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“The ineffable” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is an essential term that has various interpretations. It could be divided into two types, namely, positive and negative,
or real and fake. The negative or fake type can be clarified by logical analysis, while the positive or real type can be understood
only through philosophical critique. Both the positive and negative types consist of infinity or absoluteness, but the infinity
is subject to distinctions in meaning and logic.
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Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (8): 64–68 相似文献
2.
JIANG Yi 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2021,16(1):6
Wittgenstein’s mysticism has been one of the focuses of critics and commentators of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Two prevailing readings hold different attitudes towards it. The classical reading commits to the mysticism in the Tractatus, while the therapeutic reading rejects it amid its interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In this paper, I will argue against both by discussing how the Chinese reading understands the Tractatus. I will show that the ineffable in the Tractatus is not any type of mysticism, and that the Chinese reading of the Tractatus is a metaphysical one without any mysticism. 相似文献
3.
Pablo Acuña 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2018,26(1):1-23
Customary interpretations state that Tractarian thoughts are pictures, and, a fortiori, facts. I argue that important difficulties are unavoidable if we assume this standard view, and I propose a reading of the concept taking advantage of an analogy that Wittgenstein introduces, namely, the analogy between thoughts and projective geometry. I claim that thoughts should be understood neither as pictures nor as facts, but as acts of geometric projection in logical space. The interpretation I propose thus removes the root of the identified difficulties. Moreover, it allows important clarification concerning some central aspects of the Tractarian theory of representation, and it yields a unifying elucidation regarding Wittgenstein’s remarks on the solipsistic thesis. 相似文献
4.
HUANG Min 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2021,16(1):26
Why does Wittgenstein say in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that the world has as its members only facts, not things? Focusing on this question, I start with the problem, in its general form, “How is it possible to determine something as X?” and establish the excluding-allowing model for determination. From this model, I derive an argument for Wittgenstein’s aforementioned statement. The argument shows that a whole cannot be determined as consisting of components that are determined separately in a strong sense, whereas in a weak sense it can be. This thus demonstrates why the context principle holds. The recommended interpretation places suitable weight on the Tractarian notion of possibility. It provides new insights into Wittgenstein’s conception of logic, and his atomism about facts and states of affairs. 相似文献
5.
Natan Berber 《Axiomathes》2007,17(2):185-196
This paper focuses on the relation between logic and ontology. In particular, it demonstrates how classical logical theory
can clarify the ontological part of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. To this end, the work examines the adequacy of a formal system that was devised by the Polish logician, mathematician and
philosopher Roman Suszko (1919–1979) as a model for the Tractatus. Following a brief explanation of the Tractarian ontology, the main ideas of Suszko’s system and its philosophical significance
will be considered. The latter will be illustrated in the context of central Tractarian concepts. Finally, two implications
for a better understanding of the Tractarian ontology will be pointed out.
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Natan BerberEmail: |
6.
Norbert M. Samuelson 《Zygon》2000,35(1):83-97
Three theses are explored, the first two historical and the third philosophical-theological: (1) throughout most of the history ofWestern civilization, science and religion have been closely connected with each other, and each has benefited from the connection; (2) the belief that science and religion have always been in conflict is not based on the actual history of either set of institutions; and (3) structurally a relationship between the two institutions is in the interest of both. By religion here I mean specifically, but not exclusively, Judaism. 相似文献
7.
Terrance W. Klein 《Zygon》2006,41(2):365-380
Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew? 相似文献
8.
Jimmy Plourde 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2017,25(1):16-39
In this paper, I draw attention to the often-overlooked Tractarian distinction between representing (darstellen) and depicting (abbilden), provide a clear account of it and examine how it affects our understanding of the notions of ‘being a picture’, meaningfulness, truth, and falsity in the Tractatus. I also look at the recent debate in the literature on the notion of truth and show that Glock’s claim that the official theory of the Tractatus is to be accounted in terms of obtainment only and deflationary accounts such as Hacker’s derive from a failure to notice the distinction between representing and depicting (in the case of Glock) or a misconception of depicting (in the case of Hacker). Finally, I argue against the idea that either representing or depicting should be dispensed with. Both are necessary for Wittgenstein to account for every case of a proposition being a picture of reality. 相似文献
9.
S. J. Methven 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2019,27(1):134-154
In ‘Universals’ (1925), Ramsey declares that we do not, and cannot, know the forms of atomic propositions. A year later, in a symposium with Braithwaite and Joseph, he announces a change of mind: atomic propositions may, after all, be discoverable by analysis. It is clear from the 1926 paper that Ramsey intends this to be a revision of the 1925 claim. Puzzlingly, however, Ramsey does not mention analysis in 1925. My task in this article is to provide a justification for that change of mind. My argument consists of two parts. I first show what relation holds between the negative 1925 assertion and the more positive 1926 assertion which allows us to read the latter claim as a retraction of the former, as Ramsey appears to have intended it. Then I shall argue that the retraction of the 1925 claim is forced upon Ramsey by reflection on the fact that three theses, all of which he held in or around the relevant period, are, rather surprisingly, revealed to be inconsistent. 相似文献
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