Perception as abduction: turning sensor data into meaningful representation

This article presents a formal theory of robot perception as a form of abduction. The theory pins down the process whereby low-level sensor data is transformed into a symbolic representation of the external world, drawing together aspects such as incompleteness, top-down information flow, active perception, attention, and sensor fusion in a unifying framework. In addition, a number of themes are identified that are common to both the engineer concerned with developing a rigorous theory of perception, such as the one on offer here, and the philosopher of mind who is exercised by questions relating to mental representation and intentionality.     

Le transfert intermodal des objets solides à leurs représentations graphiques chez les enfants : les capacités intermodales s’améliorent-elles avec l’âge ?

Children aged of four to six years participated in two cross-modal transfer tasks. (1) They were tactually familiarized with solid objects and then tested for visual recognition memory with outline drawings of them; (2) they were visually familiarized with drawings of objects and then tested for tactually recognition of solid objects. Six simple geometric shapes were presented to the children and could be named by them. Because a preliminary V-V transfer task was totally mastered by three to four year-old children, the children of this experiment were only subjected to an additional T-T transfer task with solid objects. This task permitted the investigation, in the course of development, of their ability to haptically recognize the correct familiar shape without seeing it. Correct recognitions were recorded. They increase similarly from four to five years in the three tasks. However, V-T cross-modal transfer was really mastered between five and six-years. These results are discussed in relation to the development of sensory modes and educational factors such as the learning of writing and reading in nursery school.     

Effectuation of adaptive stability and postural alignment strategies are decreased by alcohol intoxication

Human stability control is a complex process comprising contributions from several partly independent mechanisms such as coordination, feedback and feed-forward control, and adaptation. Acute alcohol intoxication impairs these functions and is recognized as a major contributor to fall traumas. The study aimed to investigate how alcohol intoxication at .06% and .10% blood alcohol concentration (BAC) affected the movement spans and control of posture alignment. The angular positions of the head, shoulder, hip and knees relative to the ankles were measured with a 3D motion analysis system in 25 healthy adults during standing with eyes open or closed and with or without vibratory balance perturbations.Alcohol intoxication significantly increased the movement spans of the head, shoulders, hip and knees in anteroposterior and lateral directions during quiet stance (p ⩽ .047 and p ⩽ .003) and balance perturbations (p < .001, both directions). Alcohol intoxication also decreased the ability to reduce the movement spans through adaptation in both anteroposterior (p ⩽ .011) and lateral (p ⩽ .004) directions. When sober and submitted to balance perturbations, the subjects aligned the head, shoulders, hip and knees more forward relative to the ankle joint (p < .001), hence adopting a more resilient posture increasing the safety margin for backward falls. Alcohol intoxication significantly delayed this forward realignment (p ⩽ .022). Alcohol intoxication did not cause any significant posture realignment in the lateral direction. Thus, initiation of adaptive posture realignments to alcohol or other disruptions might be context dependent and associated with reaching a certain level of stability threats.     

The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content

I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I examine the definitions of NCC and argue that they lead to the view that the NCC of perception is retrieved in a stage of visual processing that is CI. Thus, the CI of a state and content is a sufficient and necessary condition for the state and its content to be purely NCC, the CI?≡?NCC thesis. Since early vision is CI, the purely NCC of perception is formed in early vision. I defend the CI?≡?NCC thesis by arguing against objections raised against both the sufficient and the necessary part of the thesis.     

Categorization by schema relations and perceptual similarity in 5-year-olds and adults: A study in vision and in audition

This research explores the way in which young children (5 years of age) and adults use perceptual and conceptual cues for categorizing objects processed by vision or by audition. Three experiments were carried out using forced-choice categorization tasks that allowed responses based on taxonomic relations (e.g., vehicles) or on schema category relations (e.g., vehicles that can be seen on the road). In Experiment 1 (visual modality), prominent responses based on conceptually close objects (e.g., objects included in a schema category) were observed. These responses were also favored when within-category objects were perceptually similar. In Experiment 2 (auditory modality), schema category responses depended on age and were influenced by both within- and between-category perceptual similarity relations. Experiment 3 examined whether these results could be explained in terms of sensory modality specializations or rather in terms of information processing constraints (sequential vs. simultaneous processing).     

Locke's theory of classification

In §155 of his New Theory of Vision Berkeley explains that a hypothetical ‘unbodied spirit’ ‘cannot comprehend the manner wherein geometers describe a right line or circle’.1 ¹All references to Berkeley are from, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds.), The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1948) The following abbreviations are used: An Essay Towards A New Theory of Vision, section x = New Theory x; Philosophical Commentaries, entry x = Commentaries x; Part I of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge, section x = Principles x. All other references to Berkeley's works are of the form The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, volume x, page y = Works, x, y. The reason for this, Berkeley continues, is that ‘the rule and compass with their use being things of which it is impossible he should have any notion.’ This reference to geometrical tools has led virtually all commentators to conclude that at least one reason why the unbodied spirit cannot have knowledge of plane geometry is because it cannot manipulate a ruler or a compass. In this article I will show that such an interpretation is flawed. I will instead argue that Berkeley's understanding of Euclidian geometry was based on Isaac Barrow's account of the foundations of geometry. On this view geometrical objects are conceived in terms of the idealized motion that generates the objects of geometry. Consequently, that what the unbodied spirit cannot do in this context is to form an idea of motion rather than being unable to handle geometrical tools.     

Leader emotion as a catalyst of effective leader communication of visions,value-laden messages,and goals

Despite the importance that effective leader communication of visions, value-laden messages, and goals seems to have in leadership, we know very little about which leader behavior is conducive to effective persuasive communication of desired end states. The current research highlights leader emotion as useful for leaders to make followers receptive to leaders’ communicated end state. Across four experiments we found that follower performance was highest when there was a match between leader emotion and end state in terms of implied regulatory focus (promotion vs. prevention). Three of these experiments tested the proposed underlying mechanism of this pattern and found that leader enthusiasm (agitation) primed followers with promotion (prevention) focus, which in turn generated high follower performance when leaders communicated end states that sustained this focus, that is, when visions appealed to promotion (prevention); persuasive messages contained openness (conservatism) values; and when goals were defined as maximal (minimal) goals.     

Segmenting the body into parts: Evidence from biases in tactile perception

How do we individuate body parts? Here, we investigated the effect of body segmentation between hand and arm in tactile and visual perception. In a first experiment, we showed that two tactile stimuli felt farther away when they were applied across the wrist than when they were applied within a single body part (palm or forearm), indicating a “category boundary effect”. In the following experiments, we excluded two hypotheses, which attributed tactile segmentation to other, nontactile factors. In Experiment 2, we showed that the boundary effect does not arise from motor cues. The effect was reduced during a motor task involving flexion and extension movements of the wrist joint. Action brings body parts together into functional units, instead of pulling them apart. In Experiments 3 and 4, we showed that the effect does not arise from perceptual cues of visual discontinuities. We did not find any segmentation effect for the visual percept of the body in Experiment 3, nor for a neutral shape in Experiment 4. We suggest that the mental representation of the body is structured in categorical body parts delineated by joints, and that this categorical representation modulates tactile spatial perception.     

Multisensory integration in the Müller-Lyer illusion: From vision to haptics

The Müller-Lyer figure is a powerful illusion in both vision and touch, although it is still unclear whether the visual and haptic illusory effects are due to modality-specific or shared processes. In order to investigate the hypothesis of a common underlying mechanism, the performance of 24 undergraduates in a manual bisection task of the Judd variant of the Müller-Lyer figure was assessed under visual, haptic, and visuo-haptic presentations (Experiment 1). In the bimodal condition participants saw the arrowheads on the front and touched the shaft on the back of a stimulus-supporting board. Illusory effects were comparable in touch and vision and were present, albeit reduced, in the bimodal visuo-haptic condition. In Experiment 2 we used the bimodal task of Experiment 1, manipulating the spatial position of the horizontal shaft on the backside of the board. The visual arrowheads affected haptic bisection, bringing about the illusory effects, only when the shaft was aligned with them. In conclusion, illusory effects transfer cross-modally from vision to haptics only in the presence of spatial coincidence, which appears to be a crucial factor for cross-modal integration. Implications for multisensory processes are discussed.     

Further evidence that object-based correspondence effects are primarily modulated by object location not by grasping affordance

Tipper, Paul and Hayes found object-based correspondence effects for door-handle stimuli for shape judgments but not colour. They reasoned that a grasping affordance is activated when judging dimensions related to a grasping action (shape), but not for other dimensions (colour). Cho and Proctor, however, found the effect with respect to handle position when the bases of the door handles were centred (so handles were positioned left or right; the base-centred condition) but not when the handles were centred (the object-centred condition), suggesting that the effect is driven by object location, not grasping affordance. We conducted an independent replication of Cho and Proctor's design, but with behavioural and event-related potential measures. Participants made shape judgments in Experiment 1 and colour judgments in Experiment 2 on the same door-handle objects. Correspondence effects on response time and errors were obtained in both experiments for the base-centred condition but not the object-centred condition. Effects were absent in the P1 and N1 data, which are consistent with the hypothesis of little binding between visual processing of grasping component and action. These findings question the grasping-affordance view but support a spatial-coding view, suggesting that correspondence effects are modulated primarily by object location.