Individual differences in reverse Hindsight bias: I never thought something like chernobyl would happen. Did I?

Hindsight bias was studied in the context of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which took place on April 26th 1986. An individual difference factor which relates to the motivation to process information, need for cognition, was expected to moderate the occurrence of hindsight bias. Probability estimates of many casualties due to the use of nuclear power in The Netherlands were obtained from 212 individuals two months before the accident in Chernobyl. These estimates were compared with similar estimates made in hindsight by the same individuals five months after the accident. Loglinear Analyses reveal a systematic hindsight bias. However, the direction of the bias was contrary to expectations. In hindsight, individuals gave lower probabilities than they actually did two months before the Chernobyl accident. These results reveal a reverse hindsight bias. As hypothesized, need for cognition moderates hindsight bias: individuals low and medium in need for cognition express a systematic reverse hindsight bias, while individuals high in need for cognition do not. High need for cognition individuals also show higher literal consistency between the two measurements, which supports a memory explanation of the moderating effect of need for cognition.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Work-family spillover of daily positive affect onto performance: The moderating role of domain identity salience

IntroductionA number of linking mechanisms between work and family domains have been studied, but one key mechanism has received little attention: the cross-domain influence of positive affect on performance.ObjectiveThis study examines the work-family spillover of positive affect at work onto performance in the family and, inversely, of positive affect in the family onto performance at work. Drawing upon the work-family enrichment theory (Greenhaus & Powell, 2006), we hypothesized that work and family identity salience moderate the work-to-family and family-to-work relationships between originating domain positive affect and receiving domain performance.MethodA sample of 124 Canadian workers completed a pre-diary survey and daily surveys during 10 consecutive days.ResultsMultilevel analyses showed an effect of daily positive affect in the family on daily performance at work, but no significant effect of daily positive affect at work on daily performance in the family. Furthermore, family identity salience facilitated the work-to-family and family-to-work spillover, whereas work identity salience had no significant moderating effect.ConclusionThe results extend the happy-productive worker thesis to the work-family interface by highlighting that positive affect contextualized in the family is related to performance at work.     

An evaluation of the reliability of probability judgments across response modes and over time

Despite the importance of probability assessment methods in behavioral decision theory and decision analysis, little attention has been directed at evaluating their reliability and validity. In fact, no comprehensive study of reliability has been undertaken. Since reliability is a necessary condition for validity, this oversight is significant. The present study was motivated by that oversight. We investigated the reliability of probability measures derived from three response modes: numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. Unlike previous studies, the experiment was designed to distinguish systematic deviations in probability judgments, such as those due to experience or practice, from random deviations. It was found that subjects assessed probabilities reliably for all three assessment methods regardless of the reliability measures employed. However, a small but statistically significant decrease over time in the magnitudes of assessed probabilities was observed. This effect was linked to a decrease in subjects overconfidence during the course of the experiment.     

Exploring the set-theoretical structure of objects by additive trees

Arrangements of feature sets that have been proposed to represent qualitative and quantitative variation among objects are shown to generate identical sets of set-symmetric distances. The set-symmetric distances for these feature arrangements can be represented by path lengths in an additive linear tree. Imperfect versions of these feature arrangements are proposed, which also are indistinguishable by the set-symmetric distance model. The distances for the imperfect versions can be represented by path lengths in an additive imperfectly linear tree. When dissimilarities are defined by the more general contrast model and a constant may be added to proximity data, then for both the perfect and imperfect arrangements an additive tree analysis obtains a perfect fit with an imperfectly linear tree. However, in the case of the contrast model also the distinction between the perfect and imperfect arrangements disappears in that also for the perfect arrangements the resulting tree need no longer be linear.The author is grateful to Mathieu Koppen for detailed comments on an earlier version of this article.     

Confidence depends on level of aggregation

The credible intervals that people set around their point estimates are typically too narrow (cf. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). That is, a set of many such intervals does not contain the actual values of the criterion variables as often as it should given the probability assigned to this event for each estimate. The typical interpretation of such data is that people are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments. This paper presents data from two studies showing the typical levels of overconfidence for individual estimates of unknown quantities. However, data from the same subjects on a different measure of confidence for the same items, their own global assessment for the set of multiple estimates as a whole, showed significantly lower levels of confidence and overconfidence than their average individual assessment for items in the set. It is argued that the event and global assessments of judgment quality are fundamentally different and are affected by unique psychological processes. Finally, we discuss the implications of a difference between confidence in single and multiple estimates for confidence research and theory.     

Individual values and well-being: The moderating role of personality traits

This study examined the role of values, traits and their interactions for the experience of eudaimonic and hedonic well-being. First wave studies on value and well-being relationships yielded inconsistent results suggesting that these relationships are moderated by other factors, possibly by personality traits. We asked a representative sample of adult Poles (N = 1161) to report on their personality traits (according to five-factor theory), values (conceptualised by Schwartz) and well-being (hedonic and eudaimonic). Results showed, that higher Extraversion, Emotional stability, Intellect, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were related to higher well-being, confirming and expanding claims from personality theory of subjective well-being: stable predispositions are related not only to subjective, but also to eudaimonic well-being. Values expressing Openness to change, Self-transcendence and Conservation were also positively correlated with well-being, while the role of Self-enhancement was unclear. This confirmed that growth needs expressed in Openness to change and Self-transcendence values promote well-being, but also that values expressing deficiency needs can be positively related to well-being, possibly in specific circumstances. Finally, the two levels of personality (traits and values) proved to have a joint relationship to well-being: higher Conscientiousness and Agreeableness enhanced positive relationships of Openness to change and Self-transcendence with some aspects of well-being.     

The relationship between mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery

Recently there has been an increasing interest in subjective mental illness recovery, and it has been recognised that there is an important role for characteristics such as self-efficacy and locus of control. Mental toughness describes a set of characteristics important for dealing with stress and pressure, and is comprised of challenge, commitment, control of emotion, control of life, confidence in abilities, and interpersonal confidence. The current study explored relationships between mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery. Seventy-seven participants (nineteen males and fifty-eight females, the majority of which were young adults aged 18–21 years) who had previously recovered from, or were currently recovering from a mental illness (self-reported) completed questionnaire measures of mental toughness and subjective mental illness recovery. Mental toughness had a positive significant relationship to recovery, with particular roles for commitment and confidence in abilities. The findings are discussed in terms of implications for recovery-oriented practice, intervention, and measurement. Further research should examine the role of mental toughness in different aspects of subjective recovery, and also explore relationships with objective measures of recovery.     

Direct social perception of others’ subjective time

In this paper, I deploy Gallagher et al.’s theory of Direct Social Perception (DSP) to help explain how we perceive others’ subjective time. This process of second-person temporal perception plays an important role in interpersonal interaction, yet is often glossed over in discussions of intersubjectivity. Using A.D. Craig (2009) ‘awareness’ model of subjective time to unify converging evidence that subjective time is embodied, affective, and situated, I argue that subjective time cannot be considered as a hidden or invisible aspect of a private mind, but is partially externally visible through our gestures, expressions, and other behaviours as they unfold within a particular context. My central thesis is that, in face to face interactions, we are able to directly perceive these visible components of other people’s subjective time. This is made possible by our “enculturated” (Menary, 2015) and enactive perceptual faculties. The process of social perception is not a passive, unidirectional affair where static information about one person’s subjective time is transmitted to the other, but rather inextricably linked with action (both at the personal and subpersonal level) and interaction effects produced by a dynamic coupling between participants. Such an enactive perspective reveals how others’ subjective time can be perceived in everyday interactions.     

Stress and subjective life expectancy: Cross-sectional and longitudinal associations in early adolescence

Using data from a longitudinal study, the present study employed a latent class mover-stayer analytical strategy to examine both the cross-sectional and longitudinal (+33 months) relationship between membership of stress classes, and subjective life expectancy. Participants were from 21 High schools in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Data were collected in the first year of High school (mean age = 12.5 years), and at +33 months (fourth year, or school year 11). Sample 1 consisted of 1171 adolescents (40.82% females, 2.56% unreported) in Northern Ireland. Sample 2 consisted of 1059 adolescents (52.79% females, 1.32% unreported) in Scotland. Adolescents with the lowest levels of stress projected the highest subjective life expectancy scores. Longitudinal analyses were jumbled and not in keeping with cross-sectional results. More research may be needed on the trajectory of subjective life expectancy over time before it can be depended upon as a reliable outcome variable in adolescent development.