Dynamic multi-criteria decision making

Most medium-and long-term decision making in industry and government can be viewed as dynamic multi-criteria decision making (MCDM), in which the decision makers are free to alter the emphasis placed on each objective in the light of developing circumstances. In this paper the problem of time-dependent weights in MCDM is discussed and an analysis of empirical data associated with dynamic decision making is presented.     

Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts

Previous research shows that children have difficulties handling intensional contexts even when they can pass a test of false belief (e.g. Cognition 67 (1998) 287; Cognition 25 (1987) 289). Some authors (Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Cognition 25 (1987) 289) place these difficulties in the linguistic and not the mental representational domain. The experiments reported here examined whether 6-year-old children could answer questions in an intensional context that did not require the explicit verbal characterization of a belief. We replicated previous findings and found that children answered according to their own knowledge in an intensional context. This occurred even though they responded by choosing a picture to insert into a protagonist's thought bubble rather than report the belief verbally. Children could correctly answer questions about the knowledge state of the protagonist and pass a test of false belief. Further experiments ruled out methodological explanations. Experiment 2 showed that the difference in answering according to own knowledge between the false belief and intensional stories is not accounted for by procedural factors in the two types of test. Experiment 3 revealed that children did not answer according to their own knowledge by default. Experiment 4 suggested that answering according to own knowledge was not a result of pictorial salience. Results are discussed in relation to the simulation-theory debate.     

Acceptance by athletes of a virtual reality head-mounted display intended to enhance sport performance

While a growing number of studies have highlighted the potential of virtual reality (VR) to improve athletes’ skills, no research has yet focused on acceptance of a VR head-mounted display (VR-HMD) designed to increase sport performance. However, even if technological devices could potentially lead to performance improvement, athletes may not always accept them. To investigate this issue, the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) examines if perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, perceived enjoyment, and subjective norms (i.e., social influence) are positive predictors of intention to use a specific technology. The aims of the present study were to test with competitive athletes the validity of the TAM before a first use of a VR-HMD intended to enhance sport performance and to examine to what extent the level of practice and the type of sport practiced have an influence on the previous variables of the TAM. The study sample comprised 1162 French athletes (472 women, 690 men, M_age = 24.50 ± 8.51 years) who usually practiced a sport in competition (from recreational to international level). After reading a short text presenting the VR-HMD and its interests for sport performance, the participants filled out an online questionnaire assessing their acceptance of this technological device before a first use. The results of the structural equation modeling analysis revealed that perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, perceived enjoyment, and subjective norms were positive predictors of intention to use this VR-HMD, validating the suitability of the TAM for investigating the acceptance by athletes of a VR-HMD designed to increase their sport performance. The results also showed that athletes of all sport levels (a) had a significant intention to use VR, (b) found it quite useful (except for recreational athletes), quite easy to use, and quite pleasant to use, even if their entourage would not encourage them to use it (except for international athletes), and (c) found the VR-HMD easy and pleasant to use whatever the sport practiced. Notably some athletes (e.g., triathletes, swimmers, cyclists) did not find the VR-HMD significantly useful and did not have significant intention to use it to increase their performance. Identifying acceptance by athletes of such a device may increase the likelihood that it will be used by athletes of different levels and from different sports, so that they can benefit from all its advantages related to the improvement of their sport performance. Needs-based targeted interventions may also be conducted toward athletes who might be reluctant to integrate this type of device into their training.     

A unified framework for interpreting a range of motivation-performance phenomena

Effects of motivation on cognition and performance have been found empirically in different fields. However, the relationship between motivation and performance seems complex and multi-faceted. While seemingly inconsistent or incompatible studies and theories of different disciplinary origins exist in this regard, we show that many of them can potentially be synthesized. Simulations within a unifying computational cognitive architecture account for empirical phenomena from different studies, which demonstrate that a mechanistic (computational) account can potentially unify the interpretations of these studies, largely based on utility calculation from intrinsic motives, and allow for further, more detailed explorations.     

A Simple Simulation Technique for Nonnormal Data with Prespecified Skewness,Kurtosis, and Covariance Matrix

We present and investigate a simple way to generate nonnormal data using linear combinations of independent generator (IG) variables. The simulated data have prespecified univariate skewness and kurtosis and a given covariance matrix. In contrast to the widely used Vale-Maurelli (VM) transform, the obtained data are shown to have a non-Gaussian copula. We analytically obtain asymptotic robustness conditions for the IG distribution. We show empirically that popular test statistics in covariance analysis tend to reject true models more often under the IG transform than under the VM transform. This implies that overly optimistic evaluations of estimators and fit statistics in covariance structure analysis may be tempered by including the IG transform for nonnormal data generation. We provide an implementation of the IG transform in the R environment.     

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with—and as extensions of—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.     

Why Doomsday Arguments are Better than Simulation Arguments

Inspired by anthropic reasoning behind Doomsday arguments, Nick Bostrom's Simulation Argument says: people who think advanced civilisations would run many fully‐conscious simulated minds should also think they're probably simulated minds themselves. However, Bostrom's conclusions can (and should) be resisted, especially by sympathisers with Doomsday or anthropic reasoning. This paper initially offers a posterior‐probabilistic ‘Doomsday lottery’ argument against Bostrom's conclusions. Suggestions are then offered for deriving anti‐simulation conclusions using weaker assumptions. Anti‐simulation arguments herein use more (epistemically and metaphysically) robust reference classes than Bostrom's argument, require no Principles of Indifference, abide better by the total evidence requirement, and yet use empirically plausible priors and likelihoods. However, while Doomsday arguments are probabilistically, epistemically and metaphysically stronger than the Simulation Argument, anthropic reasoning can (and should) refrain from embracing either.     

Taking Stock of the Diversity and Sense of Community Debate

Over the past couple of years, a debate has played out in the pages of the American Journal of Community Psychology concerning the relationship between two of Community Psychology's core values: promoting diversity and promoting a sense of community. This special section is to continue a discussion about diversity and community, both among the debate's initial contributors (Alex Stivala, Greg Townley, and Zachary Neal), as well as among others whose own work has touched on these issues (Anne Brodsky, Richard Florida, Jean Hill, and Roderick Watts). In this essay, I address some broad questions that have emerged through this discussion. First, because much has been written on the relationship between diversity and community, both in community psychology and in other disciplines, what do we know, or at least think we know? Second, since the constructs of diversity and sense of community are complex and multi‐faceted, how can definitions get in the way and how can we avoid talking past one another in this discussion? Finally, looking across the original papers that initiated this discussion, as well as the contributions in this special section, what path(s) forward do we have?     

Simulation, projection and empathy

Simulationists have recently started to employ the term “empathy” when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler’s classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding—in particular the understanding of emotional expressions—that are not explicable in terms of simulation-plus-projection routines.