《尚书》、《左传》、《国语》的心理学思想研究

《尚书》、《左传》、《国语》是我国最古老的三部文献。我国古代的心理学思想有不少都可以在其中找到源头。本文主要讨论：《尚书》的五行观念、人贵论和人性论思想、认知心理思想、个性心理思想、心理测验思想;《左传》的情感心理思想、病理心理思想、文艺心理思想;《国语》的缺陷心理思想。     

Behavioral science integration: A practical framework of multi-level converging evidence for behavioral science theories

Several frameworks exist to help science in organizing known information, connecting previously disparate phenomena, promoting understanding, and identifying gaps in knowledge. This paper integrates previous frameworks that have been used in the behavioral sciences to produce a more comprehensive, specific, and complete framework, consonant with the process of scientific discovery as based on multiple, independent, and converging lines of evidence. This multi-level convergence framework is designed specifically for the analysis and understanding of human cognitive/behavioral traits, in contrast to more general frameworks that are designed to be applied relatively widely (such as across all information processing systems or across all biological organisms). This integrated framework overcomes gaps in prior frameworks, provides a more complete picture of the interrelationships between various aspects of the behavioral sciences, and can aid in evaluating theories, both for comparison and identifying gaps in evidentiary support.     

The “impact factor style of thinking”: A new theoretical framework

Over the last few years, university policy in developed countries has placed too much emphasis on assessing publications on the basis of the impact factor. Any scientific material that has not been published in a journal indexed in the Journal Citation Reports is academically irrelevant. Hence, researchers strive hard to publish in such journals. Failure to achieve this means not having a successful career or receiving any academic recognition. A thorough analysis of the effects of this phenomenon on the researcher community leads to the conclusion that the overestimation of the impact factor is likely to cause disappointment among many researchers. Researchers only have two options: adopting a politically correct behavior, that is, following the “impact factor style of thinking”, or accepting the futility of their research regardless of its relevance. This is an example of the involvement of university policy habitus obsessed impact index. O policy impact index is accepted, or is doomed to academic ostracism, and exclusion from participation in all university policy.     

Thinking bigger: The Cronbachian paradigm & personality theory integration

Personality theories largely mirror disparities between fundamental paradigms that guide most psychology: one based upon Galton’s emphasis on inter-individual differences and the lexical hypothesis; the other inspired by Wundt is focused upon intra-individual processes, such as temperament and Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory. Previous integrations of personality models using these paradigms failed to account for observed variance, suggesting model incommensurability. We propose that a broader conception—developed from Cronbach and colleagues’ generalisability theory—provides an effective integrating framework, and show how Galtonian and Wundtian models may be assimilated within Cronbachian approaches. Additionally, Cronbachian models have novel practical implications. Application of the Cronbachian paradigm to personality will be challenging, but provides an opportunity to achieve genuine coherence in personality research.     

Constructs,inferences, and mental measurement

The ‘construct’ concept occupies a significant place in psychology and, yet its role is misunderstood. Psychologists think that theorising in the area of psychological testing involves conjuring constructs, which are operationally defined and measured via psychometric tests. However, the ‘construct’ concept is unworkable and laden with confused philosophical baggage accrued under the hegemony of logical empiricism, and its real function in psychology is obscured. Via an analysis of its history and logic, I expose its flawed conception of the relation between theoretical and observable concepts and the way in which it serves the myth of mental measurement. Finally, it is shown how the actual logic of theorising in science, which entails that theories are best inferred from relevant phenomena, not imaginatively constructed, oppugns this myth and promises to coordinate theoretical concepts with the phenomena to be explained.     

Do lesbian women have a better body image? Comparisons with heterosexual women and model of lesbian-specific factors

Body dissatisfaction is prevalent among women but may be less common among lesbian women. Although research trends toward this conclusion when samples are well-matched and body mass index (BMI) is controlled for, many studies do not exhibit these characteristics. Furthermore, few studies have examined sociocultural contributors to group differences. I addressed limitations of past research with a large community sample of lesbian (n = 479) and heterosexual (n = 400) women. I contrasted the two sexual identity groups on several body dissatisfaction measures, and tested theoretically derived relationships between lesbian-specific cultural factors and body dissatisfaction. As predicted, lesbian women reported lower body dissatisfaction than did heterosexual women on three of four measures, and expressed a larger ideal body size. A structural equation model of lesbian-specific risk and protective factors for body dissatisfaction did not reveal significant relationships. This study represents a first attempt to model culturally specific influences on lesbian body image.     

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p , not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p ? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.     

Affective States and Epistemic Immediacy

This article defends the view that an adequate response to some central epistemological problems requires us to find a role for emotions and other affective states in epistemic evaluation and also to invoke virtuous traits of character in order to explain how these affective evaluations are regulated. The argument is based on the need for some epistemic evaluations to possess a kind of immediacy, if we are not to face a worrying regress. The closing sections support the claim that epistemic evaluation depends upon appropriate character traits though a discussion of what is involved in being observant .