What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents’ Access to Socially Strategic and Non‐Strategic Information

Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents' socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents' knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times to questions about the knowledge attributed to four different agents--God, Santa Claus, a fictional surveillance government, and omniscient but non-interfering aliens--that vary in their omniscience, moral concern, ability to punish, and how supernatural they are. As anticipated, participants respond more quickly to questions about agents' socially strategic knowledge than non-strategic knowledge, but only when agents are able to punish.     

"Princess Alice is watching you": children's belief in an invisible person inhibits cheating

Two child groups (5-6 and 8-9 years of age) participated in a challenging rule-following task while they were (a) told that they were in the presence of a watchful invisible person (“Princess Alice”), (b) observed by a real adult, or (c) unsupervised. Children were covertly videotaped performing the task in the experimenter’s absence. Older children had an easier time at following the rules but engaged in equal levels of purposeful cheating as the younger children. Importantly, children’s expressed belief in the invisible person significantly determined their cheating latency, and this was true even after controlling for individual differences in temperament. When “skeptical” children were omitted from the analysis, the inhibitory effects of being told about Princess Alice were equivalent to having a real adult present. Furthermore, skeptical children cheated only after having first behaviorally disconfirmed the “presence” of Princess Alice. The findings suggest that children’s belief in a watchful invisible person tends to deter cheating.     

The Supernatural and the Miraculous

Both intention-based and causation-based definitions of the miraculous make reference to the term ‘supernatural’. Philosophers who define the miraculous appear to use this term in a loose way, perhaps meaning the nonnatural, perhaps meaning a subcategory of the nonnatural. Here I examine the aetiology of the term ‘supernatural’. I consider three outstanding issues regarding the meaning of the term and conclude that the supernatural is best understood as a subcategory of the nonnatural. In light of this clarification, I argue that a prominent causation-based definition of the miraculous should be revised so as not refer to the supernatural. I further argue that authors of intention-based definitions of the miraculous need to consider whether or not they should continue to refer to the supernatural, in their definitions of the miraculous, in light of the conclusions discerned here.

Relationships between conspiracy mentality,hyperactive agency detection,and schizotypy: Supernatural forces at work?

We examined whether belief in conspiracy theories is predicted by an overactive tendency to perceive agency in the environment, and hypothesized that this association is especially robust among high-schizotypy individuals. Samples of undergraduates (n = 209) and conspiracist website visitors (n = 37) completed measures of conspiracy mentality, hyperactive agency detection, and schizotypy. Correlation analysis indicated significant positive relationships between all pairs of variables in both groups. Multiple regression analysis showed that schizotypy is incrementally predicted by conspiracy mentality and hyperactive agency detection, with chi-square analysis revealing a significant tendency for high-schizotypal individuals to score higher on both variables. Heightened uncertainty about causally ambiguous subjective experiences likely predisposes schizotypals to greater hyperactive agency detection, thereby increasing the probability of conspiracy thinking. Findings are linked to ideological and theoretical differences between secular and supernatural conspiracist beliefs, which are readily apparent in conspiracist literature and communities, and bring into question the homogeneity of the conspiracy mentality construct.     

Finding everland: Flight fantasies and the desire to transcend mortality

Fantasies and dreams of flight are ubiquitous across cultures and throughout history and often linked to immortality. A perspective derived from terror management theory holds that flight fantasies are appealing because they suggest transcendence of the limitations of creatureliness and mortality. Five studies established the link between mortality concerns and flight fantasy. In Study 1, participants showed greater desire to fly after contemplating death compared to a control topic. In Study 2, participants showed greater desire to fly, but not to engage in other supernatural acts, after contemplating death compared to a control topic. In Studies 3 and 4, participants who engaged in flight fantasy did not subsequently demonstrate defensive reactions to a death reminder observed in nonflight conditions. Study 5 showed that flight fantasy, but not other pleasurable or empowering fantasies, decreased death thought accessibility after mortality salience, and this effect was uniquely mediated by a feeling of freedom from bodily limits.     

Naturalism, Science and the Supernatural

There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment. It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow for the possibility of supernatural entities.

Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness

In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly, I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive than Mumford’s causation-based definition.

Teleology and the intentions of supernatural agents

Teleological beliefs about the natural world often exist implicitly, and there is a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents. In the current study, participants judged a series of scientifically unwarranted teleological explanations of biological organisms and natural non-living objects, under speeded or un-speeded instructions. After controlling for belief in the existence of supernatural agents, rates of implicit (speeded) and explicit (un-speeded) teleological endorsement were moderated by the belief that supernatural agents intentionally interact with the world. Amongst non-religious individuals, rates of implicit endorsement were significantly higher than explicit endorsement, whereas for highly religious individuals the difference was non-significant. This interaction was driven predominantly by explanations of natural non-living objects. These results are consistent with an intention-based theory of teleology, and help to reconcile the finding of a positive relationship between teleological endorsement and belief in supernatural agents, with the those of an enduring teleological bias.     

Cultural Influences in the Aetiological Beliefs of Saudi Arabian Primary Care Patients About Their Symptoms: The Association of Religious and Psychological Beliefs

Objective To develop a self-report questionnaire to measure the beliefs of Arabic primary care patients about the causes of their physical symptoms; to use this to quantify the beliefs of patients consulting their general practitioners (GPs) in Saudi Arabia; and to test whether patients with psychological problems differ from others in their beliefs, particularly religious and supernatural beliefs. Methods Consecutive patients (N = 224) completed a specially developed aetiological beliefs’ questionnaire. Patients were divided into two groups (cases and non-cases of emotional disorder) according to the GHQ-12. Results Religious and supernatural aspects of culture colour patients’ symptom beliefs: that their symptoms were a test or punishment from Allah’ was the most common belief. Even in non-cases, around half the patients also endorsed nerves and stress as a cause of their physical symptoms. Cases were more likely than non-cases to endorse items related to both religious and psychological factors. Conclusion There is no support for the view that Saudi Arabian patients explain symptoms supernaturally as a way of denying psychological factors. GPs and health professionals in Saudi primary care need to understand what patients believe to be the cause of their problems and to appreciate that religious and psychological beliefs are both very common. GPs should address psychological beliefs and concerns even with those patients who present physical symptoms.     

Understanding mortality and the life of the ancestors in rural madagascar

Across two studies, a wide age range of participants was interviewed about the nature of death. All participants were living in rural Madagascar in a community where ancestral beliefs and practices are widespread. In Study 1, children (8–17 years) and adults (19–71 years) were asked whether bodily and mental processes continue after death. The death in question was presented in the context of a narrative that focused either on the corpse or on the ancestral practices associated with the afterlife. Participants aged 8 years and older claimed that death brings an end to most bodily and mental processes. Nevertheless, particularly in the context of the religious narrative, they claimed that certain mental processes continue even after death. This assertion of an afterlife was more evident among adults than children, especially with respect to cognitive processes, such as knowing and remembering. In Study 2, 5- and 7-year-olds were asked similar questions in connection with the death of a bird and a person. Seven-year-olds consistently claimed that bodily and mental processes cease at death, whereas 5-year-olds were unsystematic in their replies. Together, the two studies replicate and extend findings obtained with Western children showing that, in the course of development, different conceptions of death are elaborated—a biological conception in which death terminates living processes and a religious conception in which death marks the beginning of a new form of spiritual existence.