Behavioral consequences of intergroup sensitivity

Communication of criticism between groups is important to productive societal discourse, but may serve to inflame conflict. The defensive rejection of intergroup, relative to intragroup, criticism (intergroup sensitivity effect [ISE]) may contribute to such divides. The ISE has been observed in self-report measures, but such measures are weak and biased predictors of actual (divisive) behavior. We review recent research demonstrating that the ISE does have costly behavioral consequences. We next consider the debate concerning whether the ISE reflects defense of a valued social identity or enforcement of a conversational norm. We therefore review recent evidence for an ISE among individuals lacking identification with the target of the criticism. Third, we examine how the ISE may affect a variety of behaviors relevant to societal divisions, including political reconciliation, environmental sustainability, and vaccination. Lastly, we outline future research that can clarify the underlying mechanisms of the ISE and promote conciliatory intergroup behavior.     

Character-Principlism and the Particularity Objection

This paper is a response to particularist critics of the normative force of moral principles. The particularist critique, as I understand it, is a rejection not only of principle-based accounts of moral deliberation and justification, but also of accounts of character in which principles play a central role. I focus on the latter challenge and counter it with a view I call character-principlism .
I begin by discussing in a general way what motivates the particularity objection to principles and then contrast two views – both of which insist on the importance of attentiveness to particularity – about the relative normative status of principles and particular cases. I present some reasons for believing that we need a more normatively robust conception of the role of moral principles than the particularists provide. In the main portion of the paper, I discuss how character-principlism sees principles functioning in our lives and the lives we lead with others. I contrast this with some other accounts of desirable character that particularists can embrace, and argue that these are seriously flawed because, unlike character-principlism, they cannot satisfactorily explain how a person could possess the constancy of character that moral integrity requires.     

计算机控制心理学实验过程的计时误差分析

计算机在控制心理学实验过程中,可能引入各种潜在的计时误差,特别在短时呈现各种实验刺激时,有些误差是不应忽略的。本文重点分析屏幕刷新率对实验设计的限制及可能产生的计时误差和解决方法。     

计算机控制心理学实验过程的计时误差分析

计算机在控制心理学实验过程中,可能引入各种潜在的计时误差,特别在短时呈现各种实验刺激时,有些误差是不应忽略的。本文重点分析屏幕刷新率对实验设计的限制及可能产生的计时误差和解决方法。     

Thought suppression and its effects on thought frequency, appraisal and mood state in individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder

Leading models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) implicate thought suppression as a key factor in the escalation and persistence of the disorder. This experiment examined the effects of suppression on the frequency of obsessional thoughts in 50 individuals with a primary diagnosis of OCD, and also investigated the effects of participants' appraisals regarding their failures in thought control on distress about intrusive thoughts and on mood. Participants' most upsetting obsessional thought was primed and they then monitored its occurrence over two 4-min intervals. In the first interval, half of the participants were instructed to suppress their obsessional thought and half were instructed not to suppress any thoughts. In the second interval, all participants were given the 'Do Not Suppress' instructions. Participants rated their suppression effort and discomfort over thought occurrences after each interval and recorded their appraisals of thought recurrences during the first interval. Mood state was then reassessed. No ironic effect of suppression on frequency was noted. However, negative appraisals of thought recurrences were associated with more discomfort over thought occurrences and more negative mood at Time 2. These findings suggest that interpretations regarding failures in thought control may be of central importance in understanding obsessional problems.     

Cognitive defusion and self-relevant negative thoughts: examining the impact of a ninety year old technique

Cognitive defusion techniques are designed to reduce the functions of thoughts by altering the context in which they occur, rather than the attempting to alter the form, frequency, or situational sensitivity of the thoughts themselves. Applied technologies designed to produce cognitive defusion seem to lead to reductions in the believability of negative thoughts, but defusion techniques are generally only parts of complex packages and the role of defusion techniques per se is note yet known. The present study examined the impact of a cognitive defusion technique first described by Titchener nearly 90 years ago: rapidly repeating a single word. In series of eight single-case alternating treatment designs, this defusion technique was compared to a distraction task, and to a thought control task on reductions in the discomfort and believability of self-relevant negative thoughts. The cognitive defusion technique reduced both discomfort and believability more so than the comparison approaches. Control studies showed that the effect was probably not due to demand characteristics.     

Effects of suppressing neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects: beyond frequency

Recent cognitive-behavioral theories on obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) show that deliberate attempts to suppress intrusive and undesirable thoughts lie at the genesis of clinical obsessions. In this paper the results of an experimental study on the suppression of neutral and obsession-like thoughts in normal subjects are presented. Eighty-seven university students performed in three experimental periods: (1) base-line monitoring, (2) experimental instruction, and (3) monitoring. For each of these periods, the frequency of the occurrence of a "white bear" thought or a personally relevant intrusive thought was registered. Half of the subjects received instructions to suppress the target-thought in period 2, and the other half were instructed to only monitor the target-thought in each of the experimental periods. Several measures were also obtained before and after the experiment: annoyance caused by the intrusion, suppression effort, subjective success, and evaluative appraisals of the target-thought. The results showed neither immediate nor delayed frequency increases of the target thought. However, evidence was found that deliberate thought suppression efforts, regardless of their content, had greater negative consequences than did non suppression. These results are discussed in relation to the recent cognitive proposals about OCD.     

The paradoxical effects of suppressing anxious thoughts during imminent threat

In line with the ironic processing theory of Wegner (Psychol. Rev. 101 (1994) 34), it is often argued that the suppression of anxiety-related thoughts results in a paradoxical increase of anxiety and thought intrusions, both after and during the thought suppression. In a sample of undergraduate students (14 men, 18 women), we investigated the effects of suppressing anxious thoughts about an imminent painful electrocutaneous stimulus. During thought suppression, self-reported anxiety and frequency of anxious thoughts did not increase, and duration of anxious thoughts decreased. After thought suppression, participants experienced an increase in self-reported anxiety and the frequency of anxious thoughts. There was no effect upon thought duration. The results support the idea that suppression of anxiety-related thoughts may result in a paradoxical increase in anxiety, and may cause and/or maintain anxiety problems.     

Suppressing unwanted memories: where there is a will,there is a way?

Research suggests that suppressing unwanted thoughts, generally, is an ineffective thought control strategy, because suppression attempts oftentimes fail, and, furthermore, result in a paradoxical increase of unwanted thoughts, later on. The present study sought to investigate whether manipulated expectations about suppression efficacy determine actual effects of suppression attempts. To test this hypothesis, participants listened to an audiotaped story, and were subsequently appointed to one of four conditions: a no-instruction-control (n = 20), suppression (n = 20), suppression-works (n = 20; participants were told that suppression generally is a fruitful strategy), or suppression-does-not-work (n = 25; participants were told that suppression primarily has paradoxical effects) condition. Two hours later, participants' memories of the story were tested, and several metamemory questions were answered. Induced expectations actually determined the perceived efficacy of suppression attempts, as well as thought frequency, although perceived or actual accuracy of recollections was not affected by the instructions.     

Steep Cliff Arguments

In recent philosophical debates a number of arguments have been used which have so much in common that it is useful to study them as having a similar structure. Many arguments – Searle's Chinese Room, for example – make use of thought experiments in which we are told a story or given a narrative context such that we feel we are in comfortable surroundings. A new notion is then introduced which clashes with our ordinary habits and associations. As a result, we do not bother to investigate seriously the new notion any further. I call such an arrangement, which is perhaps a variation of the fallacy of presumption, a Steep Cliff argument. One remedy for the misdirection of a Steep Cliff argument is to tell a counterstory from the point of view of the rejected notion.