Aristotle on Pleasure and the Worst Form of Akrasia

The focus of this paper is Aristotle's solution to the problem inherited from Socrates: How could a man fail to restrain himself when he believes that what he desires is wrong? In NE 7 Aristotle attempts to reconcile the Socratic denial of akrasia with the commonly held opinion that people act in ways they know to be bad, even when it is in their power to act otherwise. This project turns out to be largely successful, for what Aristotle shows us is that if we distinguish between two ways of having knowledge (‘potentially’ and ‘actually’), the Socratic thesis can effectively account for a wide range of cases (collectively referred to here as ‘drunk-akrasia’) in which an agent acts contrary to his general knowledge of the Good, yet can still be said to ‘know’ in the qualified sense that his actions are wrong. However, Book 7 also shows that the Socratic account of akrasia cannot take us any farther than drunk-akrasia, for unlike drunk-akrasia, genuine akrasia cannot be reduced to a failure of knowledge. This agent knows in the unqualified sense that his actions are wrong. The starting-point of my argument is that Aristotle's explanation of genuine akrasia requires a different solution than the one found in NE 7 which relies on the distinction between qualified and unqualified ‘knowing’: genuinely akratic behaviour is due to the absence of an internal conflict that a desire for the ‘proper’ pleasures of temperance would create if he could experience them.     

Some Thoughts about the Origins of ``Greek Ethics'

In this paper, I argue that several of the main issues that became a focus for classical Greek philosophy were initially framed by Homer. In particular, Homer identifies a tension between justice and individual excellence, and problematizes the connection between the heroic conception of excellence and ``eudaimonia' (happiness). The later philosophers address the problems raised in Homer by profoundly transforming the way each of these terms was to be conceived.     

Two Sides of Any Issue

Seneca in his Moral Epistles to Lucilium ridicules Protagoras’ claim that both sides of any position can be equally well argued. Cicero, on the contrary, in the surviving fragments of his dialogue, the Republic, maintains in the person of Laelius that the thorough exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of any position pro and con is the best and often the only dialectical avenue to the discovery of difficult truths. There are therefore at least two sides to the issue of whether philosophers ought to address their arguments to the two sides of any issue. This paper examines the epistemic advantages and disadvantages of the same reasoning agent playing both roles of advocate and critic, as opposed to encouraging only distinct independently minded reasoning agents each to consider any of the opposing sides of an issue in dispute. The question in argumentation theory posed by this inquiry in simplest terms is whether a single thinker considering both sides of an issue is more able to arrive at truth, or whether, as the popular adage has it, two minds are inherently dialectically better than one. The answer proposed here is that it does not matter provided that the conflict of opposing views are in some manner resolved with the sincere intention of arriving at the truth.     

The Courage of Conviction: Andreia as Precondition for Philosophic Examination in Plato's Protagoras and Republic

There are at least two apparently conflicting views of courage found in Plato's dialogues: the intellectualist view exemplified by Socrates’s identification of courage with wisdom as found in the Protagoras; and the dispositional view of courage as a natural temperament to overcome fear in situations of danger, the necessary qualification for the auxiliary class in the Republic. In this paper I argue that these views are complementary, dispositional courage being a necessary precondition for the pursuit of the proper human excellence of wisdom. I demonstrate this by considering the role opinion plays in each understanding of courage, showing both that dispositional courage is necessary to ensure that proper opinions be retained in the pursuit of wisdom and that wisdom is necessary to guarantee these opinions are the proper ones. Finally, I argue that not only is this relationship of the two understandings of courage present in the Republic, but even in the Protagoras Socrates’s method of conducting the elenchus betrays awareness on his part of the importance of dispositional courage in the pursuit of wisdom     

RIGHT‐WING POSTMODERNISM AND THE RATIONALITY OF TRADITIONS

Modern thought typically opposes the authority of tradition in the name of universal reason. Postmodernism begins with the insight that the sociohistorical context of tradition and its authority is inevitable, even in modernity. Modernity can no longer take itself for granted when it recognizes itself as a tradition that is opposed to traditions. The left‐wing postmodernist response to this insight (represented, e.g., by Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault) is to conclude that because tradition is inevitable, irrationality is inevitable. The right‐wing postmodernist response (represented, e.g., by Hans‐Georg Gadamer and Alasdair MacIntyre) is to see traditions as the home of diverse forms of rationality. This requires an understanding of the Socratic, self‐critical aspect of intellectual traditions, which include both modern sciences and the great world religions.     

The Good Professor

This paper seeks to provide a philosophical analysis of the features of an excellent professor, but a well-balanced one, professionally speaking. What makes for excellence in research, teaching and service is explored in some detail, with attention paid to the contexts of four-year colleges and comprehensive universities in the united states.     

The Poor Lady Immured

This essay offers cautionary considerations on what has come to be called “public philosophy.” A conception of philosophy is set forth using Socrates as the paradigm of relentless philosophical questioning. The essay then outlines three types of public philosophy: a philosophy situated in a public setting, a philosophy whose content is modified for a varied public, and a philosophy that functions as normative consensus. The most important of these three is the philosophy modified for the public. The discussion notes examples of public philosophy from the history of philosophy, and examines the contribution of eighteenth‐century philosophers (such as David Hume) to a version of public philosophy. The risks of public philosophy are noted—in particular, that a modified philosophy may substitute the inculcation of belief over the modeling of philosophy. The essay concludes by noting that the university classroom remains an important but forgotten venue of public philosophy.     

WISDOM,MODERATION, AND ELENCHUS IN PLATO'S APOLOGY

Abstract: This article contends that Socratic wisdom (sophia) in Plato's Apology should be understood in relation to moderation (sophrosune), not knowledge (episteme). This stance is exemplified in an interpretation of Socrates' disavowal of knowledge. The god calls Socrates wise. Socrates holds both that he is wise in nothing great or small and that the god does not lie. These apparently inconsistent claims are resolved in an interpretation of elenchus. This interpretion says that Socrates is wise insofar as he does not believe himself to know what he does not know. Whether one knows is demonstrated through elenchus, which moderates between knowledge claims. Thus, elenchus is productive of a kind of wisdom even if it does not produce knowledge. This claim, if true, forms a suitable basis for Socrates' defense of himself. That it does so serves as further evidence for the interpretation of sophia as sophrosune.     

The Early Stoics and Aristotelian Ethics

Aristotle's philosophical legacy should be accepted as one of the historical influences that shaped Stoic moral and psychological thought,even if this influence needs to be demonstrated in each individual case rather than be taken for granted in general.Having discussed the methodological issues raised by the state of our documented evidence,I focus upon the particular philosophical agenda bequeathed by Aristotle,the issue of the structure of the human soul,and the theory of character and emotion.I argue that Aristotle's influence upon the Stoics is not only a matter of their adoption of Aristotelian themes or concepts but that,given the aporetic quality of much of Aristotle's writing,they accepted options as discussed,and actually rejected,by Aristotle.In particular,the Stoics have been influenced by deliberations in which Aristotle discusses,adapts or rejects positions associated with the philosophical hero of the Stoics,Socrates (in particular in De an.II,9-10 and EN Ⅶ,1-11).Seen in this light,the Aristotelian legacy appears to be even more relevant to explaining distinctive and in particular Socratic features of Stoic moral psychology than has been previously assumed.     

Socrates questions Gorgias: The rhetorical vector of Plato's “Gorgias”

This essay argues that Plato's Gorgias, a dialogue lauding dialectic over rhetoric, uses a question-and-answer format as a heuristic of argument. Specific observations are advanced to explain the implications of Plato's techniques and to provide a more sensitive understanding of the process by which sought to gain the adherence of his readers.