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普兰丁格的矛盾——普兰丁格的宗教排他论与有保证的基督教信念 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
该文针对美国当代宗教哲学家普兰丁格(Alvin Plantinga)“有保证的基督教信念”①的宗教真理认识论,指出,按照普兰丁格的排他论的宗教真理认识论,并不能保证基督教信念在面对其他宗教信念时具有优越性,因为其他宗教也可以宣称它们符合普兰丁格的宗教真理标准,从而它们的信念为真。因此普兰丁格的认识论是自相矛盾的、失效的。相比之下,普兰丁格的老师阿尔斯顿(William Alston)的实践的和生存论的宗教真理进路更为可取。 相似文献
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Robert John Russell 《Theology & Science》2013,11(1):17-19
Justin Barrett's consideration of some challenges for religious belief raised by evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion was criticized by Howard Van Till for overstating tensions, mischaracterizing the most important epistemological issues, and proposing a solution that perpetuates war on evolution. We argue that each of these claims is untrue, and is not conducive to dialogue that constructively engages and attempts to resolve tensions between science and religion where they do exist. 相似文献
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E. J. Coffman 《Synthese》2008,162(2):173-194
This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses
the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely plausible claim about warrant.
Sections 5–6 constitute the paper’s second main part. Section 5 presents an overlooked puzzle about warrant, and uses that
puzzle to generate a new argument for Warrant Fallibilism, the view that false beliefs can have warrant. Section 6 evaluates this pro-Fallibilism argument, finding ultimately that it defeats itself in
a surprising way. I conclude that neither Infallibilism nor Fallibilism should now constrain theorizing about warrant. 相似文献
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Albert Casullo 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):77-90
There are four approaches to analyzing the concept of a priori knowledge. The primary target of the reductive approach is
the concept of a priori justification. The primary target of the nonreductive approach is the concept of a priori knowledge.
There are two approaches to analyzing each primary target. A theory-neutral approach provides an analysis that does not presuppose
any general theory of knowledge or justification. A theory-laden approach provides an analysis that does presuppose some general
theory of knowledge or justification (call it the background theory). Those who embrace a theory-laden analysis incur a special burden: they must separate the features of their analysis that
are constitutive of the a priori from those that are constitutive of the background theory. My goal is to illustrate how the
failure to separate these features leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature of a priori knowledge.
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Albert CasulloEmail: |
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