Rorty's Debt to Sellarsian Metaphysics

Rorty regards himself as furthering the project of the Enlightenment by separating Enlightenment liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism. To do so, he rejects the very need for explicit metaphysical theorizing. Yet his commitments to naturalism, nominalism, and the irreducibility of the normative come from the metaphysics of Wilfrid Sellars. Rorty's debt to Sellars is concealed by his use of Davidsonian arguments against the scheme/content distinction and the nonsemantic concept of truth. The Davidsonian arguments are used for Deweyan ends: to advance secularization and anti‐authoritarianism. However, Rorty's conflation of theology and metaphysics conceals the possibility of post‐theological metaphysics. The key distinction lies between “metaphysics” and “Metaphysics.” The former provisionally models the relations between different vocabularies; the latter continues theology by other means. Sellars shows how to do metaphysics without Metaphysics. This approach complements Rorty's prioritization of cultural politics over ontology and his vision of Enlightenment liberalism without Enlightenment rationalism.     

Should One Be A Left or A Right Sellarsian? (And is There Really Such A Choice?)

The followers of Wilfrid Sellars are often divided into “right” and “left” Sellarsians, according to whether they believe, in Mark Lance's words, that “linguistic roles constitutive of meaning and captured by dot quoted words are ‘normative all the way down.’” The present article anatomizes this division and argues that it is not easy to give it a nontrivial sense. In particular, the article argues that it is not really possible to construe it as a controversy related to ontology, and goes on to argue that it is also not easy to construe it as one concerning the translatability of the normative idiom into the non‐normative one. The conclusion is that the only coherent interpretation of this disagreement is as a disagreement about the possibility and desirability of assuming a standpoint “inside” our linguistic practices.     

Differences in matching-to-sample performance with element and compound sample stimuli in pigeons

This series of experiments examined zero-delay matching-to-sample performance in pigeons with element and compound sample stimuli. In Experiment 1, compound sample stimuli were consistently followed by compound comparison stimuli and matching accuracy during testing was equivalent to element sample-element comparison trials on the color dimension. In Experiment 2, element comparisons suddenly introduced following compound samples produced a decrement on the line dimension only. Subsequent testing at various sample durations revealed higher matching accuracy following element samples than following compound samples on both the color and line-tilt dimensions. Experiment 3 replicated the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and also demonstrated that the superiority of element over compound matching performance remains constant over the sample durations tested. In Experiment 4 testing at sample durations up to 30 sec produced an overall decrement in matching performance, but again the element vs compound matching difference remained constant. The stimulus-generalization decrement hypothesis provided a better explanation of these results than either the information-overload hypothesis or the rule hypothesis.     

Sellars's Two Images as a Philosopher's Tool

The distinction between the manifest and the scientific image of man‐in‐the‐world is widely seen as crucial to Wilfrid Sellars's philosophical work. The present essay agrees with this view. It contends, however, that precisely because the distinction is important, we should not hurry to a quick and superficial understanding of it. The essay identifies several oversimplifications that can be found in the literature on the topic and argues that they are at least partly rooted in too rigid a view of the role that the two‐image distinction plays in Sellars's philosophy. It shows that this rigid approach is quite common in the secondary literature, either explicitly or by implication. It then presents a more cautious, flexible approach to the problem of the two images and explains why this approach is fruitful on the basis of textual evidence, along with the overall advantages of interpreting Sellars's thought as a whole.     

Hegel and Sellars on the Unity of Things

ABSTRACT

I have claimed previously that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic visionaries, though with radically different visions of the grand unity of things. In this paper I explain and defend that claim. Section one differentiates several kinds of monism; section two discusses Hegel’s vision of the underlying unity of thing, while section three does the same for Sellars. The compare-and-contrast assignment is brought to completion in section four.     

Editorial: Newman and Ecclesiology

Jerusalem is at the centre of Christian culture – the place of the Lord's Passion and Resurrection and the place of Pentecost – and the image of Jerusalem is fundamental to any Christian vision of the Church and the Kingdom. There was an earthly city and one in heaven; and since the temple was inseparable from the city, temple imagery – the Garden of Eden, the Holy Wisdom, the Messiah – appears in Christian hymns about Jerusalem. In the centuries preceding the advent of Christianity, both city and temple had become corrupt, so when Jesus cleansed the temple and prophesied the destruction of the city, many people would have applauded him. The harlot city that burned in the Book of Revelation was Jerusalem, and when the emperor Constantine built the Church of the Resurrection in Jerusalem, he was building a Christian temple, replacing not the one destroyed in 70 CE, but the original temple of Solomon.     

Sellars and Quine on empiricism and conceptual truth1

I compare Sellars’s criticism of the ‘myth of the given’ with Quine’s criticism of the ‘two dogmas’ of empiricism, that is, the analytic–synthetic distinction and reductionism. In Sections I to III, I present Quine’s and Sellars’s views. In IV to X, I discuss similarities and differences in their views. In XI to XII, I show that Sellars’s arguments against the ‘myth of the given’ are incompatible with Quine’s rejection of the analytic–synthetic distinction.     

Rudolf Otto: The Idea of the Holy,viewed through the lenses of spiritual direction and psychoanalysis

Rudolf Otto’s work, The Idea of the Holy [Das Heilige], is both new and old: it puts the idea of the holy or numinous into the mainstream of Christian discourse, but does this in a way that is deeply embedded in Otto’s heritage. The psychoanalytic lens puts a spotlight on engaging with the numinous from the complete experience of being human. In terms of spiritual direction, that enables a deeply incarnational approach, which is also indebted to apophatic forms of spirituality that can easily be under-valued.     

Normativity à la Mode

This paper sets out to raise questions about the metaphor of the spaceof reasons. It argues that a proper appreciation of Wittgensteinundermines the metaphysical or dualistic way of taking the metaphor thatis supposed to prevent the naturalization of reason.