The development of adaptive competence: Why cultural psychology is necessary and not just nice

I argue that developmental psychologists need to view cultural approaches to cognitive development as necessary and not just nice. Cultural psychology enables one to study problems one otherwise might not be able to study and also to identify solutions to problems that might be obscured or even distorted if one looked only at results within a single culture (usually, one’s own). I describe work my colleagues and I have done around the world addressing specific problems such as what does it mean to be adaptively intelligent in various cultures, how does illness affect intellectual functioning, and what do people even mean by “intelligence” in different cultures. The results show that cognitive development can be fully understood only if one looks beyond one’s own cultural boundaries and preconceptions. The article further argues that a theory of successful intelligence can be a useful way of studying phenomena of intellectual development within a cultural framework.     

Depiction and plastic perception. A critique of Husserl’s theory of picture consciousness

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).

Shaping of rule-governed behaviour

Over an experimental session of 80 trials, subjects counted brief auditory stimuli ("clicks") in stimulus presentation periods and indicated the number counted by pressing a key the corresponding number of times in subsequent response periods. "Correct" answers resulted in feedback. Unknown to the subjects, the feedback criterion was based on speed of pressing rather than on the correct number of presses. Speed of pressing was modified by response consequences when feedback was made dependent on pressing faster or slower than baseline speed. Modification of speed occurred independently of rules and without the subjects' ability to describe contingency or response requirements. The results suggest that non-verbal contingencies may have a shaping effect on non-salient and non-described attributes of rule-governed behaviour, and it is argued that this may be an important control mechanism of low-level behavioural attributes that are unlikely to be guided by verbal discriminative stimuli.