Perceptions of unfairness in allocations between multiple recipients

This paper introduces a new model to explain perceptions of unfairness in resource allocations between multiple recipients. The model yields several novel predictions, all confirmed in a series of new empirical tests. For instance, while much prior research focuses on the differences between the judge’s share and others’ shares, we argue that people also care about differences between others’ shares. In particular, the presence of a single loser increases perceptions of unfairness. We also study individual variation in sensitivity to the single-loser dimension. Most centrally, we offer empirical support for the existence – indeed the prevalence – of ostraphobics, individuals with an acute sensitivity to being “ostracized” as a sole loser. We show that ostraphobics perceive unfairness more strongly than other types, are higher in need to belong and fear of negative evaluation, and are more prone to a heretofore unrecognized type of preference reversal with respect to fairness.     

The biological bases of unfairness: Neuroimaging evidence for the distinctiveness of procedural and distributive justice

A classic debate in the organizational justice literature concerns the question of whether procedural justice and distributive justice are independent constructs. We investigate this question by using fMRI methods to examine brain activation patterns associated with procedural and distributive unfairness. We observed a clear dissociation of activation between these two forms of justice, and only a minimal amount of shared activation in the hypothesized regions. Specifically, unfair procedures evoked greater activation in parts of the brain related to social cognition, such as the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the superior temporal sulcus (STS), whereas unfair outcomes evoked greater activation in more emotional areas of the brain, such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). We interpret the findings as supporting the notion that the two forms of justice reflect distinct constructs, while recognizing that, as forms of justice, they are closely related nomologically.