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Joseph K. Cosgrove 《Zygon》2008,43(2):353-370
Simone Weil is widely recognized today as one of the profound religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Yet while her interpretation of natural science is critical to Weil's overall understanding of religious faith, her writings on science have received little attention compared with her more overtly theological writings. The present essay, which builds on Vance Morgan's Weaving the World: Simone Weil on Science, Necessity, and Love (2005), critically examines Weil's interpretation of the history of science. Weil believed that mathematical science, for the ancient Pythagoreans a mystical expression of the love of God, had in the modern period degenerated into a kind of reification of method that confuses the means of representing nature with nature itself. Beginning with classical (Newtonian) science's representation of nature as a machine, and even more so with the subsequent assimilation of symbolic algebra as the principal language of mathematical physics, modern science according to Weil trades genuine insight into the order of the world for symbolic manipulation yielding mere predictive success and technological domination of nature. I show that Weil's expressed desire to revive a Pythagorean scientific approach, inspired by the “mysterious complicity” in nature between brute necessity and love, must be recast in view of the intrinsically symbolic character of modern mathematical science. I argue further that a genuinely mystical attitude toward nature is nascent within symbolic mathematical science itself. 相似文献
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Philip Browning Helsel 《Pastoral Psychology》2009,58(1):55-63
Simone Weil’s theology is deeply connected to her experiences with chronic pain. Pain is paradoxical in that it is an essentially
private phenomenon yet it simultaneously demands to be shared with another. Weil’s life and thought exemplify both aspects
of this paradox, demonstrating how her pain alienated her from her own body and from others, and how her thought found full
expression as she attempted to share experiences with pain. Weil’s experience of pain was transformed in her passion mysticism,
the deep connection she felt with the crucified Christ. In this connection, the most unbearable aspect of her pain, the threat,
which it presented to her very self through annihilation, was absorbed into the cross and transformed by God’s love. While
this did not necessarily diminish Weil’s pain, the meaning it had for her as a person was transformed through an encounter
with Christ crucified, in which she experienced God’s suffering along with her. 相似文献
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Roberta Maierhofer 《Journal of Aging and Identity》2000,5(2):67-77
Simone de Beauvoir's study on age and aging can be read as an example of feminist scholarship presenting the contradictions and the ambivalence inherent in any topic dealing with women and society. Beauvoir's work both applauded and criticized by feminist scholars offers an important document for addressing the double discrimination based on gender and age, and has been influential in defining a feminist approach to the discussion of gender and age. With the graying of American feminists in the 1990s, age became a concern and Beauvoir's contribution to the area of age studies received recognition as an early contribution to the humanist exploration of the topic of aging. This article surveys interpretations of Beauvoir's work on aging by literary critics, feminist historians, and a gerontologist. 相似文献
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Inese Radzins 《The Journal of religious ethics》2017,45(2):291-308
This essay argues that Simone Weil appropriates Marx's notion of labor as life activity in order to reposition work as the site of spirituality. Rather than locating spirituality in a religious tradition, doctrine, profession of faith, or in personal piety, Weil places it in the capacity to work. Spirit arises in the activity of living, and more specifically in laboring—in one's engagement with materiality. Utilizing Marx's distinction between living and dead labor, I show how Weil develops a critique of capital as a “force” that disrupts the individual's relation to her own work by reducing it to the mere activity of calculable “production.” Capital reduces labor to an abstraction and thereby uproots human subjectivity, on a systemic scale, from its connection to living praxis, or what Weil calls spirituality. Life itself is exchanged for a simulacrum of life. In positioning living labor as spiritual, Weil's work offers a corrective to these deadening practices. 相似文献
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Christopher Thomas 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2020,28(2):145-167
ABSTRACT For Simone Weil the invocation of ‘rights’ to address extreme human suffering–what she calls ‘affliction’–is ‘ludicrously inadequate’. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the ‘cry’ of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil’s concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil’s ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention. 相似文献
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