Ownership unity,neural substrates,and philosophical relevance: A response to Rex Welshon’s “Searching for the neural realizers of ownership unity”

In this commentary, I critically assess Rex Welshon’s position on the neural substrates of ownership unity. First, I comment on Welshon’s definition of ownership unity and underline some of the problems stemming from his phenomenological analysis. Second, I analyze Welshon’s proposal to establish a mechanistic relation between neural substrates and ownership unity. I show that it is insufficient and defend my own position on how neural mechanisms may give rise to whole subjects of experience, which I call the neuro-integrative account of consciousness. Lastly, I comment on Welshon’s (2013) philosophical contribution and claim that it leaves the reader theoretically stranded.     

Growing Together, Growing Apart

Abstract : How does diversity define the limits of the Body of Christ in the context of its fundamental unity? For Lutherans the visible unity of the church is grounded in those signs and constitutive elements which convey salvation. Unified on the basis of a common baptism, a common communion, and a common mission, the church of the gospel must be defined more by being than by doing. The church doing God's redemptive work in creation will always experience tension, but we must be mindful that wholeness is not equivalent to sameness.     

Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic and graphical mathematics

We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.     

Consciousness and topologically structured phenomenal spaces

There are strong reasons to believe that our conscious inner life is structured, suggested both by introspection as well as scientific psychology. One of the most salient structural characteristics of conscious experiences is known as unity of consciousness. In this contribution, we wish to demonstrate how features of experience that pertain to the unity of consciousness could be made precise in terms of mathematical relations that hold between phenomenal objects.Based on phenomenological considerations, we first outline three such features. These are (i) environmental embedding, (ii) the mutual constraint between local and global representations, and (iii) a top-down process of object formation in consciousness. We then introduce a formal model based on the notion of phenomenal space, defined in terms of a set of quasi-elementary and extended entities. We describe the structure of phenomenal space by appealing to mereological and topological concepts, and we outline a projector-based calculus to account for the idea that the structure of phenomenal space is ultimately dynamical.Using the above concepts, one could approach the mind-matter problem by relating environmentally embedded agents to topologically well-defined objects that result from decompositions of phenomenal space. We conclude our discussion by putting it into the context of some recent conceptual questions that appear in cognitive science and consciousness studies. We opt for the possibility to regard the phenomenon of consciousness not in terms of a singular transition that happens between “brain” and “mind” but rather in terms of a series of transitions between structured layers of experience.     

和平、发展、合作——儒家文明在世界文明对话中的地位和价值

在经济全球化、科技一体化、互联网普及化的情境下 ,世界的政治、经济、文明、宗教、制度等仍然持续多元化、多极化的趋势。是全球化的多元化 ,或多元化的全球化。人作为“会自我创造的和合存在” ,是创造世界文明的原动力和原载体。儒家文明孕育了中华民族精神的成长 ,担当着建构民族主体精神的重任 ,绵延着民族生命的智慧。儒家文明一言以蔽之 ,是以治平为本 ,以仁为核 ,以和为贵。从文明冲突到文明对话 ,是价值观念、思维方式、观照视角的转换。文明对话可依照和合学的“融突论” ,而不是二元对立的非此即彼论 ,它以承认、接纳“他者”的存在为前提。儒家文明在化解世界文明冲突中 ,以其“己所不欲 ,勿施于人”的和生、和处、和立、和达、和爱原理 ,发挥着重要的、独特的、整体的作用     

Predication and cartographic representation

I argue that maps do not feature predication, as analyzed by Frege and Tarski. I take as my foil (Casati and Varzi, Parts and places, 1999), which attributes predication to maps. I argue that the details of Casati and Varzi’s own semantics militate against this attribution. Casati and Varzi emphasize what I call the Absence Intuition: if a marker representing some property (such as mountainous terrain) appears on a map, then absence of that marker from a map coordinate signifies absence of the corresponding property from the corresponding location. Predication elicits nothing like the Absence Intuition. “F(a)” does not, in general, signify that objects other than a lack property F. On the basis of this asymmetry, I argue that attaching a marker to map coordinates is a different mode of semantic composition than attaching a predicate to a singular term.     

Are moral judgments unified?

Whenever psychologists, neuroscientists, or philosophers draw conclusions about moral judgments in general from a small selected sample, they assume that moral judgments are unified by some common and peculiar feature that enables generalizations and makes morality worthy of study as a unified field. We assess this assumption by considering the six main candidates for a unifying feature: content, phenomenology, force, form, function, and brain mechanisms. We conclude that moral judgment is not unified on any of these levels and that moral science should adopt a more fine-grained taxonomic approach that studies carefully defined groups of moral judgments.     

The Churches and the Evolution of Europe

This article offers the reader some theological reflections on the 2014 ‘Agreed Statement on Christology’ (ASC). Its scope is thus limited to shedding light on certain aspects of the document that appear to the author as theologically complex and not self-explanatory. The author’s intention is not to provide the reader with a comprehensive theological evaluation of the document, but to initiate a discussion about the content of the statement so as to provide some theological groundwork for a future comprehensive evaluation. The article starts with a brief and schematic exposition of theological developments during the fourth to early fifth centuries that threatened ecclesial unity. It then delineates certain problematic aspects of Christological thought that pushed a united Christendom to the state of disunity. The main body of the article then endeavours to elucidate two sections of the ASC which were of particular interest to the author. An assessment (necessarily partial) of the ASC’s theological significance and of its ecumenical import concludes the article.     

Positive psychology on character strengths and virtues. A disquieting suggestion

The Values in Action (VIA) classification of character strengths and virtues has been recently proposed by two leading positive psychologists, Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman as “the social science equivalent of virtue ethics.” The very possibility of developing this kind of an “equivalent,” however, is very doubtful in the light of the cogent criticism that has been leveled at modern moral theory by Alasdair MacIntyre as well as the well argued accusations that positive psychology, despite its official normative neutrality, is pervaded by specifically Western individualism and instrumentalism. In order to evaluate whether the VIA project can be considered as substantially rooted in virtue ethical tradition, the classification was assessed against two fundamental features of the classical version of the latter: (1) the substantial interconnectedness of individual virtues, as expressed by the thesis of the unity of virtue, and (2) the constitutive character of the relationship between virtue and happiness. It turned out, in result, that the two above features are not only absent from but also contradicted by the VIA framework with the latter's: (1′) construal of individual virtues and character strengths as independent variables and (2′) official endorsement of the fact/value distinction. As soon as the arguments for the superiority of the classical virtue ethical perspective are provided, the potential responses available to the VIA's proponents are discussed.