiuming. They think that Xunzi’s wei 偽 (artifice), which includes zhi知 (knowing) and neng 能 (capacity), is a kind of inborn capacity to think and activate that belongs to xing. This paper points out that zhi and neng belong to xin 心 (mind) rather than xing. In the text of Xunzi, xing is mainly regarded as human emotions and desires which would result in chaos if not controlled. Making zhi and neng belong to xing does not accord with Xunzi’s theory and will confuse people with the connotation of Xunzi’s xing.     

Li,Qing, and Ethical Transformation in the Xunzi

This paper analyses the connection between knowing Dao and ethical transformation in Xunzi’s thought. While there have been many discussions concerning what Dao is and how one may come to Dao, there has not been sufficient attention on how knowing Dao leads to ethical transformation. In Section 2, I explicate Xunzi’s concept of bi 蔽 (obscurity) and suggests that one’s not knowing Dao has to do with a certain problematic state of the heart/mind. In Section 3, I analyse xu虛 (vacating), yi 一 (focusing), and jing 靜 (stilling), which are remedial practices for knowing Dao, and bring out the importance of discerning li 理 for Xunzi. In Sections 4 and 5, I propose an interpretation of the relation between li 理 and qing 情 in the process of ethical transformation. In Section 6, I highlight some remaining ambiguities that can be further investigated to deepen our understanding of Xunzi’s thought.     

Xunzi: A Paradigm of Rationalistic Virtue Ethics in Early Confucianism

Against the background of modern academic study, this article consciously uses Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a tool to theoretically analyze Xunzi’s ethical philosophy. This article tries to briefly analyze the basic structure of Xunzi’s moral philosophy and to reveal its unique rationalist theoretical character by exploring the following three topics: “the understanding of human beings,” “the establishment of a moral foundation,” and “the accomplishment of virtue in practice.” From the perspective of comparative philosophy, this article can also be viewed as a model for bringing about communication and synthesis between two philosophical traditions, namely Confucian ethics and Western virtue ethics.     

VIRTUE AS MASTERY IN EARLY CONFUCIANISM

This essay explores the interrelation of skills and virtues. I first trace one line of analysis from Aristotle to Alasdair MacIntyre, which argues that there is a categorical difference between skills and virtues, in their ends and intrinsic character. This familiar distinction is fine in certain respects but still importantly misleading. Virtue in general, and also some particular virtues such as ritual propriety and practical wisdom, are not just exercised in practical contexts, but are in fact partially constituted by the mastery of certain skills. This has implications for moral psychology, specifically how we might understand the acquisition of virtue, as well as its very nature. To try to make this claim plausible I analyze two case studies from early Confucianism: treatment of ritual propriety as a cardinal virtue, and Mencius's less carefully integrated treatment of excellence at moral discernment. I conclude by revisiting the question of the relations between skill and virtue, and exploring a few of the difficulties implied by my account of early Confucian ethics.