Arguers as editors

People use editorial criteria to decide whether to say or to suppress potential arguments. These criteria constitute people's standards as to what effective and appropriate arguments are like, and reflect general interaction goals. A series of empirical investigations has indicated that the standards fall into three classes: those having to do with argument effectiveness, those concerned with personal issues for arguer and target, and those centered on discourse quality. The essay also sketches the affinities certain types of people have for the different criteria.     

On the processing of arguments

This paper is concerned with the processing of informal arguments, that is, arguments involving probable truth. A model of informal argument processing is presented that is based upon Hample's (1977) expansion of Toulmin's (1958) model of argument structure. The model postulates that a claim activates an attitude, the two components forming a complex that in turn activates reasons. Furthermore, the model holds occurrence of the reason, or possibly the claim and the reason, activates values. Three experiments are described that provide support for the model.This research was supported by the Mellon Foundation and by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the Department of Education via an award for the Center for the Study of Learning to the Learning Research and Development Center. The contents of the paper are not necessarily the position of any of these organizations.     

Is Obama the Anti-Christ? Racial priming, extreme criticisms of Barack Obama, and attitudes toward the 2008 US presidential candidates

This study investigated the impact of subtle racial priming on the persuasive impact of criticisms of Barack Obama in the month prior to the 2008 presidential election. To prime Black or White race, participants wrote a paragraph about a student with a typical Black or White name. They then read editorials that accused Obama of being unpatriotic or being the Anti-Christ, or that listed his positions on major issues. Participants responded to both criticisms with diminished preferences for and more negative beliefs about Obama, but only when African-American race was primed. Interestingly, the Anti-Christ criticism increased preferences and positive beliefs about Obama in the absence of racial priming, suggesting this criticism may have lacked credibility under neutral conditions.     

Peirce’s ‘Prescision’ as a Transcendental Method

Abstract

In this Paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce’s method of prescision as a transcendental method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce’s pragmatism can be interpreted in a transcendental light only if we use a non‐justificatory understanding of transcendental philosophy. I show how Peirce’s prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce’s and Kant’s methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions.     

The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited

According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by presenting data that cast doubt on an assumption underlying all triviality arguments.     

Inter-hemispheric remapping between arm proprioception and vision of the hand is disrupted by single pulse TMS on the left parietal cortex

Parietal cortical areas are involved in sensori-motor transformations for their respective contralateral hemifield/body. When arms of the subjects are crossed while their gaze is fixed straight ahead, vision of the hand is processed by the hemisphere ipsilateral to the arm position and proprioception of the arm by the contralateral hemisphere. It induces interhemispheric transfer and remapping. Our objective was to investigate whether a single pulse TMS applied to the left parietal cortical area would disturb interhemispheric remapping in a similar case, and would increase a simple reaction time (RT) with respect to a control single pulse TMS applied to the frontal cortical area. Two LED were superimposed and located in front of the subjects on the saggital axis. Subjects were asked to carefully fixate on these LED during each trial. The lighting of the red LED was used as a warning signal. Following the green one was illuminated after a variable delay and served as a go-signal. The hand for the response was determined before the start of each trial. TMS was applied to the left parietal, the left frontal cortical areas, or not applied to the subject. Results revealed that: (1) Irrespective of its location, single pulse TMS induced a non-specific effect similar to a startle reflex and reduced RT substantially (15 ms on average) with respect to a control condition without TMS (mean value = 153 ms). (2) Irrespective of TMS, RT were shorter when the right or the left hand was positioned in the right visual hemi-field (i.e. normal and crossed positions respectively). (3) Finally, RT increased when single pulse TMS was applied to the left parietal area and when hands were crossed irrespective of which hand was used. We concluded that interhemispheric sensori-motor remapping was disrupted by a single pulse TMS that was applied to the left parietal cortex. This effect was also combined with some visual attention directed towards the hand located on the right visual hemi-field.     

Challenges to Audi's Ethical Intuitionism

Robert Audi's ethical intuitionism (Audi, 1997, 1998) deals effectively with standard epistemological problems facing the intuitionist. This is primarily because the notion of self-evidence employed by Audi commits to very little. Importantly, according to Audi we might understand a self-evident moral proposition and yet not believe it, and we might accept a self-evident proposition because it is self-evident, and yet fail to see that it is self-evident. I argue that these and similar features give rise to certain challenges to Audi's intuitionism. It becomes harder to argue that there are any self-evident propositions at all, or more than just a few such propositions. It is questionable whether all moral propositions that we take an interest in are evidentially connected to self-evident propositions. It is difficult to understand what could guide the sort conceptual revision that is likely to take place in our moral theorising. It is hard to account for the epistemic value of the sort of systematicity usually praised in moral theorising. Finally, it is difficult to see what difference the truth of Audi's ethical intuitionism would make to the way in which we (fail to) handle moral disagreement.     

On the Meaning of Words and Dinosaur Bones: Lexical Knowledge Without a Lexicon

Although for many years a sharp distinction has been made in language research between rules and words—with primary interest on rules—this distinction is now blurred in many theories. If anything, the focus of attention has shifted in recent years in favor of words. Results from many different areas of language research suggest that the lexicon is representationally rich, that it is the source of much productive behavior, and that lexically specific information plays a critical and early role in the interpretation of grammatical structure. But how much information can or should be placed in the lexicon? This is the question I address here. I review a set of studies whose results indicate that event knowledge plays a significant role in early stages of sentence processing and structural analysis. This poses a conundrum for traditional views of the lexicon. Either the lexicon must be expanded to include factors that do not plausibly seem to belong there; or else virtually all information about word meaning is removed, leaving the lexicon impoverished. I suggest a third alternative, which provides a way to account for lexical knowledge without a mental lexicon.