The fundamentality of existence and the subjectivity of quiddity

It would not be an overstatement to say that Mulla Sadra’s metaphysical system—commonly known as transcendent philosophy or transcendent wisdom (hikmat muta‘aliyyah)—is founded on the fundamentality of existence and the subjectivity of quiddity or whatness. I will begin this essay by drawing a rather simple picture of this principle under the title “A Common Error.” Then I will proceed by explaining its background and the reasoning supporting it, while offering a more detailed elucidation of the problem. The essay will end by examining two recent interpretations that have gone to extremes in describing quiddity’s subjective nature. This article was written in Farsi specifically for this edition of Topoi and was translated by D. D. Sodagar and Muhammad Legenhausen.

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The fundamentality of existence or quiddity: a confusion between epistemology and ontology

Regarding the exhaustive discussions of the fundamentality of existence versus the fundamentality of quiddity, it is a necessary preliminary to examine and analyze the first documented statement of the fundamentality of existence. Following this, we must inquire how the concept is obtained on the basis of which such a judgment could be formed. Then we must illuminate the meaning of propositions that state only that an object is or exists (ontological propositions). Finally, by explaining the meaning of the words “quiddity” and “existence” and comparing them, indications are found of confusion between epistemological and ontological issues.

RETRACTED ARTICLE: On the illuminationist approach to imaginal power: outline of a perspective

Imagination has always been a mysterious issue for modern philosophy and psychology. In this paper, however, I will not deal with modern theories of imagination; instead, I will suggest an alternative notion of imaginal power by stepping back toward Persian illuminative thought within which we may glimpse a hint of a transcendent concept of imagination as the source of human subjectivity and its power to create the object and the world. My objective here is to extend some noetic aspects of this concept and extract further conclusions theoretically. To this end, I will first introduce a brief account of the noetic characteristic of the Illuminationist perspective of the imagination, then I outline aspects of its efficiency which may shed some light on the modern debate on the subject and its relation to the object.