Henry Freund: 1896–1982

Dr. Henry Freund was one of the foremost authorities on stuttering in Europe, and his contributions on the psychology of the disorder continued after emigrating to this country. He was a neurologist and psychiatrist, as well as a speech pathologist. He died in 1982, and in this posthumous paper he describes his career and personal experiences, while undergoing therapy from the most famous European speech pathologists of his time. He also offers some cogent comments about current therapies and future needs.     

Selective association learning in the rat: Generality of response system

Three experiments with rats examined the possibility that the cue-consequence specificity effect is not mediated by the conditioning of selective associations, but instead reflects the selective behavioral expression of taste-illness and exteroceptive-shock conditioning. Experiment 1 showed that the selective aversion performance could be obtained despite the use of locomotor withdrawal from the CS as the index of conditioning. Experiment 2 compared the response profiles of animals conditioned with footshock or illness to presentation of a saccharin or noise CS. During the test with the noise CS, lithium-conditioned subjects did not differ from control rats on any of several behavioral categories, but shock-conditioned rats showed high levels of freezing in response to the noise cue. During the saccharin test, lithium-treated rats engaged in behaviors such as chin wiping, head shaking, and gaping; these behaviors were rarely or never seen in shock-conditioned rats or controls, whose behavioral profiles during the saccharin test were almost identical. Experiment 3, using a blocking design, found that a noise-lithium pairing did not attenuate subsequent conditioning of a saline-lithium association, nor did a saccharin-shock pairing interfere with conditioning of a noise-shock association. These results confirm that the cue-consequence specificity effect is mediated by the selective associability of taste with illness and of exteroceptive cues with footshock.     

A case report of pathological rule-governed syllable intrusion

A detailed analysis of a unique speech disturbance, marked by the frequent appearance in the speech stream of a meaningless intrusive syllable, is presented. Following a lengthy thoracic surgery, an American English speaking patient began to speak with non-English prosodic patterns, which evolved to a conspicuous intrusion in his speech of the syllable /sis/. This syllable and its variants were attached to words in a manner which conformed to the regular phonological rules in English (for formation of plural, possessive, and third person singular morphemes). The distribution and frequency of the intrusive syllable are described, and possible explanations for the abnormal occurrence of this particular syllable are discussed.     

In Defence of Constructive Empiricism: Maxwell’s Master Argument and Aberrant Theories

Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen’s view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell’s reasoning will make it clear that neither is the case. This dissection includes an analysis of Maxwell’s ‘aberrance–argument’ (omnipresent in his many writings) for the claim that science implicitly and permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the universe, which then paves the way for his own metaphysical-realist hierarchy-view of science. This aberrance-claim, which Maxwell directs against a widely shared and harmful ideology of science called ‘Standard Empiricism’, generally has been ignored too, for more than a quarter of a century. Our conclusions will be that (i) Maxwell’s attacks on CE can be beaten off, and (ii) his ‘aberrance–arguments’ do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish, but (iii) we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertarian nature of CE.     

Van Inwagen and the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument

In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however, that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.

Husserl’s Way to Authentic Being

In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment.     

Empirical bayes estimates of domain scores under binomial and hypergeometric distributions for test scores

We introduce two simple empirical approximate Bayes estimators (EABEs)— and —for estimating domain scores under binomial and hypergeometric distributions, respectively. Both EABEs (derived from corresponding marginal distributions of observed test scorex without relying on knowledge of prior domain score distributions) have been proven to hold -asymptotic optimality in Robbins' sense of convergence in mean. We found that, where and are the monotonized versions of and under Van Houwelingen's monotonization method, respectively, the convergence rate of the overall expected loss of Bayes risk in either or depends on test length, sample size, and ratio of test length to size of domain items. In terms of conditional Bayes risk, and outperform their maximum likelihood counterparts over the middle range of domain scales. In terms of mean-squared error, we also found that: (a) given a unimodal prior distribution of domain scores, performs better than both and a linear EBE of the beta-binomial model when domain item size is small or when test items reflect a high degree of heterogeneity; (b) performs as well as when prior distribution is bimodal and test items are homogeneous; and (c) the linear EBE is extremely robust when a large pool of homogeneous items plus a unimodal prior distribution exists.The authors are indebted to both anonymous reviewers, especially Reviewer 2, and the Editor for their invaluable comments and suggestions. Thanks are also due to Yuan-Chin Chang and Chin-Fu Hsiao for their help with our simulation and programming work.     

To Believe in Belief

Summary  Take the following version of scientific realism: we have good reason to believe that (some of the) current scientific theories tell us something specific about the underlying, i.e. unobservable, structures of the world, for instance that there are electrons with a certain electric charge, or that there are viruses that cause certain diseases. Popper, the rationalist, would not have adhered to the proposed formulation of scientific realism in terms of the rationality of existential beliefs concerning unobservables. Popper did not believe in belief. According to Van Fraassen, the empiricist, one may yet have a rational existential belief concerning unobservables, given a liberal notion of rationality of belief. In this paper I will investigate to what extent a reassessment of both Popper’s rejection of the rationality of belief and Van Fraassen’s reformulation of the rationality of belief, points towards a new and pragmatist dissolution of the ‘problem of scientific realism’.