PARADIGMS OF BELIEF, THEORY AND METATHEORY

Abstract. My account of the recent turnabout in the treatment of mental states in science and its basis in a modified concept of causal determinism and my claim that this opens the way for beliefs and values consistent with science are here reaffirmed in response to perceived weaknesses and "inherent incompleteness." Contested issues are reviewed to better clarify the main thesis. An inherent weakness in respect to deep spiritual needs is recognized and tentative remedial measures explored.     

Adaptation, teleology, and selection by consequences

This paper presents and defends the view that reinforcement and natural selection are selection processes, that selection processes are neither mechanistic nor teleological, and that mentalistic and vitalistic processes are teleological but not mechanistic. The differences between these types of processes are described and used in discussing the conceptual and methodological significance of “selection type theories” and B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorist view that “operant behavior is the field of intention, purpose, and expectation. It deals with that field precisely as the theory of evolution has dealt with another kind of purpose” (1986, p. 716). The antimentalism of radical behaviorism emerges as a post-Darwinian extension of Francis Bacon's (and Galileo's) influential view that “[the introduction of final causes] rather corrupts than advances the sciences” (Bacon, 1905, p. 302).     

Polanyi's Finalism

Although Michael Polanyi's model of science and his construal of the nature of the real are usually thought to be congenial to religion and although Polanyi himself says that "the stage on which we thus resume our full intellectual powers is borrowed from the Christian scheme of Fall and Redemption" (Polanyi 1958, 324), theologians have given little attention to the model of God he presents. The metaphysical and theological vision unfolded in part 4 of Personal Knowledge is a thoughtful alternative to materialist versions of neo-Darwinism and provides a platform for revisiting four long-standing controversies at the interface of science and religion: whether life and mind can be completely specified in terms of physical analysis, whether nature can be adequately understood without appeal to final causes, whether natural selection adequately explains life's diverse forms, and whether knowledge can be fully objectified. Through an exploration of Polanyi's contribution to these discussions, we undertake to show not only that his treatment of God as a cosmic field is strikingly original but also that in reinstating activity as a metaphysical category, he reconstructs our understanding of our creaturely hope and calling.     

Drivers’ visual attention: A field study at intersections

Crossing a road intersection, a driver must collect visual information from various locations. The allocation of visual attention, which allows this collection, mainly relies on top-down processes. This study focuses on three top-down factors which influence the collection of visual information: the value of visual information for the ongoing task, their bandwidth, and the familiarity with the environment. These factors are studied according to the priority rules at intersections (Give way, Stop or Priority), the expected traffic density (Lower or Higher) and the number of passages (First or Second passage). Fourteen participants were installed in an instrumented vehicle equipped with an eye-tracker. They drove during 1h45 along a 80-km long route, mainly on rural roads, which included 19 intersections. Visual attention was studied by means of the head and gaze horizontal eccentricity. Effects were found for each of the three factors, in agreement with Wickens’ theoretical framework and with previous studies, despite the important variability in the data due to the experimental situation.     

Higher-order cognitive factors affect subjective but not proprioceptive aspects of self-representation in the rubber hand illusion

In the current study we look at whether subjective and proprioceptive aspects of selfrepresentation are separable components subserved by distinct systems of multisensory integration. We used the rubber hand illusion (RHI) to draw the location of the ‘self’ away from the body, towards extracorporeal space (Out Condition), thereby violating top-down information about the body location. This was compared with the traditional RHI which drew position of the ‘self’ towards the body (In Condition). We were successfully able to draw proprioceptive position of the limbs in and out from the body suggesting body perception is a purely bottom-up process, resistant to top-down effects. Conversely, we found subjective self-representation was altered by the violation of top-down body information – as the strong association of subjective and proprioceptive factors found in the In Condition became non-significant in the Out Condition. Interestingly, we also found evidence that subjective embodiment can modulate tactile perception.     

Sustained attention to spontaneous thumb sensations activates brain somatosensory and other proprioceptive areas

The present experiment was designed to test if sustained attention directed to the spontaneous sensations of the right or left thumb in the absence of any external stimuli is able to activate corresponding somatosensory brain areas. After verifying in 34 healthy volunteers that external touch stimuli to either thumb effectively activate brain contralateral somatosensory areas, and after subtracting attention mechanisms employed in both touch and spontaneous-sensation conditions, fMRI evidence was obtained that the primary somatosensory cortex (specifically left BA 3a/3b) becomes active when an individual is required to attend to the spontaneous sensations of either thumb in the absence of external stimuli. In addition, the left superior parietal cortex, anterior cingulate gyrus, insula, motor and premotor cortex, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, Broca’s area, and occipital cortices were activated. Moreover, attention to spontaneous-sensations revealed an increased connectivity between BA 3a/3b, superior frontal gyrus (BA 9) and anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32), probably allowing top-down activations of primary somatosensory cortex. We conclude that specific primary somatosensory areas in conjunction with other left parieto-frontal areas are involved in processing proprioceptive and interoceptive bodily information that underlies own body-representations and that these networks and cognitive functions can be modulated by top-down attentional processes.     

Downward causation and supervenience: the non-reductionist’s extra argument for incompatibilism

Agent-causal theories of free will, which rely on a non-reductionist account of the agent, have traditionally been associated with libertarianism. However, some authors have recently argued in favor of compatibilist agent-causal accounts. In this essay, I will show that such accounts cannot avoid serious problems of implausibility or incoherence. A careful analysis of the implications of non-reductionist views of the agent (event-causal or agent-causal as they may be) reveals that such views necessarily imply either the denial of the principle of supervenience or the assumption of bottom-level indeterminism. I will contend that the former alternative comes at a high cost, while the latter is quite plausible. Therefore, providing that they accept the condition of the truth of indeterminism, non-reductionist accounts of the agent do not have to contradict our scientific worldview. Interestingly, while they should be taken seriously by anyone who is concerned with the passivity of the agent’s role under a reductionist scenario, non-reductivist accounts end up contributing an extra incompatibilist argument to the free will debate.     

Agents,objects, and their powers in Suarez and Hobbes

The paper examines the place of power in the action theories of Francisco Suarez and Thomas Hobbes. Power is the capacity to produce or determine outcomes. Two cases of power are examined. The first is freedom or the power of agents to determine for themselves what they do. The second is motivation, which involves a power to which agents are subject, and by which they are moved to pursue a goal. Suarez, in the Metaphysical Disputations, uses Aristotelian causation to model these two forms of power. Freedom is efficient causation, but in a special form that I explain as involving something that ordinary causation does not – the contingent determination of outcomes. Motivating power is final causation, which Suarez characterizes as the power of a goal or end to move us to attain it through its goodness or desirability. Suarez regards these two forms of power as consistent – we can be moved by the goodness of a goal freely to determine for ourselves that we act in order to attain it. Hobbes denied the existence of all forms of power beyond ordinary causation, the power of one motion in matter to determine another. So he denied the very existence both of freedom and of any form of motivating power beyond the ordinary causal power of desires as materially based psychological states to produce actions. The goodness itself of a goal never moves us, whether to desire the goal in the first place or to act in order to attain it. The paper examines Hobbes’s arguments and their consequence – establishing the foundations for Hume’s scepticism about practical reason.     

Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state

This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as (e.g.) tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while (1) merely preparing, (2) not taking any steps, and (3) the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs (such as tadpoles) are immature frogs, some actions (such as intentions) are immature actions.