近五十年来台湾地区士林哲学之研究与前瞻

根据祁尔松（Etienne Gilson）的说法,中世纪哲学,尤其是十三世纪的思想,是基督宗教哲学。本文按其在台湾发展时所袭用的名词,称之为士林哲学。士林哲学之传入中国,虽然早在利玛窦时期（1550—1610）已经开始,但真正成为学术思想之主流之一,是最近五十年来在台湾地区的发展。20世纪初士林哲学初传入台湾时,当时的思想环境,对基督宗教哲学并不十分友善,这种种情况,与中世纪的思想家,面对信仰与神学之挑战相似。当时的思想家,融合各种不同的思想派系,对柏拉图与亚理斯多德的观念,重新诠释与批判,批判与诠释是创新的基础。所以,中世纪可说是哲学的第二春,而中世纪哲学之精华,即全盛期的士林哲学。十四世纪唯名论之后,士林哲学逐步式微,于十九世纪末再兴。本文认为,士林哲学在台湾发展之过程,与其在中世纪之盛行,及十九世纪末之再兴,背景虽异但有不少相似之处,而这些相似之处,正是士林哲学之基本思想与立场。本文对台湾士林哲学之发展,从四方面探讨：（1）回到形上学之根以面对新的挑战;（2）形上学基本立场与概念之说明;（3）反思与批判;（4）未来发展之方向。本文所参考之资料,一是已发表之学术文献;其二是与学者们之正式交谈——如学术演讲、座谈会等,及非正式之谈话、访问等。     

主体的复归与现象学的先验转向

现象学的先验转向是由意义自在转向先验主体,由完全悬置自我到复归主体,这一方面是由于观念自在论的种种困难所促成,另一方面主体主义哲学惟有通过先验转向才能克服其主观性悖论,先验观念论是主体主义哲学最后和最高的形式,而这种最高形式中也隐藏着先验主体的一些理论困难。     

Deleuze and Naturalism

Abstract

Against the tendency to regard Deleuze as a materialist and a naturalistic thinker, I argue that his core philosophical writings involve commitments that are incompatible with contemporary scientific naturalism. He defends different versions of a distinction between philosophy and natural science that is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and with the scientific image of the world as a single causally interconnected system. He defends the existence of a virtual realm of entities that is irreconcilable with ontological naturalism. The difficulty of reconciling Deleuze’s philosophy with ontological naturalism is especially apparent in his recurrent conception of pure events that are irreducible to their incarnation in bodies and states of affairs. In the last section of this essay, I canvass some of the ways in which Deleuze’s thought might be reconciled with a more liberal, pluralist and ethical naturalism that he identified in an early essay on Lucretius.     

Focused attention, open monitoring and automatic self-transcending: Categories to organize meditations from Vedic, Buddhist and Chinese traditions

This paper proposes a third meditation-category—automatic self-transcending— to extend the dichotomy of focused attention and open monitoring proposed by Lutz. Automatic self-transcending includes techniques designed to transcend their own activity. This contrasts with focused attention, which keeps attention focused on an object; and open monitoring, which keeps attention involved in the monitoring process. Each category was assigned EEG bands, based on reported brain patterns during mental tasks, and meditations were categorized based on their reported EEG. Focused attention, characterized by beta/gamma activity, included meditations from Tibetan Buddhist, Buddhist, and Chinese traditions. Open monitoring, characterized by theta activity, included meditations from Buddhist, Chinese, and Vedic traditions. Automatic self-transcending, characterized by alpha1 activity, included meditations from Vedic and Chinese traditions. Between categories, the included meditations differed in focus, subject/object relation, and procedures. These findings shed light on the common mistake of averaging meditations together to determine mechanisms or clinical effects.     

Internalism,externalism, and transcendental idealism

The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation.     

Phenomenological immanence,normativity, and semantic externalism

This paper argues that transcendental phenomenology (here represented by Edmund Husserl) can accommodate the main thesis of semantic externalism, namely, that intentional content is not simply a matter of what is ‘in the head,’ but depends on how the world is. I first introduce the semantic problem as an issue of how linguistic tokens or mental states can have ‘content’—that is, how they can set up conditions of satisfaction or be responsive to norms such that they can succeed or fail at referring. The standard representationalist view—which thinks of the problem in first-person terms—is contrasted with Brandom’s pragmatic inferentialist approach, which adopts a third-person stance. The rest of the paper defends a phenomenological version of the representationalist position (seeking to preserve its first-person stance) but offers a conception of representation that does not identify it with an entity ‘in the head.’ The standard view of Husserl as a Cartesian internalist is undermined by rejecting its fundamental assumption—that Husserl’s concept of the ‘noema’ is a mental entity—and by defending a concept of ‘phenomenological immanence’ that has a normative, rather than a psychological, structure. Finally, it is argued that phenomenological immanence cannot be identified with ‘consciousness’ in Husserl’s sense, though consciousness is a necessary condition for it.     

Interkinaesthetic affectivity: a phenomenological approach

This Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological investigation of interkinaesthetic affectivity first clarifies the sense of affectivity that is at stake here, then shows how Husserl’s distinctive approach to kinaesthetic experience provides evidential access to the interkinaesthetic field. After describing several structures of interkinaesthetic-affective experience, I indicate how a Husserlian critique of the presupposition that we are “psychophysical” entities might suggest a more inclusive approach to a biosocial plenum that includes all metabolic life.

Bergson's and Sartre's Account of the Self in Relation to the Transcendental Ego

The historico-political category of 'Continental philosophy' arose in the United State and includes such figures as Adorno, Arendt, Beauvoir, Cairns, Carr, Cavailles, Deleuze, Derrida, Fink, Foucault, Funke, Gadamer, Gurwitsch, Habermas, Heidegger, Held, Ihde, Jaspers, Jonas, Kersten, Kristeva, Ingarden, Landgrebe, Levinas, Lyotard, Marcel, Marcuse, Marx, Merleau- Ponty, Mohanty, Natanson, Ortega y Gasset, Pato?ka, Reinach, Ricoeur, Sartre, Scheler, Schutz, Seebohm, Sokolowski, Spet, Stein, Stroeker, and Waldenfels. What these diverse figures share is (a) an early but not necessarily continued critical involvement with Husserl's phenomenology and (b) subsequent intellectual interaction with others who also began that way. Some comments on relations with analytic philosophy are also included with this historical sketch.     

The Archaelogy of Spirit and the Unique Self: A Husserlian Reading of Conrad-Martius

Although the connections of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology, what she called, “realontology,” to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology were constant concerns that usually remained in the background of her work, on occasion they became foreground. Similarly the problems surrounding the individuation of the person and spirit were persistent but rather marginal in her writings. In this paper I want first to review some of the issues as they are connected to ontological and transcendental phenomenology. Then I want to relate them to the cosmological and theological issues that were no less important for Conrad-Martius.