“AFTER THE EVENT”: FREUD'S UNCANNY AND THE ANXIETY OF ORIGINS

This essay aims to revise Freud's theory of the uncanny by rereading his own essay of that name along with the key material Freud drew on in formulating his theory: E. T. A. Hoffmann's short story “The Sandman” (1816a) and Ernst Jentsch's essay “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906a). While arguing, initially, both that Jentsch's work is fundamentally misconstrued by Freud and that it offers a better account of what happens in Hoffmann's story, the essay moves beyond Jentsch's account to offer a more philosophically oriented theory of the uncanny, one more in line with Freud's ideas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a).     

Stimulus specificity in avoidance learning

The present experiments address the issue of stimulus specificity in fear and avoidance learning. First, it was established that light stimuli are effective warning signals (WS) in shuttle avoidance. Then light stimuli were shown to produce conditioned suppression in the conditioned emotional response situation comparable to that produced by noise conditioned stimuli. Finally, the effectiveness of noise onset and noise offset as feedback signals was tested. This was assessed under conditions of immediate and delayed termination of a light WS. Delayed termination of a light WS interfered with avoidance learning and the introduction of noise offset as a feedback signal enhanced it. The only demonstration of stimulus specificity was the failure of noise onset to function as a feedback signal.     

‘For our garden of remembrance is somewhere else’: Narratives of separation through the eyes of Freud's patients

This article presents a unique collection of narratives of separation – unique because the separation here is from psychoanalysis and from Freud as analyst. These narratives were published as part of memoirs written about Freud by three of his patients. Their narratives of separation give us an innovative point of view on the psychoanalytic process, in particular with respect to the importance they place on the termination phase of the analysis at a time when Freud himself had not given it much consideration. The three autobiographical texts are Abram Kardiner's memoir (1977); the memoir of Sergei Pankejeff, known as the Wolf Man (Gardiner, 1971a ); and ‘Tribute to Freud’, by the poet H.D. ( 1974 ). These three distinguished narratives are discussed here as works of translation, as understood by Walter Benjamin (1968 [1955]), Paul Ricoeur (2006 [2004]), and Jean Laplanche (1999 [1992]). They express translation under three aspects: reconstruction of the past (the work of memory), interpreting the conscious residues of the transference (the work of mourning), and, as a deferred action, deciphering the enigmatic messages received from Freud as the parental figure. This representation of the analysand's writing suggests that the separation from analysis is an endless work of translation within the endless process of deciphering the unconscious.     

Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.

Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson,and the Difference it Should Make

P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, R. Jay Wallace, and Philip Pettit for problems due to individualistic assumptions.Thanks to an audience at Carleton University for helpful discussion.     

Science,Values and Loves: Theologies as Expressive Constructions

Invited to write “a manifesto for [my] own theological position”, I begin with science and human rights as excellent examples of universalist aspirations of modernity. Modern individualism is important too, as particular existential loves shape each life. Science, morality, and personal loves are interwoven in theologies, as creative constructions. The sciences are important, as we need not only individual authenticity but also accountability. My position presented here is science-inspired naturalistic theism. It is not “religious naturalism”, given the categorical difference between facts and values. It is not “natural theology”, as inductive approaches do not reach that far. It comes closer to a “theology of nature”, but it does not assume the epistemic claims involved. I consider theologies to be important expressive constructions.     

Comprehension of human pointing gestures in young human-reared wolves (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis lupus</Emphasis>) and dogs (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis familiaris</Emphasis>)

Dogs have a remarkable skill to use human-given cues in object-choice tasks, but little is known to what extent their closest wild-living relative, the wolf can achieve this performance. In Study 1, we compared wolf and dog pups hand-reared individually and pet dogs of the same age in their readiness to form eye-contact with a human experimenter in an object-choice task and to follow her pointing gesture. The results showed that dogs already at 4 months of age use momentary distal pointing to find hidden food even without intensive early socialization. Wolf pups, on the contrary, do not attend to this subtle pointing. Accordingly in Studies 2 and 3, these wolves were tested longitudinally with this and four other (easier) human-given cues. This revealed that wolves socialized at a comparable level to dogs are able to use simple human-given cues spontaneously if the human’s hand is close to the baited container (e.g. touching, proximal pointing). Study 4 showed that wolves can follow also momentary distal pointing similarly to dogs if they have received extensive formal training. Comparing the wolves to naïve pet dogs of the same age revealed that during several months of formal training wolves can reach the level of dogs in their success of following momentary distal pointing in parallel with improving their readiness to form eye-contact with a human experimenter. We assume that the high variability in the wolves’ communicative behaviour might have provided a basis for selection during the course of domestication of the dog.     

A genetic and environmental analysis of sensation seeking

The genetic and environmental contributions to the trait of sensation seeking were analyzed using the responses of 422 pairs of twins to the Sensation Seeking Scale (Form IV). The biometrical method of Jinks and Fulker was applied to the data. The data fit the model indicating the likelihood of a predominantly additive gene action controlling the general trait. The heritability figure of 58% (69% of the reliable variance) was quite high for a personality trait. Data from other studies suggest that the heritability of the personality trait rests upon specific inherited biological traits, such as the biochemicals of the brain and gonadal hormones which affect arousability of the central nervous system and relevant traits, such as mood, impulsivity, risk taking, and sociability.     

The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future

Abstract: Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this article, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this connection reveals that the abovementioned objection to reductionism cannot get off the ground. Though the connection I propose is weaker than the connection typically presupposed, I nonetheless run up against a conclusion reached by Susan Wolf in “Self‐Interest and Interest in Selves.” According to Wolf, metaphysical theses about the nature of personal identity have no significance for our attitude of special concern. By arguing against Wolf's treatment of self‐interest, I suggest that her arguments for this conclusion are misguided. This discussion leads to further clarification of the nature of the link between theories of personal identity and our special concern and, ultimately, to a better understanding of the rationality of this attitude.