What is it for a Life to go Well (or Badly)?: Some Critical Comments on Wayne Sumner’s Theory of Welfare

In an effort to construct a plausible theory of experience-based welfare, Wayne Sumner imposes two requirements on the relevant kind of experience: the information requirement and the autonomy requirement. I argue that both requirements are problematic. First, I argue (very briefly) that a well-know case like ‘the deceived businessman’ need not support the information requirement as Sumner believes. Second, I introduce a case designed to cast further doubt on the information requirement. Third, I attend to a shortcoming in Sumner’s theory of welfare, namely that it is unclear which of later and informed assessments are to be treated as authoritative when it comes to the evaluation of a person’s welfare. Finally, I suggest that, in combination with ‘welfarism’ (to which Sumner subscribes, and which has it that welfare is all that matters from a moral viewpoint), the information requirement entail morally troublesome conclusions: e.g. the conclusion that, from a moral point of view, we should, other things being equal, only to be concerned with the alternative that makes one person slightly better off in respect of welfare instead of also being morally concerned with the alternative that makes one person very happy.     

Ingroup Bias, Classic Ethnocentrism, and Non-Ethnocentrism Among American Whites

This study collapsed ingroup bias into two types: a classic Sumnerian type, in which favorable perceptions of the ingroup were linked to unfavorable perceptions of the outgroup, and a simple ingroup bias type that consisted of all other instances of ingroup superiority. Simple ingroup bias was the more common type among a General Social Survey (GSS) national probability sample of 1,119 non-Jewish whites who rated Jews, blacks, Asians, and Hispanics on five traits. The two types appear to represent different points on an ethnocentrism continuum; thus, researchers who do not distinguish between them may underestimate the possible impact of ethnocentrism. The generally low levels of classic ethnocentrism did increase for people low in education or high in authoritarianism or social distance. The research also tested an ethnocentrism typology. Many respondents fell into two nonclassic ethnocentrism categories: positivity (where own-group and other-group ratings are both favorable) and neutral matching.     

Mark Twain's life‐long fascination with phrenology

Samuel Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain; 1835–1910), American humorist and writer, followed scientific and medical developments, and relished exposing questionable practices and ideas. In his youth, he pondered how phrenologists were assessing character, and in 1855 he copied sections of a phrenology book and a skull diagram into a notebook. Later, in London, he had two phrenological examinations by Lorenzo Fowler—one without and the other after identifying himself. Following his “test,” which produced contrasting results, he began to ridicule phrenologists and phrenology in Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn, and other works. He underwent at least two more head readings in the United States, and in Eddypus, an unfinished work from 1901 to 1902, he maintained that phrenologists base their insights primarily on how people dress and answer questions. Although now lampooning the craniological tenets of phrenology, Twain never seemed to reject the idea of distinct faculties of mind associated with specialized brain organs.     

Recentering Christian Ethics as Comparative Religious Ethics

The filial relationship between Christian ethics and Comparative Religious Ethics (CRE) need not be perniciously distortive and can be salutary for comparative work. I suggest that the suspicions about CRE as a disguised form of a “Christian ethical enterprise” are overstated and that we can appreciate the value of the legacy of Christian ethics for comparative work in the focal themes of emancipatory criticism and common morality. Both of these themes, even if influenced by Christian ethics, reflect more universal social‐moral problems that can be discerned in cross‐cultural contexts.