Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

I did not expect to be dreaming: Explaining realization in lucid dreams with a Bayesian framework

The commonsense view is that a lucid dream starts when the dreamer realizes that they are currently dreaming. The notion of realization, however, has been accepted at face value, with little consideration of whether the dreamer realizes that they are dreaming in the sense of actual reasoning, or if it is a mere epiphenomenon of lucid dream initiation. This article offers a solution to this problem by, first, arguing that the transition to lucidity can occur as a result of successful reasoning, and second, building a model of this reasoning in terms of probabilistic reasoning. The established Bayesian model explains realization in lucid dreams taking under consideration two factors: the beliefs that the dreamer holds on what is generally probable and improbable, and the dreamer’s admissibility of being in a dream. Defended against important objections, the model offers an explanation of lucid dream initiation, relevant for future research on dreaming.     

Learning algorithm for an intelligent decision making system based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures

The paper presents the formalism of an intelligent decision-making system based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures, which has an architectural similarity to the human brain. An invariant of the organizational and functional structure of the intellectual decision-making process based on the multi-agent neurocognitive architecture is developed. An algorithm for teaching intelligent decision-making systems based on the self-organization of the invariant of multi-agent neurocognitive architectures is presented. Using this algorithm, an intelligent agent was trained and the architecture of the learning process was built on the basis of an invariant of neurocognitive architecture. Further research is related to training an intelligent agent in more complex behavior and expanding the capabilities of an intelligent decision-making system based on multi-agent neurocognitive architectures.     

A longitudinal study of "intrusion-based reasoning" and posttraumatic stress disorder after exposure to a train disaster

Previously, we found that chronic PTSD relates to “intrusion-based reasoning” (IR), i.e. the tendency to interpret distressing intrusions themselves as evidence that danger is impending, regardless of objective danger information (Engelhard et al., Behav. Res. Ther. 39 (2001) 1139). This study was intended to elucidate the causal status of this relation. Twenty-nine residents of a Belgian town witnessed a train crash and were assessed for IR and PTSD symptoms within 1 month and were re-assessed for PTSD at 3.5 months. Fourteen control residents did not witness the crash and were also tested for IR. The IR paradigm involved rating the danger of brief scenarios in which objective danger and presence of intrusions about the crash were systematically varied. The directly exposed residents showed greater danger ratings to scenarios in which intrusions were included than did the controls. IR was strongly related to both acute and chronic PTSD symptoms. It did not significantly predict chronic PTSD symptoms after controlling for acute symptoms, although the partial correlation (r=0.26, p=0.09) was in the expected direction. The data suggest that IR is involved in the onset and maintenance of PTSD symptoms, but more clarity about causality awaits future larger and experimental studies.     

Latent profile analysis of working memory capacity and thinking styles in adults and adolescents

This study of adults (n = 269) and adolescents (n = 308) applied latent profile analysis to preference for rational and/or experiential cognition, coupled with working memory capacity (WMC). A 4-profile solution comprising rationally dominant, experientially dominant, dual preference, and disengaged groups was retained for both adult and adolescent samples. Our solution indicated that high WMC was associated with both preference and ability to engage in rational processing. Profile membership significantly discriminated both adults and adolescents on several reasoning tasks and measures of cognitive biases. Overall our results indicate that cognitive processing styles and WMC can be combined to create a typology that distinguishes between four types of thinkers who significantly differ in their performance on reasoning tasks.     

It's in the sample: the effects of sample size and sample diversity on the breadth of inductive generalization

Developmental studies have provided mixed evidence with regard to the question of whether children consider sample size and sample diversity in their inductive generalizations. Results from four experiments with 105 undergraduates, 105 school-age children (M = 7.2 years), and 105 preschoolers (M = 4.9 years) showed that preschoolers made a higher rate of projections from large samples than from small samples when samples were diverse (Experiments 1 and 3) but not when samples were homogeneous (Experiment 4) and not when the task required a choice between two samples (Experiment 2). Furthermore, when a property occurred in large and diverse samples, preschoolers exhibited a broad pattern of projection, generalizing the property to items from categories not represented in the evidence. In contrast, adults followed a normative pattern of induction and never attributed properties to items from categories not represented in the evidence. School-age children showed a mixed pattern of results.     

Second order inductive logic and Wilmers' principle

We extend the framework of Inductive Logic to Second Order languages and introduce Wilmers' Principle, a rational principle for probability functions on Second Order languages. We derive a representation theorem for functions satisfying this principle and investigate its relationship with the first order principles of Regularity and Super Regularity.     

Reading and reflecting sacred texts in the presence of the other. An empirical study on the use of ‘scriptural reasoning’ in teacher education

In this article the method of Scriptural Reasoning (SR), a text-based approach to interreligious dialogue between participants of the three Abrahamic religions, was implemented for a teacher education setting at a German university. Not only students with an outspoken religious conviction but also agnostic and atheist students, preparing themselves to become teachers in public schools, were invited into the conversation. The article documents and discusses the qualitative-empirical research in which the SR meetings were embedded. The aim of the article is not to create a hermeneutical theory for SR but rather to explore how SR as a method, with its specific learning tool of text-work, can be turned into a broader didactical model which can be transferred to other learning environments and which can in the long run provide empirical evidence on successful teacher education in multi-religious and multi-worldview societies and schools.     

Do reasoning limitations undermine discourse?

Why does discourse so often seem shallow, with people arguing past one another more than with one another? Might contributing causes be individual and logical rather than only dialogical? We consider here whether there exist errors in reasoning that could be particularly damaging in their effects on argumentive discourse. In particular, we examine implications for discourse of two such errors – explanation as a replacement for evidence and neglecting the likelihood of multiple causes contributing to an outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, we show these errors to be prevalent in a cross section of adults, as well as samples of community college students and young adolescents, with minimal age-related improvement. They also occur, although less frequently, among a sample of highly educated adults, and in Study 3, we examine their role in the discourse of college-educated adults. We point finally to evidence that these individual reasoning errors are potentially addressable through education.