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The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis
is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which
empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates
on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference
will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation
only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious
constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive
explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of
differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible
confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from
the phenomena’. 相似文献
2.
Jacob Busch 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):55-65
The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought
to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that
theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the
argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists
are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for
theory choice.
相似文献
Jacob BuschEmail: |
3.
Aviezer Tucker 《Erkenntnis》1998,48(1):61-83
The paper explicates unique events and investigates their epistemology. Explications of unique events as individuated, different, and emergent are philosophically uninteresting. Unique events are topics of why-questions that radically underdetermine all their potential explanations. Uniqueness that is relative to a level of scientific development is differentiated from absolute uniqueness. Science eliminates relative uniqueness by discovery of recurrence of events and properties, falsification of assumptions of why-questions, and methodological simplification e.g. by explanatory methodological reduction. Finally, an overview of contemporary philosophical disputes that hinge on issues of uniqueness emphasizes its philosophical significance. 相似文献
4.
Jan-Willem Romeijn 《Journal of Applied Logic》2013,11(4):430-439
This paper discusses the role of theoretical notions in making predictions and evaluating statistical models. The core idea of the paper is that such theoretical notions can be spelt out in terms of priors over statistical models, and that such priors can themselves be assigned probabilities. The discussion substantiates the claim that the use of theoretical notions may offer specific empirical advantages. Moreover, I argue that this use of theoretical notions explicates a particular kind of abductive inference. The paper thus contributes to the discussion over Bayesian models of abductive inference. 相似文献
5.
Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):141-148
Kyle Stanford’s arguments against scientific realism are assessed, with a focus on the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
I argue that discussions of underdetermination have neglected a possible symmetry which may ameliorate the situation.
相似文献
Peter Godfrey-SmithEmail: |
6.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):149-158
Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic
induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006,
Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the
underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper,
I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction
would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that
which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.
相似文献
Anjan ChakravarttyEmail: |
7.
Rogério Passos Severo 《Synthese》2008,161(1):141-165
Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the
following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the
existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might
be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis within Quine’s philosophy, and
(v) it does not carry with it the anti-realistic consequences often associated with the thesis in recent debates. The paper
analyzes Quine’s views on the matter and the changes they underwent over the years. A conjecture is put forth about why Quine’s
thesis has been so widely misrepresented: Quine’s writings up to 1975 tackled primarily the formulation and justification
of the thesis, but afterwards were concerned mostly with the question whether empirically equivalent rivals to the theory
we hold are to be considered true also. When this latter discussion is read without bearing in mind Quine’s earlier formulation
and justification of the thesis, his thesis seems to have stronger epistemic consequences than it actually does. A careful
reading of his later writings shows, however, that the formulation of the thesis remained unchanged after 1975, and that his
mature and considered views supported only a very mitigated version of the thesis. 相似文献
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