Visible/invisible Herzl. The meaning of portrait and the quest for aniconism

At the end of the nineteenth century Theodore Herzl presented ideas that would embrace the visual arts in order to promote the new Zionist movement. Art was to play an important role in forming Zionist awareness, with Herzl's image expressing the ideas, as well as personifying Zionism and the Jews. However, a part of the Jewish religious community could not come to terms with the fact that Western European art had found its way into Jewish culture, therefore all debates on all visual aspects of Zionism were based on aniconism. This is why, some images of Herzl try to avoid direct visualization of the face, the most notable examples being profile pictures, silhouette images, micrographics, presenting him from behind or in dim light. All these modes of incomplete representation found their justification in traditional Jewish texts relating to the visual arts.     

Theodor Bibliander's Machumetis saracenorum principis eiusque successorum vitae,doctrina ac ipse alcoran (1543) as the Sixteenth-century “Encyclopedia” of Islam

The Machumetis saracenorum principis (1543, second edition 1550), compiled by the Zurich theologian Theodor Bibliander, has long been recognized as one of the most significant texts on Islam published in the Latin West in the Early Modern era. The Qur'an translation it contained (the first ever to be printed) was not superseded for over 100 years. This article explores how the work functions as a whole text in the context of Bibliander's life and theology, with particular attention paid to its paratexts (that is, its framing devices) and organization. Bibliander's compilation is discovered to be a self-contradictory, problematic text. In the sixteenth century, new information on the Turks and their religion did not replace, but rather was placed simply alongside other materials, sometimes substantiating older materials, sometimes directly contradicting them. This ambiguity opened up space for new and different readings while supporting, simultaneously, the received tradition. All of this points to the important transitional nature of the sixteenth century in Christian–Islamic engagement.     

Iconic reading in a case of alexia without agraphia caused by a brain tumor: a tachistoscopic study

The lack of nonverbal reading comprehension in the clinical disconnection syndrome, alexia without agraphia, has been contradictory to the relative reading comprehension of the right hemisphere in split brains. We report a 39-year-old patient with verbal alexia without agraphia caused by brain tumor. On rapid tachistoscopic presentation of object names, he denied seeing anything but showed nonverbal reading comprehension by pointing to the corresponding objects. He lost this ability when he recovered ability to name individual letters of the object names. Our results suggest that even partial verbal reading such as the naming of single letters makes demonstration of iconic reading impossible and that total functional disconnection from verbalization, as initially noted in this case or in split brain studies, is necessary to show nonverbal reading comprehension.     

Commodification in law: ideologies,intractabilities, and hyperboles

In this paper I first aim to identify, from a perspective mindful of both analytic and Continental traditions, the central normative issues at stake in the various debates concerning commodification in law. Although there now exists a wealth of thoughtful literature in this area, I often find myself disoriented within the webs of moral criteria used to analyze the increasingly ubiquitous practice of converting legal goods into monetary values. I therefore attempt to distinguish and organize these often conflated conceptual distinctions across several registers of moral analysis. Second, I formulate what I consider the most illuminating questions regarding the criteria used to evaluate commodification in law. Critiques of commodification in law face what I call problems of ideology, intractability, and hyperbole, and identifying these issues helps to explain the momentum of the law and economics movement.

Off the beaten track: Freud,sound and music.Statement of a problem and some historico‐critical notes1

The authors note that the element of sound and music has no place in the model of mental functioning bequeathed to us by Freud, which is dominated by the visual and the representational. They consider the reasons for this exclusion and its consequences, and ask whether the simple biographical explanation offered by Freud himself is acceptable. This contribution reconstructs the historical and cultural background to that exclusion, cites some relevant emblematic passages, and discusses Freud’s position on music and on the aesthetic experience in general. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship between Freud and Lipps, which is important both for the originality of Lipps’s thinking in the turn‐of‐the‐century debate and for his ideas on the musical aspects of the foundations of psychic life, at which Freud ‘stopped’, as he himself wrote. Moreover, the shade of Lipps accompanied Freud throughout his scientific career from 1898 to 1938. Like all foundations, that of psychoanalysis was shaped by a system of inclusions and exclusions. The exclusion of the element of sound and music is understandable in view of the cultural background to the development of the concepts of the representational unconscious and infantile sexuality. While the consequences have been far reaching, the knowledge accumulated since that exclusion enables us to resume, albeit on a different basis, the composition of the ‘unfinished symphony’ of the relationship between psychoanalysis and music.     

‘Exploding the Limits of Law’: Judgment and Freedom in Arendt and Adorno

In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy of history, and as such sees the question of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but actually unfree subject of modernity.